Let us now show what pity is, how men that commiserate others are affected, and what things and persons are the objects of pity. But let pity be a certain pain arising from an apparent destructive and dolorific evil which befals some one undeservedly, and which he who feels this pain, or some one belonging to him may expect to suffer, and this when the evil is seen to be near. For it is evident that he who will commiserate another person must necessarily be one who will think that either himself, or some one belonging to him, may suffer a certain evil, and such an evil as we have mentioned in the definition of pity; or an evil similar or allied to it. Hence, neither do those who consider themselves as utterly lost feel pity; (for they do not think they shall suffer any thing further than what they have suffered) nor those who fancy themselves exceedingly happy; for they insult those that are in calamity. For if they fancy that every kind of good is present with them, it is evident that they must also fancy they cannot suffer any evil; since a security from evil is among the number of goods. Those, however, who are compassionate are such as think they may suffer; and such as have suffered evils; and have escaped them. Likewise elderly men, on account of their prudence and experience. Those that are feeble, and those that are more timid. Also those that are erudite; for they accurately consider the mutability of human affairs. And those that have parents, or children, or wives; for they consider their evils to be their own. Those likewise are compassionate who are not overpowered with anger or confidence; for those that are pay no attention to futurity. And also those who are not insolently disposed; for those that are do not think they shall suffer any evil. But those are compassionate who exist between these. Nor again, are those compassionate who are very timid; for those who are terrified feel no pity, because they are occupied with their own passion. Those likewise are compassionate who think that there are some worthy persons; for he who thinks that no one is worthy will fancy that all men deserve to suffer evil. And in short, a man is compassionate when he is so disposed as to remember that such like evils have happened either to him, or to those belonging to him. And thus we have shown how those who compassionate others are affected. What the things are, however, which they compassionate is evident from the definition. For all such painful and lamentable circumstances as are of a destructive nature, are subjects of commiseration. And, likewise, such evils as fortune is the cause of if they are great. But evils which are lamentable and destructive are, death, stripes, the maladies of the body, old age, disease, and the want of nutriment. And the evils of which fortune is the cause are, the privation of friends, a paucity of friends; (on which account, also, it is lamentable to be torn from friends and familiars) deformity of body, imbecility, and mutilation. It is also a subject of commiseration for some evil to happen there, where it was fit some good should have been done. And for a thing of this kind to happen frequently. Likewise for some good to be present, when no advantage can be derived from it; as was the case with the gifts which were sent to Diopithis from the king of Persia; for they were sent to him when he was dead. It is also a subject of commiseration, when no good happens to any one, or if it does happen, it cannot be enjoyed. These, therefore, and things of this kind are subjects of commiseration. But men compassionate those they are well acquainted with, unless they are very much allied to them; for towards these, when they are about to suffer any evil, they are affected in the same manner as towards themselves. Hence, Amasis, when his son was led to death, did not, as they say, weep; but he wept when he saw his friend beg. For this, indeed, was an object of commiseration, but the former was a dreadful circumstance. For that which is dreadful is different from that which is commiserable, and has the power of expelling pity. It is also frequently useful to the contrary indignation. Men, likewise feel compassion for their familiars when some evil is near them. They also commiserate those who are similar to themselves in age, in manners, in habits, in dignities, and in birth. For in all these it is more apparent that they may suffer the like evils. For in short, it is here also necessary to assume that men feel pity for the evils of others, if they are such as they are fearful may befal themselves. Since, however, calamities which appear to be near, are the subjects of compassion, but such as happened ten thousand years ago, or which will happen ten thousand years hence, as they are neither the objects of expectation nor remembrance, are either not at all the subjects of compassion, or not in a similar degree; hence, those things which are represented by the same gestures, voices and apparel, and in short by the same action as those who were in some calamity adopted are necessarily more pitiable. For they cause the evil which we commiserate to appear nearer, placing it before our eyes, either as that which will be, or which has been. Calamities, likewise, which have recently happened, or which will shortly happen, are for the same reason more pitiable. Signs, also, and the actions which have been employed by miserable men, are pitiable; such as the garments which they have worn, and other things of the like kind. The species, likewise, and whatever else is of a similar nature, of those in calamity, as for instance, of those who are dying, are subjects of commiseration; and especially of those who are in such circumstances are worthy men. For all these things because they seem near, produce greater commiseration; because he who suffers, appears not to deserve these evils, and because the calamity is before our eyes.
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