Aristotle, Politics. Book VIII, Chapter 06


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But we will now show whether it is proper that children should be taught to sing and play upon any instrument or not, which before was considered by us as dubious. It is, however, not immanifest that it makes a great difference, in order to qualify someone in a certain art, if he learns the practical part of it. For it is one of the things impossible, or it is difficult for a man to become a good judge of works which he cannot himself perform. At the same time it is necessary that boys should have a certain exercise; and the rattle of Architas seems well contrived, which is given to children, in order that by using it, they may not break the things that are in the house; for a child cannot be quiet. This, therefore, is well adapted to infants; but education is a rattle to those young persons who are older than infants. That youth, therefore, should be so instructed in music as to be able to practice it is evident from arguments of this kind. But it is not difficult to determine what is becoming, and what is not becoming of their age, or to answer the objections which some make to the study of music as sordid and illiberal. For, in the first place, it is necessary that young persons should practice music, in order that they may be able to judge of it. And on this account it is requisite that they should do this when they are young. But when they become older, they may omit the practical part, since they will be able to judge of what is beautiful in the art, and will be properly delighted with it, through the discipline which they acquired in their youth. With respect, also, to the censure which is thrown by some persons on music, as a thing which renders those who are skilled in it sordid and illiberal, it is not difficult to dissolve it, by considering to what extent those who are to be educated with a view to political virtue, should be instructed in this art, and of what kind of melodies and rhythms they should partake; and also on what kind of instruments they should learn the science of music. For this it is probable makes a difference. For in these the solution of the censure consists; since nothing can prevent certain modes of music from producing those effects which are ascribed to them. It is evident, therefore, that the learning of it should not be an impediment to posterior actions, nor render the body vile and useless for warlike and political employments; but it should be practised by the young, and made subservient to disciplines by those of a more advanced age. The latter of these, however, will be accomplished, if youth are not permitted to labour in those parts of music which are the objects of disputes between the masters in that science, and do not perform such pieces as excite wonder from the difficulty of their execution; and which, from being first exhibited in the public games, have now become a part of education. But they should be permitted to learn as much of things of this kind as will enable them to receive delight from beautiful melodies and rhythms; and not only that delight which music produces in common, both in some other animals, and in a great number of slaves and children.

From these things, also, it is evident what kind of instruments they should use. For neither should they be taught to play on the flute, nor any other artificial instrument, such as the harp, or some other of the like kind, but on such instruments as will make them good judges, either of the discipline of music, or of some other discipline. Farther still, the flute is not a moral instrument, but is rather orgiastic, [or pertaining to the celebration of orgies;] so that it is to be used at those times in which spectacles are rather capable of effecting purification than discipline. To which we may also add, that in the flute there happens to be that which is contrary to education, and that playing on it prevents the use of speech. Hence, the ancients very properly forbade the use of it to youth and freemen, though they themselves used it at first. For becoming more at leisure through their riches, they were also more magnanimous with respect to virtue. And both before and after the Median war, their noble actions so exalted their minds, that they paid attention to every discipline, not giving the preference to any one in particular, but investigating all of them. Hence, also, they introduced the flute among disciplines. For at Lacedaemon, a certain choragus, or master of the choir, himself played on the flute to the choir; and at Athens it was so common, that almost every freeman could play on it. But this is evident, from the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when he was choragus. Afterwards, however, the flute was rejected by them, in consequence of experience having enabled them to form a better judgment of what tended to promote virtue, and what did not. In a similar manner, also, many of the ancient instruments were rejected, such as the magadis, and the barbiton; and those which were calculated to inspire the performers on them with pleasure; and all such as required a scientific hand. What is fabled, likewise, by the ancients concerning the pipe or flute, is very rational. For they say that Minerva, having found it, threw it away. Nor is it ill said that the goddess did this, in consequence of being indignant at the deformity of face which this instrument produces. Nevertheless it is more probable that she rejected it, because the knowledge of it contributes nothing to the reasoning power. But we attribute to Minerva science and art. Since, however, we do not approve of the artificial discipline of instruments, and of the performance on them, but we admit it for the purpose of contests in music; for in these the performer does not play for the sake of improving himself in virtue, but with a view to the pleasure of the hearers, and to gratify their importunity; this being the case, we do not think the practice of it unfit for freemen, but we are of opinion that it is of a more mercenary nature; and that it happens to be confined to sordid and illiberal persons. For the end to which the practice of it refers is bad. For the spectator being importunate is accustomed to make them change their music; so that the artists who attend to him regulate their bodies according to his motions.


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