SINCE, however, it appears that there is the same end to mankind, both publicly and privately, [i.e. to men, both as individuals and as citizens,] and it is necessary that there should be the same boundary to the best of men, and the best polity, it is evident that the virtues which pertain to leisure should exist [in the best polity]. For, as we have frequently said, peace is the end of war, and leisure of business. But those virtues are useful for the purposes of leisure, and for the solace of life, the employment of which consists in leisure, and also those whose employment consists in the privation of leisure. For it is requisite that many necessaries should be present, in order that we may be at leisure. Hence, it is requisite that the city should be temperate, brave, and accustomed to endurance; for, according to the proverb, leisure is not for slaves. But those who are unable to encounter dangers bravely, are the slaves of those who attack them. Fortitude and endurance, therefore, are necessary for the purposes of business; but philosophy for the purposes of leisure; and temperance and justice are necessary in both these times, but especially in the time of peace and leisure. For war, indeed, compels men to be just and temperate; but the enjoyment of prosperity, and leisure in conjunction with peace, are more apt to produce insolence. Those, therefore, whose condition appears to be most prosperous, and who enjoy everything that can make men blessed, require the possession of much justice, and much temperance; as, for instance, those, if there are such persons, who, as the poets say, are in the islands of the blessed. For these especially will be in want of philosophy, temperance and justice, because they in a much greater degree lead a life of leisure, in an abundance of such like goods. It is evident, therefore, why it is necessary that a city, which is to be happy and worthy, ought to participate of these virtues. For as it is a base thing not to be able to make use of what is good, it is still more base not to be able to use it in the time of leisure, but to appear to be worthy when engaged in business and war, but servile when leading a life of peace and leisure. Hence, it is necessary not to cultivate virtue, in the way in which it is cultivated by the city of the Lacedaemonians. For they do not differ from others in not thinking that the same things are the greatest of goods which are conceived to be so by others, but in imagining that these goods are produced through a certain virtue. Since, however, these goods are greater than those of war, it is evident, from what has been said, that the enjoyment of these is greater than that of the virtues, and that it is so for its own sake. But how, and through what means, this will be effected, must now be considered. We have, therefore, by division, before shown, that, for this purpose, nature, custom, and reason, are requisite. Of these, however, we have already determined, what kind of persons they ought to be naturally, [who are fitted for this enjoyment]. It remains, therefore, that we survey, whether they are first to be educated by reason or by custom. For these ought to accord with each other in the most excellent symphony. For it is possible that reason may err from the best hypothesis, and in a similar manner may be led into error through custom. This, therefore, is evident, in the first place, in the same manner as in other things, that generation here is from a principle, and the end from a certain principle of another end. But with us, reason and intellect are the end of nature; so that the generation and the attention which is paid to the manners, ought to be accommodated to both these. In the next place, as the soul and body are two things, so likewise we see that there are two parts of the soul, the irrational, and that which possesses reason; and also that the habits of these are two in number; of which the one indeed is appetite, but the other intellect. As, however, the body is prior in generation to the soul, thus also the irrational is in generation prior to the rational part. But this is evident. For anger and will, and besides these, desire, exist in children as soon as they are born; but reasoning and intellect are naturally adapted to be ingenerated, as they advance to maturity. Hence, the care of the body is necessarily prior to that of the soul, and, in the next place, an attention to appetite is requisite. For the attention paid to appetite is for the sake of intellect; but the care of the body is for the sake of the soul.
The lessons published on this site are freely available to read. If you wish to move from reading to formal study — with graded assessments, academic records, and the support of the Academy — you may enroll at any time. Enrollment is open year round, to students of all ages.
