Since, however, every political community consists of governors and the governed, this must be considered, whether those who govern and those who are governed ought to be different, or the same persons, during the continuance of their lives. For it is evident that education ought to be conformable to this division. If, therefore, men differed as much from each other, as we conceive gods and heroes differ from men, they would immediately in the first place possess a great transcendency in the body; and in the next place in the soul, so that the superiority of the governors over the governed, would be indubitable and apparent. Hence, it would be evident, that it would be better for the one always to govern, and for the other always to be governed. Since, however, this cannot be easily obtained, and kings are not so superior to those they govern, as Scylax says they are in India, it is evident that through many causes it is necessary that all the citizens should similarly in their turns both govern and be governed. For there is the same equality among similars, and it is difficult for a polity to remain which is founded contrary to justice. For all those in the country who are desirous of innovation, will unite with those who are governed, and they will be so numerous in the state, that to be victorious over all these, will be one of the things that are impossible. But that the governors ought to excel the governed, is indubitable. The legislator, therefore, ought to consider how this may be effected, and how all may have a share in the administration. We have, however, before spoken concerning this. For nature has given us the choice, making of all one and the same kind; some, indeed, younger, but others more elderly; of whom it is fit that some should be governed, and that others should govern. But no one is indignant at being governed according to his age, nor thinks that he is superior to it; more especially when he considers that he himself shall receive the same honours which he pays, when he arrives at a proper age. In some respects, therefore, it must be said, that the governors and the governed are the same, and in others that they are different. Hence, also, it is necessary that their education should be partly the same, and partly different. For as it is said, he who intends to govern well, ought first to have been governed. Government, however, as we have said in the first part of this treatise, is either for the sake of him who governs, or for the sake of him who is governed. But of these kinds of government, we say that the former is despotic, and that the latter is the government of freemen. Some mandates, however, differ from others, not in the works [accomplished by them], but in the end proposed. Hence, it is honourable to freemen to perform many works which appear to be of a servile nature, and to be the province of young men. For actions do not so much differ in themselves with respect to being beautiful or not beautiful, as in the end, and that for the sake of which they are undertaken. Since, however, we have said that the virtue of a citizen and a governor is the same as the virtue of the best of men, and that the same person ought first to be governed, and afterwards to govern; this will be the business of the legislator, to consider how the citizens may become good men, through what pursuits this may be effected, and what is the end of the best life. But the soul may be divided into two parts; of which the one possesses reason essentially, but the other does not, yet is capable of being obedient to reason. To these parts, also, the virtues belong, according to which a man is in a certain respect said to be a good man. In which of these parts, however, the end rather subsists, will not be immanifest to those, who divide the soul as we have done. For always the less is for the sake of the more excellent; and this is similarly evident both in the productions of art and nature. But the part which possesses reason is the better part. And this also receives a twofold division, according to the manner in which we are accustomed to divide it. For the one part, indeed, is practical, but the other is theoretic or contemplative reason. It is necessary, therefore, that this part should be similarly divided, and it must evidently be admitted that the actions of it will also have an analogous subsistence. It is also necessary that the actions of the part which is naturally more excellent, should be more eligible to those who are able to acquire them. For always, that is most eligible to every one, the attainment of which is the business of the summit of his nature [i.e. of his intellect]. Every life, however, may be divided into business and leisure, war and peace; and of things which we do, some indeed are necessary and useful, but others pertain to the beautiful in conduct. And with respect to these, it is necessary there should be the same choice, both to the parts of the soul, and to the actions of the parts. Thus, war should be chosen for the sake of peace; business for the sake of leisure; and things necessary and useful, for the sake of the beautiful in conduct. The politician, therefore, in the establishment of laws, should direct his attention to all these particulars, and to the parts of the soul and their actions, but more especially to things of a better nature, and to ends. After the same manner, also, he should direct his attention to the lives of men, and the divisions of things. For it is necessary that men should be capable of business, and of engaging in war, but they ought rather to be fitted for peace and leisure. They should, likewise, be able to perform things necessary and useful, but they ought rather to be able to act beautifully. Hence, both children, and those of other ages, who want instruction, ought to look to these objects as the final end. Now, however, those Grecian states which appear to be the best governed, and the legislators who established these polities, neither appear to have arranged them with a view to the best end, nor to have framed their laws and discipline with a view to all the virtues, but to have eagerly inclined to what is useful and more productive of gain. Some later writers, also, similarly to these, have shown that they are of the same opinion. For praising the polity of the Lacedaemonians, they admire the scope of the legislator, because he has established every thing with a view to victory and war; which opinion may be easily confuted by reason, and is at present confuted by facts. For as most men desire to have despotic power, in order that they may have an abundant supply of the goods of fortune; thus, also, Thibron appears to have admired the legislator of the Lacedaemonians, and also others, who have written on their polity, because the Lacedaemonians have obtained an extensive command, through being exercised in dangers; though it is evident, that since the Lacedaemonians are now no longer in possession of the supreme power, they are not happy, nor was their legislator a good one. Further still, this also is ridiculous, that while remaining in obedience to their laws, and no one hindering their being governed by them, they lost the means of living happily. But neither do they rightly apprehend what the government is which ought to reflect honour on the legislator. For a government of freemen is better, and more conformable to virtue, than despotic dominion. Again, it is not proper to think that a city is happy, or to praise a legislator, because the people have been trained so as to conquer their neighbours; for this is attended with great inconvenience. For it is evident that every citizen, who is able, will endeavour to obtain the supreme power in his own city; for which the Lacedaemonians accuse king Pausanias, though he was so greatly honoured by them. Neither, therefore, is any one of such reasons and laws, political, useful or true. For those reasonings and laws, which are the best, ought to be inserted by the legislator in the souls of men, both privately and publicly. It is not proper, however, to pay attention to warlike exercises for the sake of enslaving those who do not deserve to be made slaves; but in order that the people, in the first place, may not be enslaved by others; in the second place, that they may endeavour to obtain the supreme power, for the sake of benefitting those that are governed, and not for the sake of despotic sway over all; and, in the third place, that they may rule despotically those who deserve to be in a state of slavery. Facts, indeed, concur with arguments in showing that the legislator should principally endeavour that what pertains to war, and the rest of legislation, should be arranged with a view to leisure and peace. For the greater part of such cities, [as that of the Lacedaemonians,] are preserved by war, but when they have obtained dominion over other states, are destroyed. For during peace, like iron, they lose their brightness. But the legislator is the cause of this, who never instructed them so as that they might be able to be at leisure.
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