We must speak, however, concerning a polity itself, and show from what kind of people a city ought to consist that is to be happy and well-governed. But there are two things on which the well-being of everything depends, one of which is, that the scope and the end of actions should be rightly established; and the other consists in discovering the actions tending to the end. For it is possible that these may be discordant and concordant with each other; since, sometimes, the scope indeed may be good, but the actions may be erroneous through which it is obtained. And at other times, all that refers to the end may be possessed, but the end proposed may be bad; and sometimes there may be an error in both. Thus, in the art of medicine, the physician does not sometimes know in what condition the body ought to be to be healthy, nor does he employ things effective of the proposed end. It is necessary, however, in arts and sciences, that both these should be obtained, viz. the end, and the actions which refer to the end. That all men, therefore, desire to live well and to be happy is evident; but some have the power of obtaining these, and others have not, through a certain fortune or nature. For to a happy life a certain supply is requisite; but less of this is necessary to those who are well-disposed, and more of it to those who are badly disposed. Others, however, immediately search for felicity erroneously, though they have the power of obtaining it. Since, however, we propose to survey the best polity, and this is that according to which a city is governed in the best manner; but the city is governed in the best manner which is most eminently happy; this being the case, it is evident that we ought not to be ignorant what felicity is. We have said, however, in the Ethics, if any use may be made of what is there asserted, that felicity is the energy and perfect use of virtue; and this not from hypothesis, but simply. But when I say from hypothesis, I mean by this, things that are necessary; and by simply, I mean what is good and beautiful. Thus, for instance, just revenge and punishments with respect to just actions, proceed, indeed, from virtue; but they are necessary, and they are necessarily good and beautiful. It is, indeed, more eligible that neither any man nor city should be in want of things of this kind. But those actions which tend to honours and wealth, are simply the most beautiful. For the other, indeed, [viz. just revenge and punishments with respect to just actions] are the choice of a certain evil; but, on the contrary, such actions as these are the means of procuring and producing good. A worthy man, likewise, will use poverty, disease, and other unfortunate casualties well; but a blessed condition of life consists in the contraries to these. For this has been determined by us in the Ethical treatises, that the worthy man is one to whom things simply good are good on account of virtue. But it is evident that the using these things after this manner, is simply good and beautiful. Hence, men are of opinion that external goods are the causes of felicity; just as if some one should think that the playing splendidly and well on the lyre, is more owing to the instrument than to the art. It is necessary, therefore, from what has been said, that some things should exist independent of the legislator, and that others should be procured by him. Hence, we wish that a city may be constituted so as to possess those things of which fortune is the mistress. For we admit that she is the mistress [of external goods]. But for a city to be worthy is no longer the work of fortune, but of science and deliberate choice. Moreover, a city is worthy, through the citizens which partake of the polity being worthy. In the city, however, which we wish to establish, all the citizens have a share in the administration. Hence, this must be considered by us, how a man becomes worthy. For if it were possible for all men to be worthy, and not some individuals only, it would thus be more eligible; since then it would follow that what might be done by an individual, might be done by all. Men, however, become good and worthy through three things. But the three things are these, nature, custom, and reason. For, in the first place, it is necessary to be born a man, and not any other animal. In the next place, the body and the soul should be of a certain quality. But it is of no advantage to be only born with some things; for custom produces mutations. For there are some things which have naturally a twofold aptitude, and through custom tend to the better and the worse. Other animals, therefore, principally live from nature, and in a certain few things from custom; but man lives by reason; for he alone possesses reason. Hence, it is necessary that these should accord with each other. For men do many things contrary to custom and nature through reason, if they are persuaded it is better thus to act. We have, therefore, before determined what kind of persons men ought naturally to be, who will readily obey the legislator. Hence, what now remains for us is the discussion of education. For some things are learnt through being accustomed to them, and others by hearing them.
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