These things, therefore, being premised, as we have before surveyed other politics, it remains that we should show what the fundamental principles ought to be of a city which is to be established conformably to the wish [of the politician]. For it is not possible for the best polity to be formed without a commensurate supply [of what is necessary.] Hence, it is requisite that many things should be pre-supposed as the objects of desire; though none of them should be such as are impossible. I mean, for instance, such things as pertain to the number of the citizens and the extent of the territory. For as other artificers, such as the weaver and the shipwright, ought to have materials adapted to their work; since in such proportion as these are better, the work produced by art will necessarily be more excellent; thus, also, it is requisite that the politician and legislator should have a proper matter appropriately subsisting. But the first of all political supplies is the number of the people, and a knowledge of how many and what kind of persons they ought naturally to be; and in a similar manner with respect to the country, how large, and what the quality of it ought to be. Most persons, therefore, think that a happy state ought to be a large city. If, however, this be true, they are ignorant what kind of a city is large, and what kind is small; for they form a judgment of the magnitude of a city from the multitude of its inhabitants. It is necessary, however, rather to look to the power of a city than its numbers. For there is, also, a certain work of a city; so that the city which is most able to accomplish this work ought to be considered as the greatest; just as some one might say, that Hippocrates was a greater physician, though not a greater man, than one who exceeded him in the size of his body. Moreover, if it were requisite to determine the magnitude of a city by looking to the number of its inhabitants, this must never be determined from a casual multitude; for it is, perhaps, necessary in cities that there should be a number of slaves, sojourners, and foreigners; but from those who are [truly] a part of the city, and from whom, as appropriate members, the city consists. For the excess of a multitude of these is an indication of a large city. But it is impossible for the city to be great in which those who are engaged in sordid occupations are numerous, and the soldiers are few; for a great city and a multitude of inhabitants are not the same thing. Moreover, it is evident from facts that it is difficult, and perhaps it is impossible, to govern properly a very numerous body of men. Of all the polities, therefore, which appear to be well-governed, we do not see that any one of them is excessively populous. And this is also evident from the credibility derived from arguments. For law is a certain order, and good legislation is necessarily good arrangement. But a number excessively great cannot partake of order; for this is the work of that divine power which comprehends this universe. Beauty, indeed, usually consists in multitude and magnitude; and, therefore, a city, whose boundary is such as we have mentioned, accompanied with magnitude, is necessarily the most beautiful; yet there is a certain measure of magnitude to cities, in the same manner as to all other things, to animals, plants, and instruments. For each of these possesses its proper power, when it is neither very little, nor excessively great; but when, in short, these are deprived of their nature, then they are in a bad condition. Thus, for instance, a ship which is only a span in length, will not be a ship, nor yet one of two furlongs in length; but when it arrives to a certain magnitude, at one time through its smallness, and at another through its excessive largeness, it will cause the navigation to be bad. In like manner, also, a city, if it consists of very few inhabitants, will not be sufficient to itself; but a city is sufficient to itself; or if it consists of a very great multitude, it will be sufficient to itself, indeed, in things necessary, in the same manner as a nation, but then it is not [properly] a city; for it will not easily become a polity. For who will be the general of a multitude excessively great, or who but a Stentor will be the herald? Hence, that is necessarily the first city, which consists of such a multitude of inhabitants as is sufficient for the purposes of a happy life according to political communion. It happens, also, that the city which exceeds this multitude in number, is a larger city. This multitude, however, [which is sufficient for the purposes of a happy life,] is not, as we have said, indefinite. But from works it is easy to see what are the boundaries of excess. For the actions of cities are the actions of those that govern, and of those that are governed. But the work of the governor is to command and judge. In order, however, to determine causes with justice, and appoint the magistrates according to their desert, it is necessary that the citizens should know the characters of each other; so that where this does not happen to take place, what pertains to magistrates and judicial processes, must necessarily be badly managed. For in each of these it is not right to proceed hastily, which, where there is a very great multitude of citizens, must necessarily be the case. Again, it will be easy for strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens, as it will not be difficult for them to remain concealed on account of the exceedingly great number of inhabitants. It is evident, therefore, that the best boundary of a city is a multitude of inhabitants, so great as to be obviously adequate to the purposes of a life sufficient to itself. After this manner, therefore, let the magnitude of a city be determined.
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