But we will now speak to those who acknowledge, indeed, that the life accompanied with virtue is most eligible, but differ with respect to the use of it. For there are some, indeed, who disapprove of political government, thinking that the life of a free man is different from the life of a citizen, and is of all others the most eligible; but others think that the life of a citizen is the best. For, according to them, it is impossible that he who does nothing should act well; but to act well and felicity are the same thing. Both these, however, partly say what is right, and partly what is not right. Those, indeed, assert what is right who say, that the life of a free man is better than the life of him who is despotically governed; for this is true. For there is nothing venerable in employing a slave, so far as he is a slave; since the mandate pertaining to things necessary, in no respect partakes of the beautiful. To think, however, that all government is despotic is not right. For the government of freemen differs no less from that of slaves, than that which is by nature free, differs from that which is by nature a slave. This, however, has been sufficiently discussed by us in the former part of this treatise. But to praise inaction more than action is not right; for felicity is action. Farther still, the actions of just and wise men have many and beautiful ends; though perhaps these things having been thus determined, some one may apprehend, that supreme power is the best of all things; for thus a man will be the lord of the greatest number, and the most beautiful actions. Hence, he who can obtain the power of governing, ought not to yield it to another, but should rather seize it, and neither a father should in this respect pay any attention to his children, nor children to their father, nor, in short, one friend to another. For that which is best is most eligible; but to act well is that which is best. This, therefore, perhaps would be truly said by them, if that which is the most eligible of all things was present to those who plunder and use violence to others. Perhaps, however, it is not possible that it should; and it is falsely supposed to be so. For it is no longer possible that such actions should be beautiful, [i.e. the actions of those who assume the supreme power over others,] unless those who assume this authority differed as much from others as a man from a woman, a father from his children, and a master from his slaves. Hence, he who thus deviates from rectitude, can never afterwards act with a rectitude so great, as is his deviation from virtue. For among similars, the beautiful and the just are reciprocal; since this is equal and similar. But for equals not to partake of the equal, and for similars not to partake of the similar, is contrary to nature. Nothing, however, which is contrary to nature is beautiful. Hence, if there is some one who is superior in virtue, and in the power of performing the most excellent things, this man it is beautiful to follow, and him it is just to obey. It is necessary, however, that not only virtue, but also power should be present, according to which such a man will be able to act. But if these things are well said, it must be likewise admitted that felicity consists in acting well, and a practical or active life will be the best both in common for every city, and privately for every individual. The practical life, however, does not necessarily refer to others, as some think it does; nor are those discursive energies of the soul alone practical, which are for the sake of those things that result from acting, but this is much more the case with those self-perfect contemplations and discursive energies, which subsist for their own sakes. For acting well is an end; so that a certain action also is an end. But we especially say that those persons act and are the lords of external actions, who contrive the plans which others execute. Moreover, neither is it necessary that those cities which have no intercourse with others, and which deliberately choose thus to live by themselves, should remain inactive; for it is possible that the parts of them may have mutual intercourse; since there are many communications of the parts of a city with each other. And in a similar manner, this is true of every individual of the human species. For, was it otherwise, scarcely would divinity and the whole world possess a happy condition of being, who, besides their proper energies, have no external actions. It is evident, therefore, that the same life is necessarily the best for every individual man, and in common for cities and citizens.
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