Aristotle, Politics. Book VII, Chapter 02


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It now remains for us to say, whether the felicity is the same of one individual man and a city, or it is not the same. But this also is evident; for all men will confess that it is the same. For those who admit that the felicity of one man consists in wealth, these also must admit that a whole city is blessed if it is opulent. And those who especially honour a tyrannical life will say, that the city whose dominion is the most extended is the most happy. If any one, likewise, admits a man to be happy through virtue, he will also say that the city which is more worthy is more happy. Here, however, there are two things which require consideration; one indeed, whether the life is more eligible which subsists through being a member of the community, and partaking of the city, or rather that which consists in living as a stranger, separated from political society. And again, what polity, and what disposition of a city, are to be considered as the best; whether the whole community should be eligible to a share in the administration; or not some persons, but the greater part. Since, however, this is the work of political reasoning and speculation, and not that which is eligible to each individual; but we at present prefer the consideration of this, that indeed will be foreign to our purpose, but this will be the business of the present discussion. It is evident, therefore, that the most excellent polity is necessarily that in which any one may have it in his power to act in the best manner, and to live blessedly. It is, however, dubious with those who acknowledge that the life accompanied with virtue is most eligible, whether the political and practical life is eligible, or rather that which is liberated from all external concerns, such as is the contemplative life, which some persons say is alone the life of a philosopher. For nearly those men who have been most ambitious of becoming virtuous, appear to have preferred these two lives, both formerly and now. But I mean by the two, the political and the philosophic life. The manner, however, in which the truth subsists makes no small difference. For it is necessary that an individual separately, and a polity in common, should, if they are truly wise, have the better object in view. But some are of opinion that a tyrannic government over those that are near us, is accompanied with the greatest injustice; and that a political one is not unjust, but is an impediment to the felicity and tranquillity of life. Others, however, are of a contrary opinion; for according to them a practical and political life is the only life adapted to man; since actions pertaining to each of the virtues are not in a greater degree performed by private persons, than by those who are engaged in public life, and in the management of the state. Some, therefore, are of this opinion, but others say that the tyrannical and despotic mode of government is the only happy one. And in some polities the object of the laws is to rule despotically over their neighbours. Hence most legal institutions, wherever dispersed, if they have any one common object in view, have all of them, as I may say, this, to govern. Thus, in Lacedæmon and Crete, both the education and the multitude of the laws are nearly arranged with a view to war. Farther still, in all nations, those who are able to reduce others to servitude, are honoured on that account; as is evident among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls. In some nations, also, there are laws for the purpose of stimulating this virtue, as in Carthage. It is said that every person is allowed to wear as many rings as he has served campaigns. There was, likewise, a law in Macedonia, that the man who had not himself killed an enemy, should be obliged to wear a halter. But among the Scythians, at a festival, no one was permitted to drink out of the cup which was carried about who had not killed an enemy. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, as many columns were fixed on the tomb of a man as he had slain enemies. And among different nations different things of this kind prevail; some of them being established by law, but others by custom. Perhaps, however, it may seem to be very absurd to those who are willing to take this subject into consideration, to enquire whether it is the work of a politician to be able to survey how a state may govern, and despotically rule over its neighbours, whether they are willing or unwilling [to be so governed]. For how can that be either political or legislative which is not legal? But it is not legal, not only to govern justly, but also unjustly; for it is possible to conquer unjustly. We do not, however, see this in the other sciences. For it is not the province either of the physician or the pilot, to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to his passengers. Many persons, however, seem to think that a despotic is a political government; and that which they do not admit to be just and advantageous for themselves, they are not ashamed to exercise over others. For they endeavour to be justly governed themselves, but pay no attention to the justice which belongs to others. But a despotic power is absurd, except where one party is formed by nature for dominion, and the other for subordination. Hence, if this be the case, it is not proper to endeavour to govern all men despotically, but those only who are adapted to be so governed; as neither is it proper to hunt men, either for food or sacrifice, but that which is adapted to be hunted; and this is a wild animal, or an animal which is fit to be eaten. Moreover it is possible for one city to be happy in itself, viz. if it is governed well; though it should happen to be so situated as to have no connection with any other state, while it used good laws, and its constitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for then it would have no occasion for these. It is evident, therefore, that all the attentions which are paid to war must be admitted to be beautiful, not as the highest end of all things, but as the means of procuring this end. But it is the business of a worthy legislator to survey the city, and the kind of men that inhabit it, and every other communion, and how the people may partake of a good life, and the felicity attendant upon it. Some legal institutions, however, differ from others; and this is the province of the legislative science, to see, if there are any neighbouring states, what mode of conduct is to be observed towards them, and how each should make use of each. What the end is, however, which the best polity should endeavour to attain, will be considered by us hereafter.


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