It is necessary that he who proposes to make an appropriate inquiry concerning the best polity, should, in the first place, determine which is the most eligible life. For this being immanifest, the most excellent polity must, also, necessarily be immanifest. For it is reasonable to suppose that those will act in the best manner, according to their circumstances, who are governed in the best way, if nothing unexpectedly happens. Hence it is requisite to know, in the first place, what the life is which, as I may say, is the most eligible to all men. And, in the next place, whether the same, or a different, life is most eligible, both to the community and an individual. As I think, therefore, that I have sufficiently said many things concerning the best life in my exoteric [or popular] discourses, I shall employ what I have said on this subject here. For, in reality, no one would oppose one of the divisions, viz. that since there are three kinds of good, that which pertains to externals, that which pertains to the body, and that which pertains to the soul, all these ought to be present with men that are blessed. For no one would call him blessed who had no portion of fortitude, or temperance, or justice, or prudence, but feared the flies that flew round him; nor him who did not abstain from the most contemptible things, if he desired to eat or drink; nor him who, for the sake of a farthing, would murder his dearest friends. And, in a similar manner, no one would call him blessed who is so stupid and deceived in things pertaining to his reasoning power as to resemble a child or a madman. But all men will acknowledge these things to be evident; though they disagree as to the quantity and excess of them. For they think, indeed, that the possession of any portion of virtue is sufficient; but of wealth, and property, and power, and fame, and every thing of this kind, they endeavour to procure an infinite excess. We, however, say to them, that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us concerning these things, that men do not acquire and preserve the virtues by external goods, but external goods by the virtues. We also see from experience, that a happy life, whether it consists in joy or in virtue, or in both, is in a greater degree present with those whose manners and reasoning power are adorned in excess, but whose possession of external goods is moderate, than with those who possess more of things of a useful nature, but are deficient in the goods of the mind. The truth of this, likewise, may easily be perceived by those who consider it rationally. For external goods have an end, like a certain instrument; and every thing useful is of such a nature, that the excess of it is either necessarily hurtful, or is of no advantage to its possessor. But with respect to the goods pertaining to the soul, each of these increases in utility in proportion to its excess; if it is proper to call these not only beautiful, but also useful. In short it is evident that the best dispositions of things are with reference to each other, such as are the excesses of the things themselves, by which they differ from one another. Hence, if the soul is more honourable, both than external possessions and the body, simply, and with reference to us, it necessarily follows, that the best disposition of each must have the same analogy. Again, these things are naturally adapted to be eligible for the sake of the soul; and it is necessary that all truly wise men should choose them on this account, and not the soul for the sake of them. Let it, therefore, be granted to us, that every one enjoys as much of felicity as he possesses virtue and prudence, and acts according to their dictates, employing God himself as a witness of the truth of this;
WHO IS HAPPY AND BLESSED, YET NOT THROUGH ANY EXTERNAL GOOD, BUT HIMSELF THROUGH HIMSELF, AND BECAUSE SUCH IS HIS NATURE;
since good fortune, also, is on this account something different from felicity. For the causes of the external goods of the soul are chance and fortune; but no one is just or temperate through fortune. Hence it follows from the same reasoning, that the best city, and which acts well, is happy. But it is impossible for those to do well who do not act well; and there is no beautiful deed, either of a man, or of a city, without virtue and prudence. The fortitude, however, justice, and prudence of a city, have the same power and form as they have when participated by individuals. And thus much by way of introduction. For neither is it possible to avoid touching on this subject, nor does the present treatise allow me to go through a complete investigation of it, as it belongs to another discussion. At present, therefore, let so much be admitted, that the best life, indeed, both separately to an individual, and in common to cities, is a life accompanied with virtue, and so far supplied with external goods, as to be able to perform virtuous actions. If, however, there are any who are not convinced by what has been said, their doubts shall be considered hereafter, since we shall now proceed, according to our intended method.
The lessons published on this site are freely available to read. If you wish to move from reading to formal study — with graded assessments, academic records, and the support of the Academy — you may enroll at any time. Enrollment is open year round, to students of all ages.
