Since, however, there are principally four parts of the multitude, viz. husbandmen, sordid artificers, tradesmen, and hirelings; and as there are also four kinds of people who are useful in war, viz. the horsemen, the heavy-armed soldiers, the light-armed, and sailors;—this being the case, where it happens that the country is adapted to horsemen, there a powerful oligarchy may be easily established; for the safety of the inhabitants is derived from the power of the horse. The nurture of horses, however, belongs to men of great property. But where the troops are heavy-armed, there the oligarchy next to this in order may be established; for the heavy-armed rather consist of rich men than of the poor. And the light-armed force, and sailors, form an entirely democratic power. At present, therefore, where there is a great multitude of such kind of people, when a sedition arises, they frequently fight in an inferior manner. It is necessary, however, that a remedy for this evil should be obtained from warlike generals, who appropriately mix the light-armed soldiers with the horse and the heavy-armed; for by this means the people in seditions obtain a superiority over the rich; since these being lighter easily contend with the horse and the heavy-armed. Hence, for an oligarchy to establish a force from these, is to establish a force against itself. It is necessary, however, by distinguishing the different ages of the citizens, since some of them are elderly, but others young men, that the fathers should teach their sons while they are young, light and easy exercise, but when they are grown up they should be perfect in all the employments of war. The admission, also, of the people to a share in the government, should either be regulated as was before observed, by a census; or else, as at Thebes, it should be allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased from sordid occupations; or as at Messalia, where they are chosen according to their worth, whether they are citizens or foreigners. And with respect to magistrates of the highest rank, which it is necessary to have in a state, it is requisite that the services which they are to perform for the public good should be laid down, in order that the common people may not be willing to have any share in them, and that they may be favourable to the magistrates, when they know what a price they pay for their honours. It is likewise fit that the magistrates on entering into their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices, and erect some public structure, in order that the people, by partaking of the entertainment, and seeing the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public buildings, may perceive with pleasure the stability of the government. It will also happen that the costly donations of the nobles will be recorded. This, however, is not done at present in oligarchies, but the very contrary. For the leading men are no less desirous of gain than of honour. On which account such oligarchies may be fitly called little democracies. And thus we have shown how democracies and oligarchies ought to be established.
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