It is also the business of the legislator and of those who wish to establish such a polity as this, not to make it the greatest of works, or the only one, but rather to endeavour that it may be preserved; for it is not difficult for it to remain one, or two, or three days, in whatever manner it may be governed. Hence, it is necessary to endeavour to procure its safety by all those means which we have mentioned, in assigning the causes of the preservation and destruction of polities; avoiding, indeed, things which corrupt it, but establishing such laws both written and unwritten, as especially contain those things which are the preservation of polities; and not supposing that to be either democratical or oligarchical which particularly causes a city to be governed democratically or oligarchically, but that which causes them to endure for the longest time. But the demagogues of the present day, gratifying the people, occasion many confiscations in the courts of justice. Hence, it is necessary that those who are concerned for the welfare of the polity should act in a manner contrary to what they do, and establish a law to prevent forfeitures from being divided among the people, or paid into the treasury, and to have them appropriated to sacred purposes. For those who act unjustly would not then be at all less cautious; since they would be similarly punished. But the mob would be less anxious to condemn those who were judged by them, as they would gain nothing by it. Farther still, the causes which are brought before the public should be made as few as possible, and those who rashly bring an action against any one should be punished severely. For it is not usual to prosecute the common people, but the nobles. It is likewise necessary that all the citizens in the polity should in the greatest degree be benevolently disposed towards each other; but if they are not, at least they should not consider those who have the chief authority in the state as their enemies. Since, however, the last species of democracies consist of a great multitude of men, and it is difficult to get the common people to attend the public assemblies unless they are paid for it, this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is hostile to the nobles. For the deficiencies therein must necessarily be made up by taxes, confiscations and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice; which things have already subverted many democracies. Hence, where there are no revenues, there ought to be but few public assemblies and courts of justice. And they should take into consideration, indeed, many things, but should continue sitting for a few days only. For by this means the rich will not be afraid of the expense, if they should receive nothing for their attendance, but the poor did. Judgement also would thus be given much better. For the rich are not willing to be absent in any days from their own affairs; but they will willingly be so for a short time. But where there are revenues, that should not be done which the demagogues now do; for they divide the surplus of the public money among the poor, and the poor receive, and again want the same supply. For such kind of assistance to the poor is a perforated vessel. It is requisite, however, that he who is truly a friend to the people should take care that the multitude are not too poor; for this is the cause of a democracy being depraved. It must, therefore, be contrived that there may be a lasting abundance. And since this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the public money should be collected together, and then distributed at once among the poor; especially if some one is able to collect as much as is sufficient to purchase a little field for each poor person; but if this cannot be done, a sum should be given to each sufficient to procure the implements of trade and husbandry. But if there is not enough for all to receive so much at once, then the money should be distributed according to tribes, or some other allotment. In this democracy also, the rich should pay the poor for necessary services, but should not be obliged to furnish them with useless amusements. The Carthaginians, being governed in some such manner as this, had the people for their friend. For by always sending some of the people into colonies, they made them rich. It is also the province of generous and intelligent noblemen to divide the poor amongst them, and afford them an opportunity of applying themselves to their respective works. It is likewise well to imitate those of Tarentum; for these, making possessions common for the use of the poor, procure the benevolence of the multitude. Again, they have likewise two ways of electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, and others by lot; by the latter, indeed, in order that the people may have a share in the government; but by the former, in order that the state may be better governed. This also may be effected by dividing the same magistracy, and choosing some of the magistrates belonging to it by vote, but others by lot. And thus we have shown how democracies ought to be established.
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