MONARCHIES, however, are, in short, preserved by things contrary to those which are the causes of their destruction. But to speak of each separately, kingdoms are preserved by bringing them to a more moderate form. For by how much less extensive the power is of kings, by so much the longer will their government necessarily continue. For they will be less despotic, and more equal to others in their manners, and they will be less envied by those whom they govern. For on this account, also, the kingdom of the Molossi continued for a long time; and that of the Lacedæmonians, in consequence of their government being divided from the beginning into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment of the ephori. For by taking something from the power of the king, he increased the duration of the kingdom; so that after a manner, he made it not less, but greater; as they say he answered his wife, who asked him, if he was not ashamed to leave his kingdom less to his children, than he received it from his father? No, said he, for I deliver it to them more lasting. But tyrannies are preserved according to two modes which are most contrary to each other, one of which is, when the power is delegated from one to the other; and in this way most tyrants govern. It is also said that Periander, the Corinthian, established many of these particulars; and many such may be obtained from the government of the Persians. The methods, however, which were devised in former times for the preservation of tyrannies are these; to abase those who surpass others in excellence, and destroy men of elevated minds; and neither to permit public tables, nor assemblies, nor education, nor any thing else of the like kind; but to guard against every thing through which two things are usually produced, viz. elevated sentiments and confidence; and neither to suffer schools, nor other associations of those who are at leisure, and to do every thing through which all the citizens will in the most eminent degree be ignorant of each other. For knowledge increases mutual confidence. To oblige all strangers, likewise, to appear in public, and to live near the gates of the city; for thus their actions will be in the smallest degree latent; and always being in a state of slavery, they will seldom entertain any elevated thoughts. And besides all these, to add such other Persian and Barbaric methods as are tyrannical. For all of them are capable of effecting the same thing. For this purpose, likewise, it is necessary to endeavour not to be ignorant what every one who is under their government says or does, and in order to accomplish this to employ spies; such as the women at Syracuse called informers. Hiero, also, used to send out listeners, wherever there was any assembly or conversation; for in consequence of the people fearing such persons, there will be less freedom of speech; and if they should speak freely, they will be in a less degree concealed. It is requisite, also, that the people should accuse and be at variance with each other, friends with friends, the commons with the nobles, and the rich with each other.
It is likewise advantageous for a tyranny, to make all those who are under it poor, that they may not be able to compose a guard, and that being employed in daily labour, they may have no leisure to form conspiracies. But an instance of this are the pyramids of Egypt, the edifices dedicated to the gods by the Cypselidæ, and the temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by the Pisistratidæ, and the works of Polycrates at Samos. For all these are able to effect the same thing, viz. to keep the governed fully employed and poor. For this purpose, likewise, it is requisite to multiply taxes, as at Syracuse; for in the space of five years, it happened that Dionysius consumed all the property of his subjects in taxes. A tyrant, also, is a maker of war, in order that his subjects may not be at leisure, and may continually be in want of a general. And a kingdom, indeed, is preserved through friends; but it is especially the property of a tyrant to distrust his friends, as though all men were willing, but his friends particularly were able, to destroy him. Those things, also, which take place in the last species of a democracy, are all of them tyrannical; such as the authority of women in families, in order that they may reveal the secrets of their husbands, and indulging slaves for the same reason; for neither slaves nor women conspire against tyrants. But when they are treated with kindness, both of them are necessarily benevolent to tyrannies and democracies; for the people also wish to be the monarch. Hence, the flatterer is honoured by both these governments; by democracies, indeed, the demagogue; for the demagogue is the flatterer of the people. But among tyrants he is honoured, who will associate with them in an abject manner; which is the work of flattery. For on this account a tyranny is a lover of base friendship; since tyrants rejoice in being flattered. No man, however, of a liberal mind will do this. For worthy men love, but do not flatter. And bad men, indeed, are useful for bad purposes; for according to the proverb, one nail drives out another.
It is also tyrannical, not to be delighted with any grave or liberal man; for a tyrant thinks that he alone is a person of this description. But he on the contrary who supports his own dignity, and is a friend to freedom, diminishes the transcendency and despotism of the tyrant. Hence, tyrants hate such men, as destructive to their government. It is also tyrannical to feast and associate with strangers rather than with citizens, as if the latter were enemies, but the former have no hostile designs. These, therefore, and such like particulars, are tyrannical, indeed, and preserve a tyrannical government; but they are in no respect deficient in depravity. As I may say, however, all these are comprehended in three species. For a tyranny aims at three things; one, that those who are in subjection to it are men of abject minds; for no pusillanimous man will engage in a conspiracy against the government. The second is, that they should have no confidence in each other; for a tyranny is not dissolved till some of the citizens confide in each other. Hence, also, tyrants are hostile to worthy men, as hurtful to their government; not only because such men do not think they ought to be governed despotically, but also because they are faithful both to themselves and others, and neither accuse themselves, nor others. But the third thing at which a tyranny aims is, the impotency of things themselves; for no one attempts things that are impossible. Hence, no one will attempt to destroy a tyranny, unless there is power to effect its destruction. These, therefore, are the three boundaries to which the designs of tyrants are directed. For all tyrannical actions may be referred to these three hypotheses; that the people may have no confidence in each other; that they may be powerless; and that they may be pusillanimous. Such, therefore, is one of the modes through which the safety of tyrannies is effected. But the other mode pays attention to their preservation in a way contrary to what has been already described. It may, however, be apprehended what it is from the destruction of kingdoms. For as one mode of the corruption of a kingdom consists in making the government more tyrannical, thus also the safety of a tyranny consists in making it more kingly; preserving one thing only, viz. power, that it may rule over not only the willing, but also the unwilling; for if it loses this, it also loses its tyrannical power. It is necessary, however, that this, as an hypothesis or foundation, should remain firm; but in other particulars it is requisite partly to act, and partly to appear to act royally, and to perform this part well. And in the first place, indeed, it is necessary to seem to pay attention to the affairs of the public, neither making presents so large as to excite the indignation of the multitude, when the money is to be obtained from their works and hard labour, and is given profusely to mistresses, foreigners, musicians and actors; but to keep an account both of what is received and spent; which is at present done by some tyrants. For he who governs in this manner, will rather seem to be the master of a family than a tyrant. But it is not proper that the tyrant should be afraid of ever wanting money, while he is the lord of the city; for this fear belongs to those tyrants who quit their kingdom, and it is more advantageous for these to want money, than to leave it behind them hoarded up. For the guardians to whom they intrust it, will be less desirous of making innovations. These guardians of property, however, are more dreadful to absent tyrants than the citizens; for some of the latter the tyrant takes with him, but the former are left behind.
In the next place, it is requisite that the tyrant should appear to collect such taxes, and require such services, as the exigencies of the state demand; that whenever they are wanted they may be employed for the purposes of war. In short, he should endeavour to be considered as the guardian and treasurer of the property of the public, and not of his own. His appearance, likewise, should not be severe, but grave. And it should also be such, that those who approach him, may not fear, but rather may venerate him. It will not, however, be easy to accomplish this, if he is despised. Hence, though he should pay no attention to the other virtues, it is necessary that he should to political virtue, and that he should cause his subjects to believe that he does. Farther still, he ought not only to appear to act with no indecent insolence towards either any young man or woman, but he should also be careful that no one belonging to him acts in this manner. The women also of his family should conduct themselves with similar decorum towards other women; for many tyrannies have been destroyed through the insolence of women. With respect to corporeal enjoyments, also, he should act in a way directly contrary to what some tyrants now do. For they not only indulge themselves in these as soon as it is day, and for many days in a continued succession, but they also wish that others may see them doing this, in order that they may be admired by them as happy and blessed. In things of this kind, therefore, he ought to be especially moderate. But if he is not, he ought to appear to others to avoid them. For it is not the sober, but the intoxicated man, who is exposed to stratagems or contempt; nor does this happen to the vigilant man, but to him who is asleep. He must, also, act in a manner nearly contrary to every thing that has been formerly mentioned by us. For he ought to improve and adorn the city, as if he were the curator of it, and not a tyrant.
Again, he should always appear to be remarkably attentive to what pertains to the gods. For men are less afraid of suffering any thing illegal from persons of this description, if they think that he who governs them is religious, and pays attention to the worship of the gods. They will likewise be less inclined to conspire against him, as being one who has the gods for his protectors. It is necessary, however, that he should appear to be such a one, without any suspicion of improbity; and he should so honour men of merit in every particular, that they may not think they should ever be more honoured by their fellow citizens in a free state. Such honours, likewise, as these, he should distribute himself; but he should inflict punishments through other persons, viz. officers and judges. It is, however, the common protection of every monarchy, not to make any one man very great, but if any, more than one; for they will have a watchful eye over each other. But if it should be necessary to make any one man great, it must not be one of audacious manners; for manners of this description are on all occasions most readily disposed to effect a revolution. If, also, it should seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, this should be done gradually, and all his authority should not be taken from him at once. Farther still, he should abstain from all insolence; and above all others, from two kinds, that pertaining to corporeal punishment, and lascivious conduct towards young men. But he must be especially careful not to act in this manner towards those who are ambitious. For the avaricious bear grievously any injury that affects their property; and ambitious and worthy men, any stain to their honour. Hence, such punishments are not to be used by the tyrant, or else they should be inflicted by him conformably to the laws of the country, and not through contempt. His associations, also, with youth, should be from amatory causes, and not through tyrannical authority. And, in short, he should make amends for any seeming disgrace, by bestowing greater honours. Those, however, among all that conspire against the person of a tyrant, are most to be dreaded by him, and require most to be guarded against, who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, if they can but accomplish their purpose. Hence, it is especially necessary to be cautious of those who either conceive themselves to have been injured, or those who are dear to them; for those persons are regardless of themselves who attack others through anger; and as also Heraclitus says, it is difficult to fight with anger, for it is purchased with life. Since, however, cities consist of two parts, viz. of poor and rich men, it is especially necessary that both these should be protected by the government under which they live; and that the one part should be in no respect injured by the other. But whichever party is the stronger, that the tyrant must particularly endeavour to have on his side, that if any disturbance should arise, he may not be obliged to make his slaves free, or deprive the citizens of their arms. For either part being added to his own power, will render him superior to any insurrections. It would be superfluous, however, to enumerate every particular of this kind. For the object at which the tyrant should aim is evident, viz. that he ought to appear to those whom he governs, not to be tyrannical, but like the father of a family and a king; not a plunderer, but a protector; and that he should pursue moderation in his manner of living, and not excess. Farther still, he should associate with his nobles, and sooth the multitude. For from these things, it necessarily follows, that his government will not only be better and more desirable, in consequence of ruling over better and not abject persons, and because he will neither be hated nor feared, but also because his government will be more lasting. And, finally, he should be so disposed with respect to his manners, as to be either well-affected towards virtue, or to be half worthy; and not to be wholly wicked, but half-wicked.
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