It now remains to discuss a monarchy, and to show the causes through which it is corrupted, and through which it is naturally adapted to be preserved. Nearly, however, the particulars which happen to kingdoms and tyrannies, are similar to those we have already mentioned respecting other polities. For a kingdom, indeed, is conformable to an aristocracy; but a tyranny is composed of the last species of an oligarchy and democracy. Hence, it is most pernicious to those that are under its government, as being composed of two evils, and possessing the degeneracies and the errors of both these polities. But the generation of each of these monarchies, i.e. of a kingdom and a tyranny, is immediately from things of a contrary nature. For a kingdom is formed for the protection of the worthy against the multitude; and kings are appointed from among worthy men, according to a transcendency of virtue, or of actions arising from virtue, or according to the excellence of the race from which they originated. But a tyrant is chosen from the people and the multitude, an enemy to the nobles, in order that the people may not be injured by them. This, however, is evident from what happens. For nearly most tyrants, as I may say, became so from being demagogues; having gained the confidence of the people by calumniating the nobles. For some tyrannies were established after this manner, when the cities were now increased; but others prior to these, from kings who deviated from the ancient customs of the country, and aspired after a more despotic government. Others were formed from such as were elected to the principal offices in the state. For formerly the people allowed a long time to magistracies and public charges. But others were established from oligarchies who had elected some one to have supreme authority in offices of the greatest importance. For by all these modes it was easy to establish a tyranny, if they were willing to do so; in consequence of having a pre-existent power, some indeed, of a kingly government, but that of others arising from the honours of the state. Thus Phidon at Argos, and other tyrants, became tyrants, in consequence of having previously possessed a kingly power. But those in Ionia, and Phalaris, became tyrants through having enjoyed the honours of the state. Panætius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others after the same manner, obtained their tyranny from having been demagogues. As we have said, therefore, a kingdom is arranged according to an aristocracy. For it is established according to desert, viz. either according to private virtue, or family, or beneficent actions, or according to these united with power. For all those who have benefitted, or are able to benefit cities, or nations, have acquired this honour; some indeed by having through war prevented the people from being enslaved, as Codrus; but others from having liberated the people from slavery, as Cyrus; or from having been the founders of cities, and settlers of colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon and Molosus.
A king, however, desires to be the guardian of the people, in order that those who have property may suffer no injury in the possession of it, and also that the people may not be exposed to any insolent abuse of their persons. But a tyrant, as we have frequently observed, pays no attention to the general good, except for his own advantage. With respect, however, to the scope of each, the tyrannical indeed is the delectable; but the royal, the beautiful in conduct. Hence, of exorbitant acquisitions, riches are indeed tyrannical; but those which pertain to honour, are rather of a royal nature. And with respect to a guard, that which is regal, indeed, is political or composed of citizens; but that is tyrannical which consists of foreigners. That a tyranny, however, contains the evils both of a democracy and an oligarchy is evident. From an oligarchy, indeed, it has for its end gain; for thus only the guards and the luxuries of the tyrant can be permanent. From this also, it places no confidence in the people; and, therefore, deprives them of the use of arms. It is also common to an oligarchy and a tyranny to use the people ill, and to drive them out of the city, and their own habitations. But a tyranny derives from a democracy, the being hostile to the nobles, and destroying them both latently and openly; and likewise banishing them as adversaries in the same art, and as an impediment to the government. For from these things it happens that conspiracies arise, both among those that desire to govern, and those who are not willing to be slaves. Hence arose the advice of Periander to Thrasibulus, to take off the tallest stalks; intimating by this, that it is always necessary to destroy the most eminent citizens. As, therefore, it has been nearly said by us, it is necessary to think that there are the same principles of the mutations of polities, as of monarchies. For through injustice, and through fear and contempt, many of those who are under a monarchical government conspire against it; but of all injustice, they are most especially incited to this through insolent conduct. But sometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their own property. The ends too are the same as in tyrannies and kingdoms. For there is a magnitude of wealth and honour with monarchs, which all men desire to obtain. But of stratagems, some are against the body of those who govern, but others are against the government itself. Those stratagems, therefore, that are formed on account of insolent conduct, are against the body. But since insolence is multifarious each of the parts of which it consists becomes the causes of anger. Nearly, however, most of those who are under the influence of anger, form stratagems for the sake of revenge, but not for the sake of superiority. Thus the stratagem against the children of Pisistratus arose from the injurious treatment of the sister of Harmodius, and also because he himself had been provoked and insulted. For Harmodius became their enemy on account of his sister, and Aristogiton for the sake of Harmodius. There was likewise a conspiracy against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because at a banquet with boys that he loved, he asked one of them, whether he were with child by him. And Phillip was slain by Pausanias because he neglected to revenge the injury that he had received from Attalus. And Amintas the Little was slain by Derda, for insulting him on account of his age. The eunuch also was slain by Evagoras the Cyprian, in consequence of having been insolently treated by him, through his taking the wife of his son from him. Many stratagems likewise have been formed against monarchs for the shameful acts some of them have committed on the bodies of other persons; such as the plot of Crateus against Archelaus, for his familiarity with him was always disgusting to him; so that even a small pretext became sufficient, viz. because he had not given him any one of his daughters in marriage as he had promised. But when he was entangled in the wars with Sirra and Arabeus, he gave his eldest daughter to the king of Elimea, but his youngest to the son of Amyntas, thinking that he should thus have less dissention with him that was born of Cleopatra. The cause however of the hatred of Crateus to Archelaus, was occasioned by his venereal intercourse with him. Hellanocrates the Larissæan also formed a conspiracy through the same cause. Paron, likewise Heraclides and Æneus, slew Cotys, in order to be revenged for the injury done to their father. And Adamas revolted from Cotys because he had been gelded by him when he was a boy, conceiving that he had therefore been insolently treated by him.
Many also, who have had their bodies scourged with stripes, have through resentment either killed those who caused them to be inflicted or conspired against them, even when they had great authority and kingly power. Thus at Mitylene, Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the Pentalidæ, who used to go about striking those they met with clubs. And in latter times, Smerdus killed Penthilus, for whipping him, and permitting his wife to drag him along. Dechamnicus likewise became the leader of the conspiracy against Archelaus, being the first that urged others to rebel. The cause however of his anger was this, that Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged, but Euripides was greatly offended with him, for having said something about the foulness of his breath. And many others have either been killed or conspired against through such like causes. The like also has happened through fear. For this has been one cause of the destruction of monarchies, as well as of other polities. Thus Artabanes conspired against Xerxes, fearing the accusation made by his enemies concerning Darius, whom he had caused to be hanged without being ordered to do so by Xerxes, and supposing that he should be pardoned, and that Xerxes would not remember it, in consequence of the splendid supper which he had given him. Some kings also have been killed through contempt. Thus some one slew Sardanapalus in consequence of having seen him spinning with his women, if those who relate this assert what is true. If this however is not true of him, yet it may be of some other person. And Dion conspired against the younger Dionysius, in consequence of despising him, seeing that the citizens were disposed to be rebellious, and that he was always intoxicated. Some friends likewise conspire against monarchs through contempt; for from the confidence which is placed in them, they think they shall not be discovered. And those who think they shall be able to obtain the government, conspire after a certain manner against the king through contempt. For as being powerful, and despising danger in consequence of their power, they will readily attempt to dethrone him, as has been the case with the generals of armies against monarchs. Thus, Cyrus attempted to dethrone Astyages, despising both his manner of life and his power; the latter because his forces were inactive, and the former for its luxuriousness. Thus, also, Suthes, the Thracian, who was the general of Amadocus, conspired against him. But others engage in conspiracies through more than one of these causes; as, for instance, both through contempt, and desire of gain; as was the case with Mithridates in his conspiracy against Ariobarzanes. Those, however, especially, who are naturally bold, will through this cause conspire against monarchs, from whom they have obtained military honour. For fortitude when it has power is audacious; through both which, as it is then easy to vanquish, conspiracies are formed.
Of those, however, who conspire against monarchs through ambition, the motive is different from any of the above-mentioned. For unlike some persons who attack tyrants, in consequence of seeing that they shall procure for themselves great gain and great honour, those who are influenced by ambition attack them; but the former, indeed, conspire against them through the cause already assigned; and the latter engage in this as they do in every other illustrious action, that they may be illustrious and distinguished; and they destroy monarchs, not through a desire of obtaining monarchy, but glory. The number, however, of those who are impelled thus to act through this cause, is very small; for it is necessary to suppose that they regard their own safety as nothing, in case they should not accomplish their purpose. It is requisite, indeed, that these persons should embrace the opinion of Dion; though it cannot easily be adopted by many. For he made war upon Dionysius with a few soldiers, and said, that however little the advantage that he obtained might be, it would satisfy him to have gained it; so that if he should happen to die immediately after he had conquered a very small part of that country, he should think this death would be advantageous for him.
But a tyranny is corrupted, in one way, indeed, like every other polity, externally, if some neighbouring state surpasses it in power. For it is evident that the wish to subvert it will arise from a contrariety of deliberate choice. But all men do that which they wish to do when they are able. The polities, however, which are contrary to each other are, a popular government, indeed, to a tyranny, as, according to Hesiod, a potter is hostile to a potter. For the last species of a democracy is a tyranny. But a kingdom and an aristocracy are opposed to each other, through the contrariety of the polity. Hence, the Lacedæmonians destroyed many tyrannies; as also did the Syracusians during the time in which they were well-governed. Tyrannies, also, are destroyed, when those who have a share in the government are seditious; as happened to be the case with the tyranny of Gelon, and at present with that of Dionysius. For the former was destroyed through Thrasibulus the brother of Gelon, who flattered Gelon’s son, and incited him to pleasure, in order that he himself might govern. The family, however, united their endeavours, not in short that they might dissolve the tyranny, but that they might destroy Thrasibulus. But their accomplices, in consequence of an opportunity presenting itself, expelled all of them. Dion, however, having by force of arms, and the assistance of the people, expelled Dionysius, was himself slain. But since there are two causes through which tyrannies are principally attacked, viz. hatred and contempt, it is necessary that one of these, hatred, must have an inseparable existence with tyrants; and many dissolutions of tyrannies have been effected through contempt. As an indication of this, most of those who have raised themselves to the supreme power, have also preserved it; but all their successors have, as I may say, immediately lost it. For in consequence of living luxuriously, they soon became despicable, and afforded many opportunities for conspiracies. It is necessary, however, to consider anger as a certain part of hatred; for after a manner it becomes the cause of the same actions. Frequently, also, it is more efficacious than hatred; for those who are under the influence of anger, attack others more strenuously, because this passion does not employ the reasoning power. But it especially happens that men follow the impulse of anger through having been insolently treated; and from this cause the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ was destroyed, and many other tyrannies. Hatred, however, is the cause of greater mischief. For anger is accompanied with pain; so that it is not easy to reason when under the influence of this passion; but hatred is without pain. In short, as many causes as we have assigned to be the destruction of a pure and the last species of an oligarchy, and an extreme democracy, so many also must be admitted to be the causes of the destruction of a tyranny; for these are divided tyrannies. A kingdom, however, is in the smallest degree corrupted by external causes; on which account it is very lasting. But numerous corruptions happen to it internally. And it is corrupted in two ways; one indeed, when those who have a share in the government are seditious; but the other when they endeavour to govern men tyrannically, by assuming greater power than is legal. Kingdoms, however, no longer exist at present, but rather monarchies than tyrannies; because a kingdom is indeed a voluntary government, and has supreme authority in things of greater consequence. But as in this government there are many similar to the king, and yet no one so transcendently great, as to be equal to the dignity of this government, hence men do not willingly endure it. If, however, any one governs through fraud or force, this now appears to be a tyranny. But in those kingdoms that are hereditary, it is requisite to assign another cause of their destruction besides those we have mentioned, viz. that many of the kings in such governments soon become objects of contempt, and that in consequence of not possessing tyrannical power, but regal honour, they conduct themselves insolently. For the dissolution of such kingdoms is easily effected. For he is immediately no longer a king, whom his subjects are not willing to obey; but a tyrant reigns over an unwilling people. Monarchies, therefore, are corrupted through these and other such like causes.
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