It is necessary, however, that those who are to fill the first departments in government should have three qualifications; in the first place, indeed, a regard for the established polity; in the next place, the greatest abilities for the business of their office; and in the third place, virtue and justice adapted to the polity in which they live. For if the just is not the same in all polities, there must necessarily be differences of justice. It is, however, dubious, when all these qualifications do not happen to be found in the same person, how the choice is to be made. Thus, for instance, if some one is qualified to be a general, but is a bad man, and not a friend to the polity; but another is a just man, and a friend to it, in what manner ought the choice to be made? It seems, however, that it is requisite to look to two things, and consider which of them all men partake in a greater, and which in a less degree. Hence, in the choice of a general, it is requisite to look to his experience and skill rather than his virtue; for fewer partake of military skill than of worthy manners. But the contrary method must be observed in the guardianship of the state, and the management of the finances; for these require more virtue than the multitude possess. But science is common to all. Some one, however, may doubt, why if a man has sufficient abilities for the administration of public affairs, and is also a friend to the state, it is necessary that he should be virtuous. For by these two things he will act in a manner advantageous to the community. May we not say, it is possible that those who possess these two qualities may be intemperate; so that as they neglect their own affairs, though they are acquainted with them and love themselves, thus also nothing will prevent them from acting in the same manner towards the public. In short, those things in the laws which we say are advantageous to the polity, all these preserve polities. And as we have frequently said, the greatest principle is to be careful that the multitude of those who wish well to the polity, is greater than the multitude of those that do not. But besides all this, it is necessary not to be ignorant of the medium, of which at present degenerate polities are ignorant. For many things which appear to be of a popular nature, dissolve democracies, and many things apparently oligarchical, dissolve an oligarchy. Those, however, who think that this is one of the virtues, extend it to excess, being ignorant that, as a nose which deviates from the most beautiful rectitude, towards the aquiline or the flat nose, may yet still be beautiful and graceful to the view, yet if this deviation is extended to a still greater degree, in the first place the commensuration of the part is lost, and at last it no longer appears to be a nose, through the excess and deficiency of contraries. The like also takes place in the other parts of the body. But this likewise happens to be the case with other polities. For both an oligarchy and a democracy may be in a sufficiently good condition, though they deviate from the most excellent order. But if any one extends either of them in a still greater degree, at first indeed he will make the polity to be in a worse condition; and at last, it will be no longer a polity. Hence, it is necessary that the legislator and the politician should not be ignorant what kind of things those are which preserve a popular state, and what those are which corrupt a democracy; and in a similar manner with respect to an oligarchical state, and an oligarchy. For it is not possible for either of them to exist and be permanent without the rich and the multitude. But when there is an equality of property, this polity must necessarily be of another form; so that those who corrupt the laws which pertain to excess, i.e. to inequality in property, corrupt polities.
Errors also are committed by the demagogues, both in democracies and oligarchies; in the former, indeed, where the multitude are the lords of the laws; for the multitude by contending with the rich, divide the city into two parts. It is necessary, however, on the contrary, that they should always appear to speak in favour of the rich. But in oligarchies, the oligarchics should speak in favour of the people, and the oaths which they take should be contrary to those which they now take. For now in some oligarchies they swear, “I will be malevolent to the people, and consult how they may be in a bad condition.” It is requisite, however, that they should suppose and feign the contrary, signifying in their oaths, that they will not injure the people. But of all that has been said, that which contributes most to the permanency of polities is what all of them at present neglect, viz. the education of youth with a view to the polity to which they belong. For no laws, however useful, and however much approved by all those that are in administration, will be beneficial, if the citizens be not accustomed to, and instructed from their childhood in the nature of the government under which they live; in the nature of a democracy, indeed, if the laws are democratical; but of an oligarchy, if the laws are oligarchical. For if there is intemperance in one man, there is also in a city. To be educated, however, with a view to the polity, is not this, to do such things as will gratify those who govern oligarchically, or those who wish for a democracy, but to do those things by which the former will be able to conduct an oligarchy, and the latter a democracy. But now in oligarchies, indeed, the children of the magistrates are educated delicately; and those of the poor are exercised and inured to labour; so that they are both more willing and able to produce innovations. In those democracies, however, which appear to be especially democratical, the contrary to what is advantageous to them is established. But the cause of this is, that liberty is badly defined by them. For there are two things by which a democracy appears to be defined, viz. by the people having the supreme power, and by liberty. For justice indeed appears to be equality; and that which seems to be equal to the multitude, has the supreme authority. But liberty and equality consist in any one doing what he pleases. Hence, in such like democracies every man lives as he pleases, and, as Euripides says, as he thinks fit. This, however, is a bad thing. For to live conformably to government, ought not to be considered as slavery, but as safety. Such, therefore, as I may say, are the causes through which polities are changed and corrupted, and such also are the causes through which they are preserved, and become permanent.
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