In the next place it follows that we should speak concerning the preservation of each polity, both in common and separately. First therefore it is evident, that if we possess a knowledge of the causes through which polities are corrupted, we shall also know through what causes they are preserved. For contraries are effective of contraries; and corruption is contrary to preservation. In well-tempered polities, therefore, it is as necessary as any thing else, to be careful that nothing be done illegally. And this is especially to be guarded against in what is of a trifling nature. For the transgression approaches secretly, in the same manner as small expences consume property, when they are frequently made. But the transition is latent because it is not effected at once. For the reasoning power is deceived so as to paralogize by these expenses, as it were through this sophistical argument: if every part is little, the whole also is little. This however, is partly true, and partly not. For the whole and all the parts are not small, but are composed of small parts. This, therefore, is one thing which the government ought to guard against. In the next place, it ought not to credit those speeches which are composed with a view to deceive the multitude; for they will be confuted by deeds. We have however before shown what the nature is of the sophisms pertaining to polities of which we are speaking. Farther still, we may see that not only some aristocracies, but also some oligarchies, continue firm, not because the polities are secure, but because the magistrates act well both to those who have no share in the government, and to those that have; by not injuring indeed those that have no share in it; and by introducing those who are leading men in the state to the government of it; and also by not disgracing unjustly those who are ambitious, nor injuring the multitude in what relates to gain. But by not injuring those who have a share in the government, through conducting themselves towards each other in a popular manner. For that equality among the multitude which democrats explore, is not only just among those of a similar rank but is advantageous. Hence if there are many who have a share in the administration, many of the democratic edicts will be useful; such as for the magistrates to be in office only for six months, in order that those of a similar rank, may also be magistrates in their turn. For those of a similar rank are, as it were, the people. Hence among these, demagogues frequently exist, as we have before observed. And, in the next place, oligarchies and aristocracies, will be less liable to fall into dynasties. For it is not similarly easy for those who are magistrates for a short, as it is for those who are magistrates for a long time, to act wickedly; since tyrannies are on this account produced in oligarchies and democracies. For either those who are of the greatest consequence in each of these polities establish a tyranny, in the one indeed the demagogues, but in the other the dynasties, or the chief magistrates, who have been the governors for a long time. Polities, however, are preserved, not only because the causes of their corruption are remote, but sometimes also because they are near; for the citizens are terrified, in consequence of the polity being in a worse condition than it was formerly. Hence it is necessary that those who pay attention to the welfare of the state, should introduce fear among the people, in order that they may preserve the constitution, and not, like a night-guard, dissolve the protection of the polity, and also that they may cause danger which is remote to be apparently near.
Again, it is requisite to endeavour to guard against the quarrels and seditions of the nobles through the laws, and also against those who are free from such contentions, before they are involved in them; as to know an evil from its very beginning is not the province of any casual person, but of a politician. But to prevent a mutation taking place, on account of the census, in an oligarchy, and a polity properly so called, while the census remains the same, but the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to survey the general amount of the census at the present time, and compare it with the amount in past times, and to do this annually in those cities in which the census is annual. And in larger cities it will be useful to do this once in three or five years. If the whole likewise should be found to be much larger or much less than it was at the time when the census was first established, let there be a law either to extend or contract the census; if it exceeds indeed, extending it by multiplication; but if it is deficient, contracting it, and making it to be less. For in oligarchies and polities properly so called if this is not done, it will happen that a dynasty will be produced in the one, and in the other a democracy instead of a polity, and a polity or a democracy instead of an oligarchy. It is common however to a democracy, an oligarchy, a monarchy, and to every polity, not to suffer any one to acquire a rank very superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour to confer small honours for a long time, than great honours for a short time. For the latter corrupt; and it is not the province of every man to bear prosperity well. But if this rule is not observed, let not those honours which are conferred all at once, be again all at once taken away, but rather by degrees. And especially indeed let this regulation be made by the laws, that no one shall have too much power, neither through his friends, nor his wealth. But if he has, for his excess therein, let it be contrived that he shall quit the country. Since, however, some persons make innovations in order that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living, it is necessary that a certain magistrate should be appointed to inspect the manners of those who do not live in a way conducive to the welfare of the polity; whether it be a democracy, an oligarchy, or any other form of government. And for the same causes those should be guarded against who are most prosperous in the city. But the remedy of this is always to appoint those who are distinguished by opposite characteristics, to the business and offices of the state; I mean, that worthy men are opposed to the multitude; and the poor to the rich. And to endeavour that the multitude of the poor and the rich should be mingled together, or that the number of those who are in the middle class should be increased; for this dissolves the seditions which arise from an inequality of condition. That, however, which is of the greatest consequence in every polity, is, that it be so ordained both by the laws, and other regulations, that the office of magistrate shall not be venal. But it is especially necessary that this should be observed in oligarchies. For thus the multitude will not be so indignant at being excluded from a share in the government, but will rejoice that they are permitted to attend to their private concerns, as they will if they suspect that the rulers defraud the public. For then they are afflicted, both because they have no share in the honours of the state, and because they are pillaged by those in office. There is, however, one way in which it is possible for a democracy and an aristocracy to exist together, if any one should choose to establish such a form of government. For it will thus be possible, for both the nobles and the multitude to obtain what they desire. For to permit all to govern is democratical; and for the nobles to be in the magistracy, is aristocratical. But the way is this,—to prevent any emolument being obtained from the office of magistrate. For the poor will not wish to have a share in the administration, when it is attended with no gain, but they will rather desire to attend to their own affairs; and the rich will be able to govern, because they will want nothing of the community. Hence, it will happen that the poor will become rich, by being employed in their own concerns, and the nobles will not be governed by any casual persons. To prevent, therefore, the public property from being defrauded, the money belonging to the community should be delivered out openly in the presence of all the citizens, and copies of the accounts should be deposited in the different wards, tribes, and divisions. But as the magistrates are to derive no emolument from their office, honours ought to be established by law, for those who conduct themselves in their office with applause. It is necessary, however, in democracies, that the rich should be spared, not only by not permitting their possessions to be divided, but not even the produce of them, which in some polities is done latently. It would likewise be better to prevent them when they wish to exhibit expensive, but not useful public entertainments of plays, music, processions, and the like. But in an oligarchy great care should be taken of the poor, and offices which are lucrative should be distributed among them. If, likewise, any rich man acts insolently towards them, their punishment should be greater than if they insulted one of their own rank. Inheritances also should descend according to affinity, and not in the way of gift; nor should the same person have more than one inheritance. For thus, property will be more equally divided, and many of the poor will become rich. It is likewise advantageous in a democracy, and in an oligarchy, to distribute to those who have a less share in the government, an equality or a preference in other things; in a democracy indeed to the rich; but in an oligarchy to the poor; except those offices in which the principal authority of the state consists. For these ought to be committed to those only, or to many of them, that have a share in the government.
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