But oligarchies are changed in two most apparent ways. One indeed when the common people are injured; for then every one becomes a sufficient patron of sedition; and especially when their leader happens to be one of the oligarchy; as was Lygdamis at Naxus, who afterwards tyrannized over the Naxians. The other mode, however, of changing an oligarchy, has not its beginning from the sedition of the people, but from a different cause. For sometimes it is effected by the rich, who have no share in the government, when those that are in administration are very few indeed; as happened to be the case at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities. For those who had no share in the government, did not cease to raise disturbances, till they were admitted to it; first the elder brothers, and then the younger also. For in some places the father and son are not permitted to have a share in the administration at one and the same time; but in others the elder and younger brother are permitted. And there, indeed, the oligarchy partakes more of a polity. But at Ister it ended in a democracy. In Heraclea, from being in the hands of a few, it consisted at length of six hundred. But at Cnidus, the oligarchy was changed in consequence of the nobles quarrelling with each other, because but few had a share in the government; and, as we have just observed, if the father was in office, the son was not; or if there were many brothers, the eldest only had a share in the administration. For the people rising through the dissentions of the nobles, and taking one of them for their leader, obtained the victory. For sedition is imbecile. And in ancient times at Erithria, and during the oligarchy of the Basilides, though they properly attended to the affairs of the polity, yet, at the same time, because the people were indignant that they were governed by a few, they changed the polity. Oligarchies, likewise, are changed of themselves, and through the factions of the demagogues. The art, however, of conciliating the people is twofold; one, indeed, among the few themselves; for these, though they are very few, have their demagogues; as at Athens in the time of the thirty tyrants, Chares became powerful by flattering them; and, in the same manner, Phrynicus in the time of the four hundred. But the other is, when those who are in the oligarchy flatter the mob. Thus, at Larissæa, those who were the guardians of the polity, flattered the mob because they were elected by them. And this will be the case in those oligarchies in which the governors do not elect the magistrates; but the magistrates are chosen either from among men of great property, or a certain rank, and by the soldiers or the people; which happened to be the case at Abydos. This likewise takes place, where the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme power; for the demagogues favouring the people in their causes, change the polity; as was the case at Heraclea in Pontus. Farther still, this also takes place, when some persons attempt to reduce the oligarchy to a smaller number; for those who seek for equality, are compelled to apply to the people for assistance.
Mutations, also, of oligarchies are produced, when those that govern consume their property by living luxuriously. For such persons are desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to obtain the tyranny for themselves, or for another. Thus Hipparinus endeavoured to obtain the tyranny for Dionysius among the Syracusians. And at Amphipolis, one whose name was Cleotimus, collected a colony of Chalcidians, and when they came caused them to quarrel with the rich. And at Ægina, a certain person, who brought an action against Chares, endeavoured, through a cause of this kind to change the polity. At one time, therefore, they endeavour to raise commotions, but at another they rob the public; whence they quarrel with each other, or with those who endeavour to detect their thefts; which happened to be the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if an oligarchy is in a state of concord, it is not easily destroyed from itself. And the polity in Pharsalus is an indication of this. For the rulers of it being few, are the lords of many, because they use their power well. Oligarchies also are destroyed when those who are in the oligarchy produce another; that is, when the whole administration being in the hands of a few, all of them do not partake of the supreme power; which once happened to be the case at Elis. For the government being in the hands of a few senators, they were reduced to a still smaller number, because their power was for life; and their mode of election was calculated to preserve this power in the families of each other, like the senators at Lacedæmon. A change in oligarchies, likewise, is effected, both in war and in peace. In war, indeed, because through a distrust in the people, the government is obliged to employ mercenary troops; and he who has the command of the army, frequently becomes a tyrant; as was the case with Timophanes at Corinth. And if there are more generals than one, they will establish a dynasty for themselves. Sometimes, however, the rulers in an oligarchy, fearing these things, suffer the multitude to have a share in the government, because they are obliged to employ the people. But, in peace, oligarchies are changed, through the rulers having no confidence in each other, and, in consequence of this, entrusting the guardianship of the state to mercenaries, and their general, who will be an arbiter between them, and sometimes becomes the master of both; which happened to be the case at Larissa when the Aleuadæ had the supreme power at Samos; and at Abydos during the time of the association, of which Iphiades was one. Seditions, also, will be produced in an oligarchy, from one party overbearing and insulting another, and from their quarrelling about their marriages or law-suits. How these will be produced from their marriages, indeed, has been already shown; and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights in consequence of being injured in a marriage. A sedition also arose in Heraclea from the decision of the court of justice; and at Thebes through a cause of adultery. And the punishment, indeed, which Eurytion suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed; as also was that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them publicly bound in the pillory. Many oligarchies, likewise, have been destroyed through their being too despotic, by certain persons being indignant at the conduct of some who were in power; as was the case with the oligarchy at Cnidus and Chios. Mutations, also, are produced from accident in what is called a polity, and in oligarchies, whenever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen from a certain census. For it frequently happens that what was fixed at first as the census for the present time, (so that but few in an oligarchy, indeed, could have a share in the government; but in a polity properly so called those of the middle rank) becomes so little through peace, or through some other prosperous circumstance, that the property of every one is equal to the census, so that all the citizens may partake of all things in the government. And this change sometimes happens gradually and latently; but sometimes more rapidly. Oligarchies, therefore, are changed, and become seditious through such causes as these. And, in short, democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, not into contrary polities, but into those which are in the same genus; as, for instance, from lawful democracies and oligarchies into those that employ absolute power, and from these again into those that are lawful.
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