Consequent to these things is the discussion concerning magistrates; for this part of a polity has many differences; as, how many magistrates there shall be, in what their authority shall consist; and with respect to time, how long each of them shall continue in office. For some polities make the magistrates to continue for six months, others for a shorter time, others for a year, and others for a much longer time. It must be considered, also, whether magistrates ought to be perpetual, or for a long time, or neither; but the same persons should frequently fill the same office, or the same person should not fill it twice, but once only. Farther still, with respect to the appointment of magistrates, it must be considered who are to be eligible, by whom they are to be chosen, and in what manner. For concerning all these particulars, it is necessary to be able to distinguish in how many ways they may be effected; and afterwards to show which of these is advantageous to such and such polities. Nor is it easy to determine this, viz. what kind of persons ought to be called magistrates; for a political community requires many rulers. Hence, neither are all those who are chosen by vote or lot to be considered as magistrates; such as in the first place the priests; for it must be admitted that these are different from civil magistrates; and besides these, the choregi and heralds, nay even embassadors, are elected. But there are, indeed, civil occupations pertaining to a certain action, which either belong to all the citizens, such as the employments of soldiers in war; or to a part of them only; such as the overseers of women and children; or the occupations are economical; for corn-meters are frequently elected; or they are servile, in which, if they are rich, they employ slaves. Those, however, especially are, in short, to be called magistrates who are permitted to deliberate and consult about certain things, and to decide causes, and who are in some command, and through the last of these, they are principally entitled to this appellation; for to command pertains in a greater degree to the office or dignity of a magistrate. This, however, is, as I may say, a thing of no consequence with respect to utility; for the controversy about the appellation is not yet determined; but it admits of another discussion which is of a more intellectual nature.
What kind of magistrates, however, and how many, are necessary to the existence of a city; and what kind of them are not necessary, indeed, but yet are useful in a good polity, may be to some one in a still greater degree a subject of doubt, with respect to every polity, and small cities. For in large polities it is both possible and necessary that one magistrate should be at the head of one department; since it is possible that many persons may have a share in the administration, because the citizens are numerous; so that some may be passed over for a long time, and others may be only once in office. Every thing, indeed, is done better which has the whole attention of one person, than when that attention is divided amongst many. But in small polities it is necessary that a few of the citizens should execute many employments; for in consequence of the paucity of inhabitants, it is not easy for many of them to be magistrates. For where will others be found to succeed them in turn? Small polities, also, will sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as large ones; except that the one will more frequently want them than the other. Hence, nothing hinders but that they may be entrusted with many charges at one and the same time; for they will not impede each other. And on account of the paucity of the inhabitants, it will be necessary to create magistrates as instruments subservient to different purposes. If, therefore, we can tell how many magistrates are necessary in every city, and how many are not necessary, indeed, yet ought to be appointed, it will be easy to know how many different offices may be assigned to one magistrate. It is also necessary not to be ignorant what tribunals in different places should have different things under their jurisdiction, and likewise over what kind of things one magistrate should every where preside. Thus, for instance, with respect to decency of manners, it is requisite to know whether it should be under the cognizance of the prefect of the forum, if the cause arises in the forum, and under that of another magistrate in another place, or every where under the inspection of the same magistrate; and also whether a distinction is to be made according to the thing, or according to the men. My meaning is, whether with respect to decency of manners, it is to be considered as one cause when it relates to a boy, but another when it relates to a woman?
With respect to polities, also, it is necessary to know whether the genus of the magistrates differs in each, or it has no difference. For instance, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy, the same magistrates have the supreme authority, yet not chosen out of those who are equal or similar, but being different in different polities? As, whether in aristocracies, the magistrates are chosen from those who are well educated; but in oligarchies, from the rich; and in democracies, from the freemen? Or do the magistrates differ as the polities differ? For in some places, the same magistrates are useful, and in others not; and in one polity it may be proper that the same magistrates should have great power, but in another small power. There are also certain magistrates peculiar to certain polities. Thus, for instance, the pre-advisers are not proper in a democracy; but a senate is. For there must be certain persons to consult and deliberate for the people, in order that they may have leisure to attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in number, the polity is oligarchic. It is necessary, however, that the pre-advisers should be but few; so that this office will be oligarchic. But where both these offices are, the pre-advisers are superior to the senators; for the power of the pre-adviser is oligarchic, but of the senator democratic. And the power, indeed, of the senate is dissolved in those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one public assembly, take all the business into their own hands. But this usually happens, when a certain great advantage or reward is appointed for those that assist in the public assemblies; for they are then at leisure to meet together frequently, and determine every thing themselves. A magistrate, however, who is an overseer of children or women, or who has any other department similar to this, is an aristocratic, but not a democratic, magistrate. For how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from appearing in public? Nor is such a magistrate oligarchic; for the women in an oligarchy live delicately and luxuriously. And thus much may suffice at present concerning these things. Let us, therefore, endeavour to discuss from the beginning, the establishment of magistrates. But the differences of them are contained within three limits; from which, blended together, all the modes of their subsistence, must necessarily be produced. Of these three, however, the first consists in those who appoint the magistrates; the second in those who are appointed; and the third, in the mode of appointment. Of each of these three, also, there are three differences. For either all the citizens appoint the magistrates, or some of them; and they are either appointed from all the citizens, or from some definite persons; viz. they are appointed either according to the estate which they possess, or to their family, or their virtue, or something else of the like kind. Thus, at Megara, the election of magistrates is from those who have returned together to their country, and who have reinstated themselves by force of arms; and this either by vote or lot. Again, these modes may be combined. My meaning is, that some magistrates may be chosen by a part of the community, but others by the whole; and some from all the citizens, but others from some of them; and some indeed by vote, but others by lot. Of each of these, however, there will be four modes of difference. For either all of them will be elected from all the people by vote, or all from all by lot; and either from all, without any distinction, or they will be elected by a certain division of tribes, wards, or companies, until they have passed through all the citizens; or they will always be elected from the whole community; and some in this, and others in that way. Again, if some magistrates are elected, either from all the citizens by vote, or from all of them by lot, or from some by vote, and some by lot; or some in this, and some in that way; I mean, some from all the citizens by vote, but others by lot. Hence, the modes will be twelve without the two combinations. But of these, two are popular, or adapted to a democracy; viz. the election of all the magistrates from all the people, by vote or lot, or by both;—some, indeed, by lot, but others by vote; or not to appoint all the magistrates at once, yet from all the people, or from some of them, and this either by vote or lot, or both; or some, indeed, from all the people, but others from a certain class of them, and this both by vote and lot. For to elect some by vote and some by lot is political. And to elect some of the magistrates from all the people, some indeed by vote, but others by lot, or by both, is oligarchic. But it is more oligarchic to elect them by both. To elect some magistrates, however, from all the people, but others from some of them, is political aristocratically; or to elect some of them by vote, and others by lot. But the election of certain magistrates, from a certain class of the people, is oligarchic; as is also the election of some of them from some of the people, by lot, but not after a similar manner; and the election of some from some of the people, both by vote and lot. But the election of certain magistrates from all the people, is not oligarchic. And the election of all of them from a certain class of the people, and this by vote, is aristocratic. So many, therefore, in number are the modes of electing magistrates, and they are thus divided according to polities. But what magistrates are advantageous to different communities, and how their offices ought to be established, and with what powers, will be evident. I mean, however, by the power of a magistrate, such a province as the management of the finances, and such an authority as that of a guardian. For there is another species of power, such as that of a general, and that which pertains to contracts made in the forum.
The lessons published on this site are freely available to read. If you wish to move from reading to formal study — with graded assessments, academic records, and the support of the Academy — you may enroll at any time. Enrollment is open year round, to students of all ages.
