Again, let us now speak in common and separately of each form of government in the consequent order, assuming the appropriate principle of each. There are, however, three parts of all polities, with respect to which a worthy legislator ought to consider what is advantageous to each; and when these subsist properly, the polity must necessarily be in a flourishing condition, and one polity must differ from another in the difference which takes place in each of these. But of these three parts, one is that which deliberates about public affairs; the second pertains to the magistrates, i.e. who they ought to be, and with what power they should be entrusted; and the third is the judicial department. The proper province, however, of the part that deliberates or consults is to determine concerning war and peace, the forming alliances and dissolving them, and also to frame laws, and decide concerning death, banishment, and the confiscation of goods, and to call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. But it is necessary that these judicial powers should either be given to all the citizens, or to some of them; as for instance, to some one magistrate, or to more than one, or some of these powers to one, and some to another; or some of them indeed to all, but others to some. That all, therefore, should have these powers, and in all things, is democratic; for the people seek for such an equality as this. But there are many modes of effecting this; one of which is to let all the citizens have these powers alternately, but not all of them at once, as in the polity of Telecles the Milesian. And in other polities, the supreme council is composed of the different magistrates; but they succeed to the offices of the community alternately from the tribes, and the parts of the state that are entirely the smallest, till they have been passed through by all of them. The people, however, only assemble about the establishment of laws, and the affairs of the polity, or for the purpose of hearing what the magistrates have to propose. Another mode is, for all the people to assemble together; but only in order to choose the magistrates, enact laws, determine concerning war and peace, and inquire into the conduct of the magistrates; while other things are conducted by the magistrates, who have their separate departments, and are chosen out of the whole community by vote, or ballot. Another mode is for the citizens to assemble in order to choose the magistrates, and examine into their conduct; and also to deliberate concerning war and alliances; but to leave other things to the magistrates that happen to be chosen, and whose employments are such as necessarily require skilful men. A fourth mode is, for all the citizens assembling together, to deliberate about all things; and for the magistrates to determine nothing of themselves, but only to have the privilege of giving their opinions first; according to which mode the last democracy is now conducted, which we say is analogous to a dynastic oligarchy, and a tyrannic monarchy. All these modes, therefore, are democratic; but when some of the citizens only have power in all things, the government is oligarchic. This, however, has many differences. For when the officers of the state are chosen out of those who have a moderate fortune, and these in consequence of their property being moderate are many, and when they do not change the prohibitions of the law, but comply with them, and all within the census are eligible, then such a government is indeed an oligarchy, but a political one from its moderation.
When, however, all the people do not partake of the deliberative power, but those who are chosen for that purpose, and these govern according to law in the same manner as in the former polity, then this government is oligarchic. But when those who have the deliberative power elect themselves, and the son succeeds the father, and they are the lords of the laws, this arrangement is necessarily oligarchic. When, also, certain persons have the power of determining certain things, such as war and peace, and when all the people inquire into the conduct of the magistrates, but the rulers into other things, and these rulers are elected either by vote or lot, then the polity is indeed an aristocracy. But when some are chosen by vote, and others by lot, and the latter either simply, or by preference, or they are elected by vote and lot in common, then this government is partly an aristocracy and partly a polity properly so called. The deliberative power, therefore, is after this manner divided in different polities, and each of these is administered according to the above-mentioned mode. It is advantageous, however, to a democracy which at present appears to be especially a democracy; by which I mean a government wherein the people are the lords of the laws, so as to have the power of deliberating; I say, it will be advantageous for it to do that which is done by oligarchies in their courts of justice. For they fine those whom they wish to try causes, if they do not attend; but a democracy rewards the poor for attending. This, also, should be done with respect to the public assemblies. For the deliberations will be better, when all the citizens deliberate in common; the common people, indeed, with the nobles, and the nobles with the multitude. It is also advantageous for those who compose the council to be elected either by vote or lot, equally from the parts of the city. And it will likewise be advantageous, if the common people in the state are very numerous, either not to reward all of them for their attendance in the public assemblies, but such a number only as is commensurate to the multitude of the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot. But in oligarchies, either some of the common people should be elected to the council, or else a court should be established, as is done in some polities, the members of which are called pre-advisers, and guardians of the laws, whose business should be, to discuss those affairs about which they had previously deliberated. For thus the people will have a share in the council, and will not have it in their power to dissolve any thing pertaining to the polity. Again, the people may either have a vote in whatever is decreed, but may not propose any thing contrary to it; or they may give their advice, while the power of determining may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to follow a contrary practice to that which takes place in polities properly so called; for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not of condemning; and the cause should be referred back again to the magistrates. For in polities the contrary takes place; since the power of pardoning is in these with the few, but not of condemning, which is always referred to the greater part of the people. After this manner, therefore, we determine concerning the deliberative power, and that which has the principal authority in a polity.
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