It is not, however, proper to consider a democracy, as some do at present, as simply a government where the multitude have the supreme power; for in oligarchies, and every where, the greater part possesses the supreme authority. Nor is an oligarchy a government, where a few are the lords of the polity. For if all the people were a thousand and three hundred, and of these a thousand were rich, and would not permit the three hundred, who were poor, to have any share in the government, though free-men, and similar to them in other things, no one would say that this polity was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, being few in number, should be superior in power to the rich, who were numerous, no one would call this an oligarchy; nor would they so denominate it, when the rest, who are rich, have no share in the honours of the state. It must, therefore, rather be said, that a democracy is when free-men are the lords of the polity; but an oligarchy when the rich have the supreme power. It happens, however, that in the former case, the many govern, and in the latter, the few; for those that are free are many, but the rich are few. If, also, dominion was to be distributed according to magnitude of body, as some persons say it is in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, it would be an oligarchy; for the multitude, both of those that are beautiful, and those that are large, is small. Moreover, neither is it sufficient that these polities should be defined by the above-mentioned particulars alone; but since there are many parts, both of a democracy and an oligarchy, it must be still farther assumed, that if free-men, being few in number, rule over the many, who are not free, this government is not a democracy; as in Appolonia, which is in Ionia and in Thera. For in each of these cities, those whose birth was remarkably illustrious, and who first founded the colonies, had the honours of the state, these persons being but few in number. Nor would the rich form a democracy, because they are very numerous, as formerly at Colophon. For there the majority had large possessions, before the war against the Lydians. But a democracy, indeed, then exists, when the free-men and the poor, being the majority, have the supreme power. And an oligarchy is when this power is possessed by the rich and the noble, being few.
We have shown, therefore, that there are many polities, and have assigned the reason why there are. But we shall now proceed to show that there are even more than these, and what they are, and why, assuming the principle we have before mentioned. For we acknowledge that every city consists not of one, but of many parts. As, therefore, if we were desirous to comprehend the species of animals, we should first observe by distinguishing the parts, that which every animal must necessarily have, as, a certain sensorium, and that which elaborates and receives the food, such for instance as a mouth and a belly; and besides these, the parts by which every animal is moved. If, then, there are only so many species, but there will be differences of these, I mean, for instance, there will be many genera of the mouth, the belly, and the sensoria, and besides these, of the motive parts; the number of the combinations of these, will necessarily produce many genera of animals. For it is not possible for the same animal to have many differences of mouth, nor in a similar manner, of ears. Hence, when all the possible combinations of these are assumed, they produce the species of animals; and these species are as many in number as the combinations of the necessary parts. The same mode of reasoning, also, must be employed, with respect to the above-mentioned polities. For cities are not composed of one, but of many parts, as we have frequently observed. One part, therefore, of a city consists of the multitude that supply it with provisions, and who are called husbandmen; but the second part is that which is called sordid and servile; and this part is conversant with those arts, without which a city cannot be inhabited. Of these arts, however, some must necessarily exist; but others administer to luxury, or to the felicity of life. The third part is commercial. But I mean by the commercial part, that which is conversant with buying and selling, with merchandize and provision. But the fourth part is the mercenary, consisting of hired labourers, or workmen. And the fifth consists of the men at arms, which is necessarily a part no less useful than the others, if the city is not to be enslaved by invaders. For it is one among the number of things impossible, that what is by nature a slave should deserve to be called a city. For a city is sufficient to itself; but a slave not. Hence, in the Republic of Plato, this is elegantly, yet not sufficiently asserted. For Socrates says, that a city is composed of four most necessary kinds of men. But these are, according to him, the weaver, the husbandman, the shoemaker and the builder. Again, also, he adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths, and herdsmen for necessary cattle; and farther still, merchants and victuallers, and all these give completion to his first city; as if every city was established for the sake of necessities, and not rather for the sake of the beautiful in conduct. His city, also, is equally in want of shoemakers and husbandmen. But he does not consider the military as a part, till the territory being increased, and joining to the neighbouring states, engages in war. Moreover, among those that compose his four divisions, and who have any connexion whatever with each other, it is necessary there should be some one to distribute justice, and determine what is just and what is not. If, therefore, it be admitted that the soul is more a part of an animal than the body, things of this kind, also, are in a greater degree to be considered as parts of the cities than those which contribute to the necessary use, viz. than the military part, and that which participates of forensic justice. To which may be added, the part that deliberates and consults, which is the business of political intelligence. And it makes no difference with respect to the argument, whether these employments separately belong to different or to the same persons; for it frequently happens, that the same persons are both soldiers and husbandmen. Hence, if both judges and senators are to be considered as parts of the city, it is evident, that the soldiers must also necessarily be a part of it. But the seventh part consists of those who spend their own property in the service of the public, and these we call the rich. The eighth part is formed of those who execute the different offices of the state; since it is impossible for a city to exist without governors. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be some persons who are able to govern, and fill the offices of the state; and this either for life, or in rotation. But the remaining offices are those of senator and judge, of which we have a little before treated. If, therefore, these things are necessary for cities, and it is requisite that they should subsist properly and justly, it is also necessary that there should be some persons who participate of the political virtues. It appears, then, to some, that the same persons may possess other powers, so as to be, for instance, soldiers, husbandmen, and artificers; and, besides this, counsellors and judges.
All men, likewise, ascribe to themselves virtue, and fancy that they are qualified to fill the greatest offices of the state; but it is impossible for the same persons to be at the same time both poor and rich. Hence, these appear to be principally the parts of a city, viz. the opulent and the needy. Farther still, because for the most part the former of these are few, but the latter many, they appear, of all the parts of a city, to be most contrary to each other; so that they constitute polities, according as they happen to prevail; and they seem to be the two polities, a democracy, and an oligarchy. That there are, therefore, many polities, and through what causes they arise, has been before mentioned. But we will now show, that there are, also, many species of a democracy and an oligarchy. This, however, is evident from what has been already said. For there are many species of the common people, and of those who are called men of note. Thus, for instance, of the common people, one species consists of husbandmen; another of artificers; another of merchants, who are employed in buying and selling; another of seamen, of whom some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in carrying goods and passengers from place to place, and others in fishing; and of each of these last there are in many places a great crowd, as the fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, the masters of gallies at Athens, the merchants at Egina and Chios, and those who carry goods and passengers from one place to another, at Tenedos. To these may be added, those who live by their manual labour, and have but little property, so that they are not able to live at leisure. Again, those, also, rank among the common people, who are not free-born on both sides, and whatever other species there may be of this kind of people.
But with respect to men of note, they are distinguished either by wealth or nobility of birth; or virtue, or education, or any such-like excellence which is attributed to them. The first kind of democracy, therefore, is that which is especially so denominated according to equality. For the law in such a democracy as this says, that the rich and the poor shall be equal, and that the one shall have no more power than the other, and that the supreme authority shall not be possessed by either of these, but that both shall similarly share it. For if liberty and equality are especially to be found in a democracy, as some persons suppose, it will principally be so by all men having similarly a share in the government. But as the people are the majority, and the opinion of the multitude has supreme authority, such a polity is necessarily a democracy. This, therefore, is one species of a democracy. But another is, when the magistrates are elected by a certain census, and this though the estate is but small. In this polity, however, it is necessary, that he who possesses wealth should be eligible to act as a magistrate, but not the man who is without wealth. Another species of a democracy is that in which every citizen, who is not infamous, has a share in the government; but the law is the ruler. Another, also, is that in which every citizen shares in the government, if only he is a citizen; and in which the law is the ruler. And another species of a democracy is, in other respects, like these, but the multitude, and not the law, have the supreme power. And this takes place, when every thing is determined by a majority of votes, and not by law. This, however, happens through the power of the demagogues. For in those democracies in which the law governs, there are no demagogues, but the best of the citizens fill the first offices in the state. But where the laws are not the lords of all, there demagogues exist. For then the people are the monarch, forming one whole from many individuals. For the many are the lords collectively, but not individually. With respect to Homer, however, when he says, that the domination of many is not good, it is immanifest whether he means this democracy of which we are speaking, or that in which each person exercises his power separately. A people, therefore, of this description, as being a monarch, endeavour to govern monarchically, in order that they may not be in subjection to the law, and become despotic. Hence, flatterers are honoured by them. And such a people as this, are analogous to the tyranny of monarchs. Hence, their manners are the same as those of tyrants, and both exercise a despotic power over more excellent persons. Their decrees, also, are like the mandates of tyrants, and the demagogues in the one polity are analogous to the flatterers in the other; and each especially derives strength from each; flatterers, indeed, from tyrants, but demagogues from a people of this description. But these demagogues are the causes why the decrees of the people, and not the laws, possess absolute authority, in consequence of refusing every thing to the people. For it happens that they become powerful, because the people have the supreme authority, and they govern the opinion of the people; for the people are persuaded by them. Again, those who accuse the magistrates, say that the people ought to be the judges of their conduct; and the people gladly receive the complaints of these persons; so that all magistracies are dissolved. It would seem, however, that he reasonably blames such a democracy as this, who says, that it is a polity according to the proper acceptation of the word. For where the laws do not govern, there is not a polity. For it is necessary, that the law should rule over all things; and that particular incidents should be determined by the magistrates and the polity. Hence, if a democracy is one among the number of polities, it is evident, that such an establishment as that in which all things are administered, by the decrees of the people, is not properly a democracy; for no decree can be universal. After this manner, therefore, the species of a democracy may be determined.
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