We must now, however, direct our attention to the king who does every thing according to his own will. For the government of a king who rules conformable to law, is not, as we have said, a species of a polity. For in all polities, as in a democracy and aristocracy, it is possible to appoint a general for life; and there are many, who entrust the administration of affairs to one person. For such is the government at Epidamnus or Dyrrachium and it is nearly the same at Oponte. With respect however to what is called an absolute kingdom, but this is a government in which the king has dominion over things according to his own will; it appears to some persons not to be conformable to nature, that one person should be the lord of all the citizens, when the city consists of similars. For to those who are similar by nature, it is necessary that there should be the same justice, and the same rank according to nature. Hence, as it is hurtful to bodies for such as are unequal to have the same food, or the same clothing, thus, also, it is with respect to honours; and in these it is similarly noxious that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank. Hence too, it is not more just to govern than to be governed; and in a similar manner, therefore, to govern and be governed alternately. But this now is law; for order is law. It is, therefore, more eligible that law should govern, than any one of the citizens. According to this reasoning, also, if it is better for certain persons to govern, these should be appointed the guardians and servants of the laws. For it is necessary that there should be certain governors; but, say they, it is not just that there should be only one ruler, since all in the city are similar.
Those things, however, which the law does not appear to be able to determine, cannot be decided by man. But the law having carefully laid down the best rules possible, leaves the magistrates to determine the rest by the most just decision. And farther still, it permits that to be corrected, which to those who are experienced in such affairs, may appear to be better than what is already established. He, therefore, who orders intellect to govern, appears to order that god and the laws shall govern; but he who orders man, orders, in addition to this, a wild beast to govern. For desire is a thing of this kind, and anger distorts the judgment of those who govern, and the best of men. Hence law is intellect without appetite. But the example derived from the arts appears to be false, that it is a bad thing to apply for a remedy when ill to books, and that it is more eligible to employ those who are skilled in medicine. For these do nothing contrary to reason through friendship, but receive a pecuniary recompence when they have restored their patients to health. Those, however, who have the management of political affairs, are accustomed to do many things through hatred or favour. As a proof of this, whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been bribed by his enemies to destroy him, he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure. And moreover, physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians, and those who teach the gymnastic exercises, exercise with those of the same profession, as not being able to form a judgment of the truth, in consequence of judging of their own affairs, and being connected with passion. Hence it is evident that those who seek for what is just, seek for a medium; for law is a medium. Again, the moral laws have a greater authority, and are conversant with more principal objects than the written laws; so that the man who governs according to the latter is less to be trusted than he who governs according to the former. Moreover, it is not easy for one person to attend to many things. Hence it will be necessary that many magistrates should be appointed under the supreme magistrate; so that what difference will it make, whether this is done immediately from the beginning, or one person is appointed after this manner? Further still, as we have before observed, if it is just that a worthy man, because he is better than others, should govern; two worthy men are certainly better than one. For this is what Homer says:
“When two together go.”
And also the wish of Agamemnon:
“Were ten such faithful counsellors but mine!”
But there are, also, even now, some particular magistrates who have the power of deciding as judges, those things which the law is unable to determine; so that the law cannot command and judge in these instances after the best manner; for of those in which it can there is no doubt. Since, however, some things may be comprehended by the laws, but others cannot, these are the things which produce doubt and investigation, whether it is more eligible that the best law should govern, or the best man. For it is impossible to frame laws about every thing which may be the subject of deliberation. No one, therefore, denies that it is necessary there should be some person to decide cases of this kind, viz. which cannot come under the cognizance of a written law; but it is thought to be better that there should not be one alone, but many. For every magistrate judges well, who has been disciplined by the law. But, perhaps, it may appear to be absurd to admit that some one may see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, than many persons can do with many eyes and ears; since even now monarchs procure for themselves many eyes and ears, and hands and feet. For they make those that are their friends associates with them in government; since if they are not friends, they will not act conformably to the deliberate choice of the monarch. But if they are friends to him they are also friends to his government. A friend, however, is equal and similar to him of whom he is the friend; so that if he thinks such persons ought to govern, he thinks that his equals, and those that resemble him, ought similarly to govern. The objections, therefore, which are made to a kingly government are nearly these.
The lessons published on this site are freely available to read. If you wish to move from reading to formal study — with graded assessments, academic records, and the support of the Academy — you may enroll at any time. Enrollment is open year round, to students of all ages.
