There are, however, as I may say, nearly two species of a kingdom, which are to be considered, viz. that of which we have spoken and the Lacedæmonian; for most of the others are between these. For they have absolute power over fewer than a government entirely royal, but over more than the Lacedæmonian government; so that the discussion is nearly concerning two things; one indeed, whether it is advantageous to cities to have a perpetual general, and this either by succession in lineage, or by election according to the virtue and dignity of the person, or whether it is not advantageous. But the other is, whether it is advantageous for one person to be the lord of all things, or is not advantageous. The consideration, therefore, of a general of this kind pertains rather to the laws than to the polity. For it is possible that this may be effected in all polities; so that this first mode of government must be omitted. But the remaining mode of a kingly government is the form of a polity; so that it is necessary to survey this, and discuss the doubts with which it is attended. The beginning, however, of the inquiry is this, whether it is more advantageous to be governed by the best man, or by the best laws? It appears, therefore, to those who think a royal government is to be preferred, that the laws only speak universally, but cannot adapt themselves to accidental circumstances; so that it is stupid in any art to govern according to written rules. And in Egypt it is lawful for physicians to adopt a different mode of cure after the fourth day; but if they adopted it prior to this, it was at their own peril. It is evident, therefore, through the same cause, that the best polity is not that which is conformable to written laws. And yet it is necessary that this universal reason (law) should be inherent in all governors. But it will be more perfect in him who is entirely free from passions, than in him with whom they are connascent. In law, therefore, there is nothing of the perturbation produced by the passions, but this is necessarily inherent in every human soul. Perhaps, however, some one may say, in answer to this, that man will deliberate better about particulars. It is indeed, therefore, evident, that a king should necessarily be a legislator, and that he should establish laws, yet not such as are inviolable, because they may deviate from the truth; since kings ought to have absolute authority over other things, viz. such as the law is unable to judge of either wholly or well.
But whether is it requisite that one person, who is the best of the citizens, should govern, or all the citizens? For at present, the citizens, assembling together, act as judges and counsellors; but all their judgements are concerning particulars. Perhaps, therefore, one individual, whoever he may be, will be found, upon comparison, to be inferior to many; (but a city consists of many persons), just as a banquet furnished by many persons, is better than one simple table. On this account the crowd judge of many things better than any one single person. Again, a multitude is less liable to be corrupted; but the judgement of one person is necessarily corrupted, if he is vanquished by anger, or any other such like passion. It would, however, be difficult for all those of whom a crowd consists, to be at one and the same time angry, and misled. But let the multitude consist of free-men, who do nothing contrary to law, except in those things in which the law necessarily fails. Or if this is not easy to be found in a multitude, yet if there should be many good men who are also citizens, whether will one person governing, be less liable to be corrupted, than many who are all of them good men? Or is it not evident, that many will be less liable? But it may be said, the many will be seditious, but one person will not. To this, however, it may, perhaps, be answered, that being worthy in soul, they are in the same manner one as that one person. If, therefore, a government of many persons, all of whom are good men, must be admitted to be an aristocracy, but the government of one man a kingdom, an aristocracy will be more eligible to cities than a kingdom, whether the government is accompanied with power or not, if it consists of persons similarly good. And, perhaps, on this account in former times, the kingly government was adopted, because men who very much excelled in virtue were rarely to be found, especially as the cities that were then inhabited were but small.
Further still, kings were appointed in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind, which is the work of good men. But when it happened that many persons existed at the same time, similarly virtuous, they no longer endured a kingly government; but, seeking after something common, they established a polity. After this, however, when they degenerated, they enriched themselves from public property; and from hence, it is reasonable to suppose oligarchies originated; for they made wealth to be honourable. But from these governments, the first transition was into tyrannies, and from tyrannies they changed into a democracy. For always becoming diminished, through the pursuit of base gain, the multitude grew stronger, so as to attack the rulers, and establish democracies. Since, however, it has happened, that cities afterwards became larger, perhaps it was no longer easy for any other polity than a democracy to exist. But if any one admits, that it is best for cities to be under a kingly government, what is to be done with the children of the king? Ought his family also to reign? But if these children should degenerate from the virtues of their father, their reign will be pernicious. It may, however, be said, that the king will never leave such children his successors, having it in his power to do this. But it is not easy to believe, that this will be the case; for it is a difficult thing, and requires greater virtue than belongs to human nature. There is also a doubt concerning the power of a king, whether he ought to be surrounded with a certain force, by which he may be able to compel those who are not willing to be obedient to his government; or how is he to support his authority? For if he has the supreme power according to law, and does nothing of his own will contrary to it, yet at the same time it is necessary that he should possess a power, by which he may guard the laws. Perhaps, therefore, it is not difficult to determine things pertaining to a king of this kind. For it is necessary, indeed, that he should possess a force, but that the force should be of such a nature, as to render him superior to any one person, or even to many collected together, but inferior to the whole multitude; just as the ancients appointed guards for that person whom they created the prefect of a city, and whom they called æsymnetes, or tyrant. And some one advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow him a certain number for his defence.
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