IT would seem, therefore, that all, or some of these particulars are very properly subjects of doubt in the establishment of a city. For the attainment, indeed, of a good life, education and virtue may most justly claim pre-eminence, as we have before observed. But as those who are equal in one particular, are not, therefore, equal in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing, are unequal in all, it necessarily follows that all such polities as admit they are, are degenerate polities. It has, therefore, been before said, that all men after a certain manner contend with each other justly for the offices of the state, but simply or absolutely considered, all of them do not thus contend justly. For the rich, indeed, contend with each other, because they have the greatest share of the land; but land is common property; and besides this, they are for the most part entitled to greater credit in commercial transactions. But freemen, and noblemen, contend with each other, as being nearly on an equality. For those whose descent is more honourable, are in a greater degree citizens than those who are ignobly born. And nobility of birth is every where honoured. Further still, it is reasonable to suppose, that the offspring of worthy men will be themselves worthy. For nobility is the virtue of family. In a similar manner, also, we say that virtue may justly contend for pre-eminence. For we say that justice is a sociable virtue, which all the other virtues must necessarily follow. Moreover, the many contend with the few; for they are more powerful, richer and better, when collectively taken they are compared with them. If, therefore, all these should be in one city, I mean, the good, the rich, and the noble, and besides these, a certain other political multitude, would there be any dispute concerning who ought, or who ought not to govern? In each of the before-mentioned polities, therefore, the judgment concerning those who ought to govern is indubitable. For they differ from each other in those that have the supreme power. Thus, for instance, in one polity, this power is possessed by the rich, but in another by worthy men; and after the same manner in each of the rest. At the same time, however, we must consider, how we must determine, when all these exist at once, i.e. when at the same time they inhabit the same city.
If, then, the virtuous should be very few in number, after what manner is it proper to decide? Ought we to direct our attention to the abilities of the few, if they are able to govern the city? Or should they be so many as to compose the city? There is, however, a doubt with respect to all those who contend for political honours. For those who think that men should govern because they are rich, or on account of their family being illustrious, assert, as it would seem, nothing just. For it is evident, that if one person is richer than all the rest, the right of governing all the rest will, on this principle, be justly vested in this one person. In a similar manner, he whose birth is more illustrious than that of others, will claim the right of governing those who contend for rule on account of their being freemen. And perhaps the same dispute would happen in an aristocracy on account of virtue. For if one man in this government should be better than the other worthy men in it, it is just, according to this reasoning, that he should have the supreme power. Hence if the multitude also ought to have the supreme authority, because they are more powerful than the few, it will follow that if one, or more than one, though a small number, should be more powerful than the rest, these ought to govern rather than the multitude. But all these things seem to render it evident, that no one of these definitions is right, according to which these persons think they indeed ought to govern, but that all others should be governed by them. For with respect to those who think that they ought to have the chief power in the administration on account of their virtue, and in a similar manner with respect to those who think that they ought to have it on account of their wealth, the multitude would have something which they might justly urge against them. For nothing hinders but that sometimes the many may happen to be better and richer than the few, not as individuals, but as collectively considered. Hence, with respect to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, it may be answered in this manner. For some are dubious, whether a legislator who wishes to establish laws that have the greatest rectitude, should, when that happens which we have already mentioned, establish them with a view to the advantage of the better part of the citizens, or with a view to the advantage of the many? But rectitude consists in equality; and that which is equally right will be advantageous to the whole city, and to every member of it in common. He however is a citizen in common, who both partakes of the government, and is governed. But the condition of a citizen is different in different polities. And the best condition is that in which a man is able to choose both to govern and be governed, with a view to the life which is according to virtue.
If, however, there is some one, or more than one, who greatly surpasses in virtue, though not sufficiently numerous to make the complement of a city, so that the virtue of all the rest, or their political power, should be too inferior to be compared with theirs, if there are more than one; or if but one, with his only; these are no longer to be considered as a part of the city. For it would be doing them injustice to place them on a level with those, who are so inferior to them in virtue and political power; since it is fit to consider such a one as a god amongst men. From whence it is evident that the establishment of laws is necessary for those who are equal to each other in family and power. But law is not for such persons as we have above mentioned; for they are themselves a law. And it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to subject them to the laws. For perhaps they would say what Antisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares, when they demanded to be admitted to an equal share with them in the government. Hence, also, through such a cause as this, cities that are democratically governed have established the ostracism. For these cities appear to pursue equality the most of all things; so that they compel all those who excel in power, on account of their wealth, or the number of their friends, or any other political strength, to submit to the ostracism, and leave the city for a stated time. But it is fabulously reported that the Argonauts left Hercules behind, through such a cause as this; for they were not willing that he should lead the ship Argo together with the other heroes, in consequence of very much surpassing those that sailed in it. Hence those who blame a tyranny, and the counsel given by Periander to Thrasibulus, must not be thought to be absolutely right in their reproof. For it is reported that Periander said nothing to the messenger in answer to the business he was consulted about, but striking off those ears of corn that were higher than the rest, reduced the whole crop to a level, whence the messenger, being ignorant of the cause of what was done, but relating the fact, Thrasibulus understood by it, that it was necessary to take off those men in the city that surpassed the rest. For this is not only advantageous to tyrants, nor do tyrants alone do this; but the like also takes place in oligarchies and democracies. For the ostracism has, after a manner, the same power, by restraining and banishing those who are supereminent. But those who are the lords of power do the same thing in cities and nations; as, for instance, the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians. For having rapidly obtained the superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. But the king of Persia frequently reduces the Medes and Babylonians, and other proud states, when they assume upon their former power. The problem, however, universally respects all polities, and even those that are rightly established. For degenerate polities, indeed, do this looking to private utility; and this also takes place after the same manner in those polities whose attention is directed to the common good.
This, likewise, is evident in other arts and sciences. For neither would a painter suffer an animal to have a foot which transcends symmetry, not even though it should be remarkably beautiful; nor would a shipwright make the prow, or any other part of the ship, larger than symmetry requires; nor will the master of the band permit him to be in the choir who sings louder and better than the rest. Hence, on this account, nothing indeed prevents monarchs from according with cities in supporting their own power, if they do this for the benefit of the cities they govern; and, therefore, according to qualities which are acknowledged to be transcendent, the reason upon which ostracism is founded, has a certain political justice. It is better, therefore, for the legislator so to establish the polity at first, as not to require a remedy of this kind; but in the second place, if an inconvenience such as this should happen, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction; which however was not done by cities. For they did not look to the advantage of their respective polities, but employed ostracisms seditiously. It is evident, therefore, that in degenerate polities, ostracism is privately useful and just. Perhaps, however, it is also evident, that it is not absolutely just. But in the best polity the use of it is attended with great doubt, not on account of pre-eminence in other goods, such as strength, wealth, and a multitude of friends; but when any one is found to excel in virtue, what then ought to be done? For it must not be said that such a one ought to be ejected and banished; since this would be like desiring to govern Jupiter, and divide with him the empire of the world. It remains, therefore, which seems to be natural, that all men ought willingly to obey such a one; so that persons of this description should be perpetual kings in the cities to which they belong.
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