Aristotle, Politics. Book III, Chapter 12


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In all sciences and arts, however, the end is good, but the greatest, and that which is especially the end, is in the principal of them all; and this is the political power. But political good is justice, and this is what is advantageous in common. To all men, however, the just appears to be a certain equality, and those philosophic treatises in which morals are discussed acknowledge this to a certain extent. For they say what is just, and to whom, and they also assert that equals ought to receive equal. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant what things are equal, and what are unequal; for this is attended with doubt and political philosophy. For perhaps some one may say that magistracies ought to be distributed unequally conformably to the excellence of every good man, if in every thing else there is no difference between them, but they are alike. For to persons that are different, justice is one thing, and that which is conformable to their desert another. If, however, this be true, there will be a claim for a greater share of political justice, according to colour and magnitude, and any kind of good by those who possess them transcendently. Or is not this evidently false? But this is manifest in other sciences and powers. For with respect to players on the flute, who are similar according to art, a superior claim to the flute is not given to him whose birth is more noble; for he will not play the better on that account; but the best instrument ought to be given to him who is the best artist. If, however, what we have asserted is not yet manifest, it will be more apparent as we proceed. For if there should be any one who excels in playing on the flute, but who is very deficient in the nobility of his family, or in beauty, though each of these is a greater good than the art of playing on the flute, and, according to analogy, far more excel in this art, than he does in playing on the flute; yet at the same time the best flutes ought to be given to him. For it is necessary that the transcendency in wealth and nobility should contribute to the work of playing on the flute; but they contribute nothing to it. Again, according to this reasoning, it would be possible to compare every good with every good. For if some, then in short any magnitude of body, might come into competition with wealth and liberty; so that if this man excelled more in magnitude of body than that in virtue, and if in short magnitude was a thing more excellent than virtue, all things might then be compared with each other. For if such a magnitude surpasses virtue by so much, it is evident that another magnitude must be equal to virtue. Since, however, this is impossible, it is evident that in political affairs men very properly do not contend for offices in the state according to every kind of inequality. For if some, indeed, are slow, but others swift, it is not at all necessary on this account, that these should have more, and those less; but in gymnastic contests, a difference in these things gains the prize. It is, however, necessary that contentions should arise in those particulars of which a city consists. Hence, noble, independent and rich men, reasonably endeavour to obtain honour. For it is necessary that such persons should be free, and have an estate; since a city cannot consist of all poor men, as neither can it consist of slaves. But if such persons are requisite, it is evident that justice, also, and military virtue are requisite; for it is not possible that a city can be established without these; except that without the former, indeed, it is impossible for a city to exist, but without the latter it cannot be well founded.


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