Let other particulars, therefore, be discussed separately. But it would seem that the assertion that the multitude ought rather to have the supreme power, than the most excellent men who are few, may be solved, and that it is attended with a certain doubt, and perhaps, also, has some truth. For it is possible that the many, each of which is not a worthy man, may when they are collected together be better than the worthy few, not severally, but taken in the aggregate; just as public suppers exceed those which are given at the expense of one person. For being many, each has a portion of virtue and prudence, and thus assembling together, they become like one man made up of a multitude, having many feet, many hands, and many senses. The like also takes place with respect to the manners and the conceptions of the multitude. Hence, also, the multitude are better judges of the productions of music and the poets. For some form a judgement of one part, and some of another; but all decide on the merit of the whole. Worthy men, however, differ in this from each of the many, just as it is said those who are beautiful do from those who are not so, and things painted by art, from real objects, by collecting the parts which are separately disposed into one, though the parts taken separately, such as the eye, or something else, may be more beautiful than in the picture. If, therefore, it is admitted that there is this difference with respect to every people and every multitude, between the many and the few that are worthy, it will be a thing immanifest; and perhaps, by Jupiter, with respect to some persons it is manifestly impossible. For the same assertion would also be adapted to brutes. Though in what respect do some men, as I may say, differ from brutes? Nothing, however, prevents what has been said from being true of a certain multitude. Hence, through these things, the former doubt may be dissolved, and also that which is consequent to it, viz. of whom those that are free and the multitude of the citizens ought to be the lords. But persons of this description are such as are neither rich, nor have any virtuous renown. For it is not safe for them to participate of the greatest authority in the state; since on account of their injustice and ignorance, they will in some things act unjustly, and in others err. And yet it is a very dangerous thing to allow them no power or share in the government. For when the multitude are without honour and poor, it is necessary that the city in which this is the case should be full of enemies.
It remains, therefore, that they should have a share in the public councils, and in determining causes. Hence, also, Solon, and some other legislators, gave the multitude of the citizens the power of electing the officers of the state, and likewise of enquiring into their conduct when they were out of office; but he did not permit them to be magistrates by themselves. For all of them when they are collected together, have sufficient sense, and being mingled with men better than themselves, they benefit cities, just as food which is not pure, in conjunction with the pure, causes the whole to be more useful than a small quantity of food. But each separate from the rest is imperfect for the purposes of judging. This arrangement, however, of a polity, is attended with a doubt. For in the first place, it would seem to be the province of the same person to judge who is fit to be employed as a physician, and to heal and restore to health one who is diseased. But this person is a physician. The like also takes place in other experiences and arts. As, therefore, it is necessary that a physician should give an account of his practice to physicians, this ought also to be the case in other arts. But of physicians, the first is he who practises by the direction of another, the second is the master artist, or he who directs others in their practice, and the third is he who is instructed in the medical art, but does not practise it. For there are certain persons of this description, as I may say, in all the arts. We no less, however, permit those who are only instructed in the art to judge, than those who both know and practise it. And in the next place, it would seem that the same method of proceeding is right with respect to elections. For to choose rightly is the business of those that have a knowledge of elections; just as it is the business of geometricians to choose a geometrician, and of pilots a pilot. For if certain individuals know something of particular works and arts, yet they do not know more than those who are skilled in them; so that according to this reasoning, the supreme authority should not be given to the multitude, neither in electing magistrates, nor in calling them to account for their conduct. Perhaps, however, all that has been here said is not right, on account of what was formerly asserted, if the multitude are not very servile. For each of them, indeed, will be a worse judge of things than those who are skilled in them; but all of them in conjunction, will either know them better, or not worse. And with respect to certain particulars, it is not the maker only that is the best judge, viz. in those works of which those also have a knowledge who do not possess the art by which they are fashioned. Thus with respect to a house, it not only belongs to him by whom it is built to have a knowledge of it, but he who uses it, will form a better judgement of it. But the master of the family uses it. Thus too, the pilot is a better judge of a rudder than she who made it; and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. It would seem, therefore, that this doubt will thus be sufficiently solved.
There is, however, another doubt consequent to this. For it seems to be absurd that depraved men should have greater power in the state than worthy men. But the election of magistrates, and calling them to account for their conduct, are things of the greatest consequence; and this power, as we have observed, is in some polities given to the people. For the general assembly is the mistress of all such things; and of this the people partake. They likewise deliberate in all public affairs, and try all causes, though their property is but small, and their age casual. But the questors, generals, and the chief magistrates, are taken from men of great property. In a similar manner, therefore, this doubt also may be solved. For these things, also, may perhaps be right. For neither the judge, nor the counsellor, nor a member of the general assembly, is the ruler, but the court of justice, and the assembly itself, and the people. Each, however, of the above-mentioned persons, is a part of these. But I call a part, the senator, the member of the general assembly, and the judge. Hence, it is just that the multitude should have authority in things of greater consequence. For the people, the court of justice, and the senate, are composed of the multitude; and the property of all these collectively, is more than the property of any one person, or of a few who are the chief magistrates. Let these things, therefore, be thus determined. The first doubt, however, that was mentioned, renders it evident that nothing is so necessary as that laws rightly established should possess the supreme power; and that the ruler or rulers, should have absolute authority in those things, about which it is impossible for the laws to speak accurately, because it is not easy for them to render every thing manifest universally. But it is not yet evident what kind of laws those ought to be that are rightly established, for that which was formerly a subject of doubt still remains. It is, however, necessary that laws in a manner similar to polities should be either good or bad, just or unjust; for it is evident that laws ought to be established conformably to the polities of which they are the laws. But if this be the case, it is evident that the laws which are conformable to right polities, are necessarily just; and that those which are adapted to the degeneracies of polities are not just.
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