In the first place, however, let us assume what are said to be the boundaries of an oligarchy and a democracy, and what both oligarchic and democratic justice is. For all men adhere to a certain justice, but they only proceed to a certain extent in what is just, and they do not universally speak of that which is absolutely and properly just. Thus, for instance, the equal appears to be just, yet not to all, but to those who are equal. The unequal, likewise, appears to be just; for it is so, yet not to all, but to those that are unequal. But some persons take away this justice, and therefore judge badly. The cause, however, of this is, that they judge concerning themselves. But nearly most men are bad judges about their own affairs. Hence, since justice has a reference to certain persons, and is divided after the same manner both in things and persons, as we have before shown in the Ethics;—this being the case, men acknowledge the equality of the thing, but dispute about the equality of the persons, and especially for the reason just assigned, viz. because they judge badly about their own affairs; and in the next place, because each of them speaks of what is just to a certain extent, they think that they speak of what is simply just. Thus, if some persons are unequal in riches, they fancy they are wholly unequal. Or if they are equal in a certain thing, as for instance in liberty, they fancy they are wholly equal. But they omit that which is most principally just. For if men associated with each other in society for the sake of possessions, they would partake of the city in proportion to their property; so that the reasoning concerning an oligarchy would seem to be valid. For it would not be just that he who contributed one mina, should have an equal share in the hundred along with him who bought in all the rest, either of the original money, or what was afterwards acquired. Nor was civil society established merely for the sake of living, but rather for the sake of living well. For otherwise a city might be composed of slaves, and other animals. But now this is not the case, because these neither participate of felicity, nor of a life which is according to deliberate choice. Nor does civil society subsist for the sake of association in war, in order that the members of the community may not be injured by any one; nor for the purposes of commercial intercourse, and mutual advantage. For then the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all those nations between whom there are treaties of commerce, would be citizens of one city. They have, therefore, articles to regulate their exports and imports, and engagements for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defence. But neither are common magistrates established among all of them, for they are different among different people, nor does the one pay attention to the morals of the other, or take care that no one of those acts unjustly who has entered into the common agreement, or has any depravity, but they are only attentive to this, that they do not injure each other. Those, however, who pay attention to equitable legislation, make political virtue and vice the object of consideration; from whence, also, it is evident, that in the city which is truly so called, care should be taken to render the citizens virtuous. For a communion with others merely for the sake of defence, differs only in place from associates in war that are at a great distance from each other; and law is a compact, and as Lycophron the sophist says, is a surety to the citizens of justice towards each other, though it is not sufficient to make them good and just. But that this is the case is evident. For if any one could collect different places into one, so as that the city of the Megarensians and the Corinthians might be connected with each other by walls, yet they would not be one city; nor even if the inhabitants intermarried with each other; though this pertains to those social connections which are peculiar to cities. In a similar manner, neither would there be one city, if certain persons should live separate from each other, yet not at such a distance as would not admit of an intercourse, and should have laws to prevent their injuring one another in their mutual dealings; as if one of them should be a carpenter, another a shoemaker, and another something else of the like kind, and that the number of them should be ten thousand, still, all that they would have together in common, would pertain to traffic, and an alliance for mutual defence. On what account, therefore, would it not be one city? For it would not be because the mutual intercourse is not near. For if each of those who have such intercourse should come to one place, and use his own house as a city, and each other as confederates in war, for the purpose only of affording assistance against those that should injure them, still they would not be considered as a city, by those who survey the affair accurately; if they similarly associated with each other when they were together, as when they were separate. It is evident, therefore, that a city is not a community of place, nor established for the sake of mutual safety and traffic. But it is necessary, indeed, that these things should exist, if there is to be a city, yet it does not follow that there will be a city, though all these exist. For a city is a society of people living happily with their families and their children, for the sake of a life which is perfect and sufficient to itself. This, however, will not be effected, unless they dwell in one and the same place, and intermarry with each other. Hence, in cities there are family-meetings, conventions, sacrifices, and public entertainments. But a thing of this kind is the work of friendship. For the deliberate choice of living with others is friendship. The end, therefore, of a city is the living happily; but these things are for the sake of the end. And a city is a community of families and villages, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficient life. But this, as we have said, consists in living happily and well. Hence, it must be admitted that political communion is for the sake of beautiful actions, but not for the sake of men living together. On which account, those who contribute most to such a communion as this, have a greater share of the city than those who are their equals in freedom and family, or superior to them in these respects, but are unequal to them in political virtue; or than those who surpass them in wealth, but are surpassed by them in virtue. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident, that all those who dispute about polities, assert something which forms a part of the just.
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