Consequent to what has now been said, it is requisite to consider whether it must be admitted that there is the same virtue of a good man and a good citizen, or not the same. If however it is necessary that this should be investigated, we must first assume, in the way of delineation, what the virtue of a citizen is. As a sailor, therefore, is one of those who form a community, this also we assert of a citizen. But with respect to sailors, though they are dissimilar as to power; for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, another a boatswain, and another has a different nautical appellation; it is evident that the most accurate description of each of them, will be the peculiarity of his virtue. And in a similar manner something common is adapted to all of them. For the safety of the crew is the work of all the sailors; since this is the object of desire to each of them. In like manner, also, the work of citizens, though they are dissimilar, is the safety of the community. But the polity is the community. Hence it is necessary that the virtue of a citizen should have a reference to the polity. If therefore there are many species of a polity, it is evident that it must not be admitted, that there is one perfect virtue of a worthy citizen; but we say that a good man is so according to perfect virtue. Hence it is evident, that it is possible for a man to be a worthy citizen, without possessing the virtue, according to which he is a worthy man.
Moreover, those who are doubtful concerning this question, may after another manner arrive at the same conclusion, respecting the best polity. For if it is impossible that a city should wholly consist of worthy men; but it is necessary that every one should do well according to his proper employment, and this ability proceeds from virtue; since it is impossible that all the citizens should be similar;—if this be the case, there will not be one and the same virtue of a good citizen and a good man. For it is requisite that the virtue of a worthy citizen should be possessed by all the citizens; for thus the city will necessarily be the best; but it is impossible that all the citizens should possess the virtue of a good man, unless it is also necessary that all the citizens in a worthy city should be good men. Farther still, since a city consists of dissimilar parts, for in the same manner as an animal is immediately composed of soul and body; soul, of reason and appetite; a family, of man and wife; and property, of master and slave; thus, also, a city is composed of all these, and besides these, of other dissimilar species;—this being the case, it necessarily follows that there is not one virtue of all the citizens, as neither is there the same virtue of the leader of a musical band, and of him who ranks as second in the choir. It is evident, therefore, from these things, that there is not simply one and the same virtue of all the citizens. Will there, however, be the same virtue of a certain worthy citizen, and a certain worthy man? We say, therefore, that a worthy magistrate is a good and a prudent man; but that a politician is necessarily prudent. And some persons say that the education of a magistrate should, from the beginning, be different from that of other citizens; just as the sons of kings are seen to be instructed in equestrian and warlike exercises. Euripides also says,
“No specious arts be mine, but arts the state requires.”
As if there was a certain education peculiar to a magistrate. But if there is the same virtue of a good magistrate and a good man, and a citizen is one who obeys the magistrate, there will not simply be the same virtue of a good citizen and a good man, though there will be of a certain citizen. For there is not the same virtue of a magistrate and a citizen; and on this account perhaps Jason said, that he should pine away, if he was not permitted to reign, as not knowing how to live the life of a private man. It is, however, a laudable thing to be able both to govern and to be governed, and it is the virtue of an illustrious citizen, to be able to do both these well.
If therefore we admit that the virtue of a good man consists in governing, but the virtue of a good citizen in both governing and being governed, both will not be similarly laudable. It appears, then, that sometimes the governor and the governed should learn not the same things but each that which pertains to him separately, but that the citizen should learn and partake of both these, i.e. of the ability of governing and being governed, as any one may easily perceive. For government is despotic; but it is not requisite that the governor should know how to perform necessary offices, but it is his province rather to use them; since it is servile to do the other. I mean, however, by the other, the ability of performing ministrant offices. But we say that of a slave there are many species. For the employments of a slave are numerous; and of these the spinsters are one. But these, as their name indicates, live by the work of their hands; and among these the dirty mechanic and bellows-blower is included. Hence, formerly, in some polities, such workmen had no share in the government; and this continued to be the case till democracies were established. It is not proper, therefore, that a good man, or a politician, or a good citizen, should learn these servile employments, unless they have occasion for them for their own use. For unless this is observed, it will no longer happen that the one will be a master, but the other a slave. There is, however, a certain government according to which men govern those who are of a similar genus, and freemen. For we say that this is political government, in which it is necessary that he who governs should learn to be governed. Thus a general of horse, and a commander in chief, must acquire a knowledge of their duty by having been subject to the command of others, through all the subordinate degrees of military duty. Hence, also, it is well said, that it is not possible to govern without having been governed. But of these the virtue, indeed, is different. It is, however, necessary that a good citizen should be able, and should know how, both to be governed and to govern. And this is the virtue of a citizen, to know how freemen ought to govern and be governed; and it is also the virtue of a good man. If likewise the temperance and justice of him who commands is different from those of him who, though a freeman, is under command, it is evident that there will not be one virtue only, such as justice, of a good citizen, but that his virtues will be distinguished by species, according to which he governs and is governed; just as the temperance and fortitude of a man are different from those of a woman. For a man would appear to be timid, if he was brave in such a way as a woman is; and a woman would be accounted a prattler, if she had that modesty which is becoming in a good man. For the domestic duty of a man is different from that of a woman; since it is the province of the former to acquire property, but of the latter to take care of it. But prudence is alone the peculiar virtue of him who governs. For the other virtues appear to be necessarily common to those who are governed, and those who govern. The virtue, however, of him who is governed, is not prudence, but true opinion. For he who is governed resembles the maker of a pipe; but he who governs is the piper who plays on the pipe. From these things, therefore, it is evident whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same, or different, and in what manner it is the same, and in what manner it is different.
The lessons published on this site are freely available to read. If you wish to move from reading to formal study — with graded assessments, academic records, and the support of the Academy — you may enroll at any time. Enrollment is open year round, to students of all ages.
