The question also concerning what is justly or unjustly done in a city, is connected with the former doubt. For some persons are dubious, when a thing may be said to be done by the city, and when not; as when a democracy is produced from an oligarchy, or a tyranny. For then some persons refuse to fulfill their contracts, conceiving it belongs to the tyrant and not to the city to receive the money; and many other things of a similar nature take place; as if some polities subsisted for the purpose of subjugation, and not for common utility. If, therefore, some persons act democratically after this manner, it must be said that the actions of this city are the actions of this polity, similar to those of an oligarchy and a tyranny. And here it seems to be proper to discuss the doubt, when a city ought to be called the same, and when it ought not to be called the same, but different? The most superficial investigation, therefore, of the doubt, is that which is made about the place and the people. For it is possible that the former may be disjoined from the latter, and that some persons may live in one, and some in another place. This doubt, therefore, must be considered as of a less difficult nature. For since a city is denominated multifariously, there is, in a certain respect, a facility in this inquiry. And in a similar manner as to those men who inhabit the same place, when is it proper to think that the city which they inhabit is one? For it is not through its walls. For Peloponnesus may be surrounded with one wall. But perhaps Babylon is a city of this kind, and every other place, which is rather an inclosure of a nation than of a city. And it is said that this was captured three days, and that a certain part of the city did not perceive that it was taken. With respect to this doubt, however, the consideration of it will be useful on another occasion. For as to the magnitude of a city, how large it should be, and whether it is advantageous to it to contain only one nation, or more than one, these are things which a politician should not be unacquainted with. But with respect to the same persons inhabiting the same place, whether shall we say that the city is the same, as long as the race of the inhabitants is the same, though some of them are always perishing, and others rising into existence; just as we are accustomed to say that rivers and fountains are the same, though the waters are continually changing? Or shall we say that the men are the same, from the same cause, but the city different? For if a city is a certain community, but it is a community of citizens; when the polity becomes altered and specifically different, it would seem to be necessary that the city should not be the same; just as with respect to a chorus, we say that the comic is different from the tragic, though frequently it consists of the same performers. In a similar manner, therefore, every other community and composition are different, if the species of the composition is different; just as we say that the harmony of the same sounds is different, when at one time it is the Dorian, but at another the Phrygian harmony. If however this be the case, it is evident that a city is then especially to be called the same, when we thus denominate it looking to the polity. And it is lawful to call it by the same, or by a different name, whether it be inhabited by the same persons, or by men entirely different. But whether it is just to dissolve the city or not, when it is changed into another polity, is another question.
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