In a similar manner, the Laws [of Plato] which were written afterwards, are nearly attended with the same doubts; on which account it will be better briefly to discuss the polity which is there delineated. For Socrates in the Republic, has entirely discussed but a few things concerning the community of wives and children, how it ought to subsist, and also concerning property, and the order of the polity. For the multitude of the inhabitants is divided by him into two parts, viz. into husbandmen and the belligerent part; and from these he selects a third part, whose province is to consult and deliberate, and to have the principal authority in the city. But with respect to husbandmen and artificers, whether they are to have no part in the government, or whether they are to have a certain share in it, and whether it is proper they should have arms, and join with the others in war, or not, concerning these things Socrates has determined nothing; but he thinks that the women ought to go to war as well as the men, and that they should participate of the same discipline as the guardians. And with respect to other things, he has filled his treatise with matter foreign to the purpose, and with discussing what kind of education that of the guardians ought to be. As to his treatise of Laws, the greatest part of it consists of laws, and he has said but little in it concerning a polity. Being also desirous to make this more common to other cities, he gradually brings it round again to another polity. For except the community of women and possessions, he attributes the same things to both polities. For the education is the same in both, there is the same exemption from necessary business, and the same manner of eating together, except that in that he says the women should have common tables, and that there should be a thousand men at arms, but in this, that there should be five thousand. All the discourses, therefore, of Socrates, are excellent, elegant, new and inquisitive; but it is perhaps difficult to say that they are all right. For with respect to the number just now mentioned, it is necessary not to be ignorant, that he would want the country of Babylonia for so many, or some other region of an immeasurable extent, in which five thousand idle persons may be supported, and besides these, a far greater multitude of women and servants. Every one, therefore, may indeed frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet it should not be attended with any thing impossible. It is said, however, that the legislator in establishing laws ought to direct his attention to two things, viz. the country and the men; and besides this, it is well to add, that he should look to the neighbouring places, if it is necessary that the city should live a political life. For it is not only necessary that it should use such kind of arms in war as are useful for its own country, but also such as are useful for foreign countries. But if any one does not choose a life of this kind, viz. neither the private, nor the common life of the city, yet at the same time it is no less necessary that the citizens should be dreadful to their enemies, not only when they invade their country, but also when they depart from it. It is likewise necessary to look to the quantity of property, and to consider whether it might not otherwise be better determined, by being more clearly defined. For he says, that every one ought to have as much as is sufficient for him to live on moderately, viz. so as to enable him to live well; for this is a more universal thing. Again, it is possible indeed to live temperately, and at the same time miserably; but the better boundary is to live temperately and liberally. For each being taken separately, a luxurious life is consequent to the one, and a laborious life to the other; since these are the only eligible habits with respect to the use of property. Thus, for instance, it is not possible for a man to use this property mildly or bravely, but it is possible for him to use it temperately and liberally; so that these uses are necessarily conversant with property. It is also absurd to render possessions equal, and yet not to provide for the multitude of the citizens, but to leave the procreation of children indefinite, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of women who should happen to be childless, whatever that number might be, because this also seems to happen in other cities. It is necessary, however, that this should not take place with similar accuracy, in the city which he proposes, and those which now exist. For now, indeed, no one is dubious, because property is divided among an indefinite multitude; but as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries, whether they were few or many, would have nothing at all. Some one, however, may apprehend that it is more necessary the procreation of children should be determined, than the extent of property, so that more than a certain number should not be generated. But this multitude must be defined, by looking to the destiny of the children, and considering who among them may happen to die, and also to those women who will be barren. For to neglect this, as is the case in many cities, must necessarily be the cause of poverty to the citizens. And poverty produces sedition and improbity. Phidon the Corinthian, therefore, who was one of the oldest legislators, thought that families and the number of the citizens should remain equal; though all of them at first, should have allotments unequal according to magnitude; but the contrary takes place in the Laws of Plato. With respect to these things, however, we shall hereafter show in what manner we think it would be better for them to subsist. In these laws, also, of Plato, the way in which the governors are to be distinguished from the governed is omitted. For he says, that as of one sort of wool the warp ought to be made, and of another the woof, thus also the governors ought to subsist with reference to the governed. But since he admits that all their property may be increased five fold, why should not the land, also, be permitted to increase to a certain extent? It is likewise requisite to consider whether the division of the buildings will be useful for the purposes of economy. For he distributes two houses to each person, separate from each other. But it is difficult to inhabit two houses. The whole arrangement, however, is neither a democracy, nor an oligarchy, but is a medium between these, which is called a polity; for it is composed of armed men. If, therefore, he established this polity as that which is more common than all others, he has perhaps rightly denominated it; but if as that which is the best after the first polity, it is not so. For perhaps some one will prefer to it the polity of the Lacedæmonians, or some other more aristocratic form of government. Some persons therefore say, that the best polity ought to be mingled from all polities; and on this account they praise the polity of the Lacedæmonians; for they say that is composed of an oligarchy, a monarchy, and a democracy; calling indeed a kingdom a monarchy, the government of old men [or the senate], an oligarchy, and that of the ephori a democracy, because it is formed from the people. But others are of opinion that the government of the ephori is a tyranny, and that the democratic form of government is represented in their common meal and daily course of life. In this treatise of Laws, also, it is said, that the best polity ought to be composed of a democracy and a tyranny, though no one would ever admit this to be a polity, or if he did, he would consider it to be the worst of all others. Those, therefore, speak better, who mingle many polities together. For the polity is more excellent which is composed of many polities. In the next place, the polity of Plato does not appear to contain any thing monarchical, but to be oligarchical and democratical, though it inclines more to an oligarchy. But this is evident from the appointment of the magistrates; for the election of them by lot is common to both. That those, however, who are more rich, must necessarily be members of the assembly, and elect the magistrates, or do any thing else pertaining to the management of public affairs, this is oligarchical; as is also the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich may be magistrates, and that the rank of their appointments may correspond with their fortunes. He likewise makes the election of the senate to be oligarchical; for all vote from necessity for those who are senators of the first class; afterwards, they vote for the same number out of the second, and then out of the third class; except that this compulsion to vote does not extend to all of the third or fourth class. And as for the fourth class, only those of the first and second rank in all the four are obliged to choose them. In the next place, by these means he says there will necessarily be an equal number of each rank; for those of the greatest revenue will excel in number and worth, because some of the commonality do not vote, in consequence of not being compelled to it. From these things, therefore, it is evident that it is not necessary such a polity as this should consist of a democracy and monarchy, and this will also be manifest from what will be hereafter said, when we discuss a polity of this kind. The electing likewise of magistrates from the number of those that are elected is attended with danger. For if certain persons are willing to combine together, though their number is but moderate, the election will always be conformable to their will. And thus much concerning the polity in the Laws of Plato.
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