In the next place it follows that we should consider in what manner property ought to be regulated among those who are to be governed after the best manner, viz. whether it should be common or not. But this may be considered by some one separately from what has been determined concerning children and wives. I mean, whether it is better that these should be held separate, as they now are among all nations, or that not only possessions, but also the use of them should be in common; as that the lands and grounds should have a particular owner, but that the produce should be brought together, and used as one common stock, as some nations do at present; or, on the contrary, whether the land should be common, and should be cultivated in common, while the produce of it is divided for the particular use of the inhabitants, which is said to be practised by some barbarians; or should both the land and the produce of it be common? When the husbandmen, therefore, are different from the citizens, there will be another and a more easy method; but when the citizens themselves labour, there must be many difficulties in what pertains to property. For if they be not equal, both in the advantage which they reap, and the labour which they sustain, it must necessarily happen that those who reap little, and labour much, will complain of those who enjoy and take a large share of the produce, and yet labour but little. In short, it is the most difficult of all human concerns, to live together, and have all things in common, and especially in things of this kind. And this is evident from that community which is formed by those who go out to settle a colony; for nearly they disagree very much on the most common occasions, and strike each other from trifles. Again, we most frequently strike those servants who are generally employed in the common offices of the family. The possession, therefore, of property in common, is attended with these, and other such like difficulties. But the manner in which it is now established, when it is adorned with good morals, and equitable laws, is in no small degree superior to it; for it will have the good resulting from both. But by the good resulting from both, I mean that which is the consequence of property which is common, and also of that which is peculiar. For it is necessary, that in a certain respect it should be common, but wholly peculiar. For the attentions of men when divided, will not produce accusations against each other; but property will rather be increased, as every one will apply himself to his peculiar concerns. It will also be on account of virtue, that they will perform good offices to each other, conformably to the proverb, that all things are common amongst friends. But this custom is even now adopted in certain cities, so that it is not a thing impossible to be effected, and especially in those cities that are well governed; for in these, some things are common, and others might be so. For each person possessing his own private property, some things he renders useful to his friends, but others he uses as common; as in Lacedæmon, where they use the slaves of each other, as if, in short, they were their own; as they also do their horses and dogs, and even any provision they may want in a journey. It is evident, therefore, that it is better to have private property, but to make the use of it common. But how this is to be effected, is the proper business of the legislator. Again, with respect to pleasure also, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is for a man to think that he has something which he may call his own. For it is not in vain that each person is disposed in a friendly manner towards himself, but this is natural. Self-love, however, is justly blamed. But this does not consist in a man having an affection for himself, but in loving himself more than is proper; in the same manner as with respect to a lover of money. For all men, as I may say, love every thing of this kind. Moreover, to gratify and assist our friends, or guests, or companions, is most delightful, which can be effected when property is private. These things, however, do not happen to those who make a city to be very much one. And besides this, they evidently destroy the works of two of the virtues, viz. of temperance with respect to women; for it is a beautiful deed to abstain through temperance from a woman who is the property of another man; and of liberality with respect to private property. For without private property no one can appear to be liberal, nor perform any liberal action. For the work of a liberal man consists in the use of possessions. A legislation therefore of this kind has indeed a specious appearance, and seems to be philanthropic. For it is willingly admitted by him who hears it mentioned, as he thinks that through it there will be an admirable friendship of all men towards all; and particularly when any one censures the evils which at present exist in polities, as arising from property not being common, I mean the litigations of men with each other about contracts, the judgments which are passed in court in consequence of false witnesses, and flattering the rich, none of which are produced through property not being common, but through depravity. Besides, those who possess things in common, and live in one general community, disagree much more with each other, as we see, than those who have their property separate. We perceive, however, but few of those who have their property in common disagreeing with each other, compared with the multitude of those whose property is private. Farther still, it is just not only to mention the evils those are liberated from, who have all things in common, but likewise the goods of which they are deprived. For it appears to be perfectly impossible for such a life as this to exist. It is fit therefore to think that the error of Socrates arose from his hypothesis not being right. For it is necessary, indeed, that both a family and a city should be in a certain respect one, yet not entirely. For there is a certain extent, beyond which if a city proceeds, it will no longer be a city; and there is also an extent by proceeding to which it will still be a city, but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be worse than a city; just as if some one should make a symphony to be an omophony, or the sound of one voice, or a verse, to be one foot. But it is necessary, as we have before observed, to make the people common and one through discipline; as property at Lacedæmon, and the public tables at Crete, were made common by the legislator. He, however, who intends to introduce discipline, and thinks through this that the city will be worthy, will be absurd, if he fancies that he shall form it to rectitude by such means, and not by manners, and philosophy, and the laws. It is likewise requisite not to be ignorant of this, that attention must be paid to a long time and many years, in which it will become evident, whether it will be proper to adopt such a plan. For all things, indeed, have been nearly discovered, but some have been neglected, and others, by those who knew them, have not been used. This, however, would become especially apparent, if any one could see such a polity really established. For it would not be possible to form such a city without dividing and separating it, partly into public tables, and partly into wards and tribes; so that nothing else will happen to be legally established, except that the guardians shall not be employed in agriculture; which is what the Lacedæmonians are now endeavouring to do. Moreover, neither has Socrates said, what the mode of the whole polity will be to those who have all things in common, nor is it easy to say what it will be, though the majority of the city will nearly consist of a multitude of other citizens, concerning whom nothing is determined, whether property ought also to be common to the husbandmen, or whether each should have a share to himself; and also, whether their wives and children should be in common or not. For if all things are to be after the same manner common to all, in what will they differ from those guardians? Or what greater advantage would they obtain by submitting to their government, or by the attainment of what knowledge, would they submit to it, unless they should wisely establish a thing of such a kind as the Cretans have established? For they permitting every thing else to their slaves, forbid them only gymnastic exercises, and the possession of arms. But if things of this kind should subsist with them in the same manner as in other cities, what will be the condition of the community? For there must necessarily be two cities in one city, and these contrary to each other. For Socrates makes the guardians to be as it were keepers, and the husbandmen, artificers, and others, to be citizens; but accusations, litigations, and all such other evils as he says exist in other cities, will also be found in his; though Socrates says, they will not be in want of many laws on account of their education, but such only as may be necessary for regulating the streets, the markets, and the like, while at the same time he only gives discipline to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen masters of property, by paying a tribute; but this would be likely to render them much more troublesome and conceited than the Helots, the Penestice, and the slaves which others employ. Nor has he at all determined, whether these things are similarly necessary, or not; nor with respect to things consequent to these, has he said any thing, viz. what the polity of these, their discipline, and their laws, will be. It is not, however, easy to discover, and it is of no small consequence, what the nature of these should be, for the purpose of preserving the community of the guardians. If, however, he makes the women common, but the possessions private, who will manage the domestic concerns, in the same manner as the men do those of agriculture? Though the possessions of the wives of the husbandmen should be common. It is also absurd to make a comparison from brutes and in consequence of this to say that the women ought to engage in the same pursuits as the men, though among brutes there is no domestic management. The establishment also of magistrates in the way adopted by Socrates, is dangerous; for he makes the same persons to be always magistrates. But this becomes the cause of sedition, even among those who are of no account, and much more among spirited and warlike men. It is however evident, that he must necessarily make the same persons always rulers. For the gold which God infused into the soul, is not at different times mingled in different souls, but always in the same. But he says, that gold is mingled with some souls, and with others silver, as soon as they are born; but brass and iron with the souls of those who are to be artists and husbandmen. Farther still, though he deprives the guardians of felicity, yet he says that the legislator ought to make the whole city to be happy. It is however impossible that the whole city should be happy, unless the greater number, or all the parts, or some of them, possess felicity. For felicity is not like an even number. For it is possible for the even to be inherent in the whole of a number, and yet in neither of its parts; but this is impossible in felicity. Moreover, if the guardians are not happy, who else are so? For the artificers are not, nor the multitude of those who are employed in sordid occupations. The polity, therefore, of which Socrates speaks is attended with these doubts, and with others which are not inferior to these.
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