But admitting that it is best that the communion in a city should be as much as possible one, this does not appear to be demonstrated by permitting all at once to say, this is mine, and this is not mine. For Socrates considered this as an indication that the city is perfectly one. For the word all is twofold. If, therefore, it means each individual, perhaps that which Socrates wishes to effect, will in a greater degree take place; for each person will say, this is his own son and his own wife, and he will speak in a similar manner of his property, and of every other accidental thing. Now, however, those who have their wives and children in common do not say so; but this is indeed asserted by all, though not as individuals. And in a similar manner all will thus speak concerning property, yet not as individuals. It is evident, therefore, that there is a paralogism in saying all. For the words all and both are even and odd, on account of their twofold signification, and in arguments produce contentious syllogisms. Hence, for all men to call the same thing their own, is in one way, indeed, proper, but not possible, and in another way it is not at all adapted to produce concord. Besides this, that assertion of Socrates is attended with another inconvenience. For that which is common to many, has the least attention paid to it; since men regard what is their own much more than what is common to others, and pay attention to that which every man has peculiar to himself. Every one, likewise, is more negligent of what another is to take care of as well as himself, than of his own private concerns, as in a family where many servants often perform ministrant offices worse than a few. Let every citizen then have a thousand children, and let none of them be considered as the children of the individual, but let any casual child be similarly the child of any casual parent, and all of them will be similarly neglected. Farther still, thus also every person might say of each of the citizens that acted well or ill, whatever the number might be, this is my son, or the son of this or that man; and in this manner they would speak, and thus they would doubt of each of the thousand, or of whatever number the city consisted. For it would be immanifest to whom it happened to have begotten the child, and to have preserved it when born. But whether is it better for every man thus to say of any one of two thousand or ten thousand, this is mine, or to say so as men do at present in cities? For in these one man calls another his son, another calls that same person his brother, another his nephew, or denominates him according to some other alliance, either by blood or marriage, and first extends his care to him, or to those belonging to him, while another regards him as one of the same fraternity, or of the same tribe. For it is better for a man to be a nephew in his private capacity, than a son after that manner. Moreover, neither is it possible to prevent some persons from suspecting that they are brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers, to each other. For from the resemblances which there are between children and their parents, they must necessarily obtain belief of their relationship to each other, which is said by certain cosmographers to be the case in some countries of the Upper Africa, where women are common, and the children are distinguished by their resemblances, and through this are delivered to their respective fathers. There are also some mares and cows, which naturally bring forth their young very similar to the males that begot them, as was the case with the mare in Pharsalia, called Just.
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