A community of wives, however, is attended with many other difficulties, and the cause through which Socrates says it is necessary that this should be established by law, does not appear to follow from his reasoning. And besides, it is impossible that it should produce the end which he says the city ought to attain, as we have just now observed; nor has he determined any thing about the manner in which it ought to be accomplished. But I also say, that the whole city ought to be one as much as possible, this being a most excellent thing. For Socrates assumes this hypothesis, though it is evident, that by proceeding to become in a greater degree one, it will not be a city. For a city is naturally a certain multitude; but becoming in a greater degree one, from being a city, it will be a family, and a man from being a family. For we must admit that a family is more one than a city, and one man than a family; so that even if any one were able to effect this, it is not to be done; for he would subvert the city. A city, however, not only consists of many persons, but also of those that are specifically different. For a city is not formed from similars; since a confederacy and a city are different things. For a confederacy is useful from the number of those who compose it, though they may be specifically the same. For a confederacy is naturally formed for the sake of defence, just as a greater weight causes the scale to descend more than it does with a less weight. A city, also, differs by a similar distinction from a nation, when the multitude of which it consists are not collected into separate villages, but live like the Arcadians. But the things from which a city ought to become one, are specifically different; on which account a reciprocation of the equal preserves cities, as we have before observed in the Ethics; since it is necessary that this should take place amongst freemen and equals. For all cannot govern at one and the same time, but either by the year, or according to some other arrangement, or time, so that all of them will govern, just as if shoemakers and carpenters should exchange occupations, and the same persons should not always be shoemakers and carpenters. Since, however, it is better for political society, that these should continue to exercise their respective trades, so, likewise, it is evidently better that the same persons, if possible, should always govern. But where it is not possible, (because all men are naturally equal, and at the same time, also, it is just, that whether the government be good or bad, all should partake of it) there it is best to observe a rotation, and to let those who are their equals by turns submit to those who are at that time magistrates, as they will, in their turns, be governors and governed, as if they were different persons. After the same manner, therefore, of those who govern different persons will have different offices. Hence, from these things it is evident, that a city is not naturally adapted to be one in the way in which some persons say it is, and that which has been said to be the greatest good in cities, is the destruction of cities; though the good of each thing preserves each thing. After another manner, also, it is evident that it is not better to endeavour to make a city very much one. For a family, indeed, is more sufficient to itself than one person, and a city than a family; and a city then exists when it happens that the communion of the multitude of which it consists is sufficient to itself. If, therefore, that which is more sufficient to itself is more eligible, that also which is in a less degree one is more eligible.
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