It is evident then, that in the government of a family, more attention should be paid to the human beings that compose it, than to the possession of things inanimate, and to the virtue of the former, than to the property which we call wealth; and also to the freemen than to the slaves. In the first place, therefore, with respect to slaves, it may be doubted whether there is a certain other virtue of a slave, besides organic and ministrant offices, which is more honourable than these, such as temperance, fortitude, justice, and other such like habits; or whether there is no virtue in him besides corporeal services. For each side of the question is attended with a doubt; since if there is any other virtue, in what does a slave differ from a free man? And if there is not, an absurdity follows, since slaves are men, and partake of reason. There is, also, nearly the same question concerning a woman and a child, whether there are likewise virtues of these, and it is necessary that a woman should be temperate, brave and just; and whether a child is temperate or not? And universally, this is to be enquired concerning that which by nature is governed, or governs, whether there is the same, or a different virtue in each. For if, indeed, it is necessary that both should participate of probity, why is it requisite that the one should entirely govern, and the other be governed? For it is not possible they can differ in the more and the less; since to be governed and to govern are things specifically different; but the more and the less are not. If, however, the one ought to have these virtues, but the other not, it will be wonderful. For if he who governs is not temperate and just, how can he govern well? And in the next place, how can he who is to be governed, if he has not these virtues, be governed well? For being intemperate and timid, he will not do any thing that he ought. It is evident, therefore, that both ought necessarily to participate of virtue; but in virtue there is a difference, as there is between those who are naturally governed. And this is immediately apparent in the soul. For in the soul, by nature one part, the rational, governs, but the other, the irrational, is governed; and of these parts, we say that there is a different virtue of each. It is evident, therefore, that the like also takes place in other things; so that many things by nature govern and are governed. For a freeman governs in a different manner from a slave, the male from the female, and a man from a child. And in all these, indeed, the parts of the soul are inherent (viz. the rational and irrational parts), but they are inherent differently. For a slave has not in short the deliberative power; but the female has it, indeed, but it is weak; and a child has it, but it is imperfect. Hence, it is necessary, that they should be similarly circumstanced with respect to the ethical virtues. For it is requisite to suppose that all of them, indeed, participate of these, yet not after the same manner, but in such a way as is adapted to the employment of each. On this account, it is necessary, indeed, that he who is to govern should possess ethical virtue in perfection; for his employment is simply that of an architect; and reason is the architect; but each of the others only requires as much virtue as is accommodated to his station. Hence, it is evident that ethical virtue pertains to all the above-mentioned persons, and that there is not the same temperance of a woman and of a man, nor the same fortitude and justice, though Socrates was of opinion that there is; but the fortitude of the man is of a ruling nature. A woman, according to Socrates, in the Republic of Plato, is capable of doing every thing that a man can do, but in an inferior degree; strength being the characteristic of the latter, and of a ruling nature, and of the woman, of a subservient nature. The like, also, takes place with respect to the other virtues. But this will be evident to those who consider the subject more particularly. For those who assert universally that virtue consists in the soul being well disposed, or in acting rightly, or in something of the like kind, deceive themselves. For those speak much better, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues, than those who thus define them. Hence, it is necessary to think concerning all persons conformably to what the poet [Sophocles] says of a woman,—Silence gives ornament to woman. But it is not the ornament of a man. And since a child is imperfect, it is evident that his virtue is not to be referred to himself, but to that which is perfect and his leader [i.e. his preceptor]. In a similar manner the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master. For we laid it down as a principle, that a slave is necessary for useful purposes. Hence, it is evident that he requires but a small portion of virtue, and only so much as is sufficient to prevent him from being deficient in his work either through intemperance or timidity. If, however, what has now been said is true, some one may doubt, whether it is requisite that artificers also should possess virtue; for through intemperance they are frequently deficient in their works. Or may we not say that there is a great difference between these? For a slave has a communion with his master in life; but the connexion of the artificer with the person who employs him is more remote; and the virtue which pertains to him is in proportion to his participation of slavery. For the artificer who is engaged in mean and sordid works has a certain definite slavery and weakness of the former. The virtues of the woman, therefore, are specifically the same with those of the man; but they differ in degree, as not being accompanied with so much strength as the virtues of the man. And with this opinion Aristotle himself evidently accords, when he says, “that the fortitude of the man is of a ruling, but of the woman of a subservient nature.” For that which is stronger is naturally adapted to rule, and that which is weaker, to be ruled. And a slave, indeed, is among the number of things which have a subsistence by nature; but this is not the case with a shoemaker or any other artist. It is evident, therefore, that the master ought to be the cause to the slave of a virtue of this kind, and not he who has a despotic power of instructing him in his work. Those persons, therefore, do not speak well, who deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to obey their orders; for slaves are to be admonished in a greater degree than children. After this manner, therefore, these things are to be determined. It is necessary, however, in the discussion of politics, to consider the relations of husband and wife, children and parents, the virtues of each, and their associations with each other, what is right, and what is not, and in what manner it is necessary to pursue the one, and avoid the other. For since every family is a part of a city, and husband and wife, parents and children, &c. are the parts of a family, and it is necessary that the virtue of a part should look to the virtue of the whole, it is requisite that those who direct their attention to a polity should instruct the children and the wives, if it is of any consequence to the goodness of the city, that the children and the women should be worthy. It is, however, necessarily of great consequence. For the women, indeed, are one half of the free persons; and from the children the future citizens are to be formed. Hence, since these have been discussed, the rest must be considered elsewhere, as if the subject was now finished. Making, therefore, another beginning, let us in the first place consider what has been asserted by others concerning the most excellent polity.
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