But that whatever is changed in quality, is so changed by sensibles, and that change in quantity alone subsists in such things as are said to be essentially passive to sensibles, may from hence be surveyed: for some one may apprehend that the change in quality of other things especially subsists in figures, forms, and habits, and in the assumption and loss of these; but it is in neither: for of that which is figured, when it has arrived at perfection, we do not say it is that from which it derives its subsistence. Thus, we do not say that the statue is brass, or that the pyramid is wax; or that the bed is wood; but paronymizing we say, that the first is brazen, the second waxen, and the third wooden. But we call that which htls been passively affected, and is changed in quality, by the same name as before: for we say that a thing is dry and moist, hard and hot; and also that it is wax. And, not only so, but we say that what is moist, and what is hot, is brass; calling the matter by the same name as the passion. So that, if that which is made in which there is figure, is not predicated according to figure and form, but is predicated according to passions and changes in quality, it is evident that these generations will not be changes in quality. Farther still, to speak thus may seem to be absurd, viz. either that a man or a house is changed in quality, or any thing else that is generated. But, perhaps, it is necessary that every thing should be generated, something being changed in quality; as, for instance, the matter being condensed, or rarified, or heated, or refrigerated: yet nevertheless things which are generated are not changed in quality, nor is the generation of them a change according to quality. Moreover, neither are the habits of the body, nor of the soul, changed according to quality: for of habits, some are virtues, and others vices; but neither virtue nor vice is a change in quality. But virtue is a certain perfection: for when any thing receives its proper virtue, it is then said to be perfect: for then a subsistence according to nature is especiaIIy present. Thus a circle is said to be perfect, when it especially becomes the best circle. But vice is the corruption of, and departure from this. As, therefore, neither do we call the perfection of the house a change in quality (for it would be absurd that the roof and a tile should be change according to quality, or that the house when it receives a roof, and is covered with tiles, should be changed in quality, and not rather be perfected); in like manner, in the virtues and vices, and in those who possess or receive them, the former are perfections, and the latter departures; and consequently arc not changes in quality. Again, we say that all the virtues consist in being affected in a certain manner towards a certain thing; for we admit that the virtues of the body, such as health and a good bodily habit, consist in the temperament and symmetry of things hot and cold, either of the internal parts with respect to each other, or with reference to that which contains them. The like also takes place in beauty and strength, and the other virtues and vices; for each consists in being affected in a certain manner towards a certain thing; and well or ill disposes its possessor with respect to appropriate passions. But appropriate passions are said to be those things by which any thing is naturally adapted to be generated and corrupted. Since, therefore, relatives are not themselves changes according to quality, and there is not either a change in quality, or generation, or in short, any mutation of them, it is evident that neither are habits, nor the loss and assumption of habits, changes according to quality. But perhaps it is necessary that these should be generated and corrupted, certain things being changed in quality, just as the form and morphe, for instance, of things hot and cold, or dry and moist, or in those things in which they are first inherent: for every vice and virtue is said to subsist in those things by which the possessor is naturally adapted to be changed in quality; for virtue produces the impassive, or passivity, in such a manner as is proper; but vice produces the passive and the impassive in a contrary manner. The like also takes place in the habits of the soul; for all these consist in being affected in a certain way towards a certain thing. And the virtues indeed are perfections, but the vices egressions. Farther still, virtue well disposes, but vice ill disposes, towards appropriate passions; so that neither will these be changes in quality, nor the loss and assumption of them. But it is necessary that these should be generated, the sensitive part being changed in quality, and it is changed in quality by sensibles; for all ethical virtue is conversant with corporeal pleasures and pains; and these consist either in action, or in memory, or in hope. Some of these pleasures, therefore, consist in the energy of sense, so that the sense is moved by some sensible object; but others consist in memory and hope, and derive their being from energizing according to these; for men are delighted, either from recollecting the manner in which they have been affected, or from the hope of what they expect. So that all such pleasure is necessarily produced by sensible objects. But since, when pleasure and pain are produced, vice also and virtue are produced (for they are conversant with these), and since pleasures and pains are changes in quality of the sensitive part, it is evident that something being changed in quality, these also must necessarily be lost and obtained. Again, the generation of these is attended with change in quality; but it is not itself a change in quality. Moreover, neither are the habits of the intellective part of the soul, changes in quality: for that which possesses scientific knowledgc especially pertains to things which are predicated as relations. But this is manifest; for science is not ingenerated in us, in consequence of our being moved according to any power, but it is generated when something is inherent: for from partial experience we acquire, in a certain respect, universal science. Neither therefore is energy generation, unless it should be said that beholding and touching are generations; for energy is a thing of this kind. Again, there is not generation of use and energy, unless some one should fancy that there is a generation of beholding and touching. And to energize is similar to these. But the first acquisition of science is not indeed generation nor change in quality; since, for the dianoetic part to have rested and stood still, is, we say, to possess scientific knowledge and prudence. There is not, however, a generation to resting; for there is not, in short, a generation of any mutation, as was before observed. Farther still, as when from intoxication, or sleep, or disease, any one is changed into the contraries to these, we do not say that he again becomes scientifically knowing, though it was impossible prior to this that he could use science; so neither when any one first acquires habit: for in consequence of the soul becoming established by ethical virtue, something becomes prudent and scientifically knowing. Hence, children can neither understand, nor judge according to the senses equally as well as elderly persons: for there is in them much perturbation and motion. But they become steady, and are liberated from this perturbation, sometimes by nature, and sometimes by other things. This, however, happens in both, in consequence of certain things being changed according to quality in the body, as in excitation and energy, when any one becomes sober and is roused from intoxication. It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, that to be changed in quality, and a change in quality, is effected in sensibles, and the sensitive part of the soul, but not in any thing else except according to accident.
