But it is necessary that the now, which is so called, not through another, but by itself and primarily, should be indivisible; and likewise that such a now should be inherent in all time: for it is a certain extremity of the past, beyond which there is nothing of the future; and again, it is a certain extremity of the future, beyond which there is nothing of the past. It is also, that which we say is the boundary of both. And, if it can be shown that the now is a thing of this kind in itself, and the same, it will at the same time be evident that it is indivisible. It is necessary, therefore, that the now should be the same, which is the extremity of both times: for if it were different, the one would not be successive to the other, because that which is continued is not composed from impartibles. But if each is separate, there will be time between them; for every thing continued is of such a kind, that there is something synonymous between the extremes. If time, however, is that which is between, it will be divisible; for it has been shown that all time is divisible. So that the now will be divisible. But if the now is divisible, there will be something of the past in the future, and something of the future in the past; for that according to which it is divided, will separate the present and future time. At the same time, however, the now will not be a boundary of itself, but through another: for the division is not of that which subsists by itself. To which we may add, that of the new there will be something which will be past, and something which will be future; and not always the same past or future. Neither, therefore, is the now the same; for time is multifariously divisible. So that if these things cannot be inherent in the now, it is necessary that the same now should be in each. But if the same, it is also evident that it is indivisible: for if it were divisible, the same things would happen as have been already mentioned in the former argument. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that there is something in time indivisible, which we say is the now. But that nothing is moved in the now is manifest from the following considerations: for if any thing is so moved, it may be moved in it swifter and slower. Let the now, therefore, be N, and let that which is swifter be moved in it through the length A B. Hence that which is slower, will be moved in the same, through a length less than A B, as for instance, through A C. But since that which is slower is moved in the whole now through A C, that which is swifter will be moved in less than this. So that the now will be divided. But it was indivisible. It is not possible, therefore, for a thing to be moved in the now. But neither can a thing be at rest in the now: for we say that a thing is at rest which is naturally adapted to be moved, but is not moved when it is naturally adapted, and where, ancl as it is naturally adapted to be moved. So that since nothing is naturally adapted to be moved in the now, it is evident that it possesses no natural aptitude to be at rest in the now. Again, if there is the same moment in both times; but it is possible to be moved in the whole of the one, and to be at rest in the whole of the other; and if that which is moved in the whole time, may be moved in any part of this time, in which it is naturally adapted to be moved; and that which is at rest may similarly be at rest; — if this be the case, it will happen, that the same thing may at the same time be at rest, and be moved; for the same thing, that is, the now, is the extremity of both times. Farther still, we say that a thing is at rest, which subsists similarly, both itself, and its parts, now, and formerly. But in the now there is not the prior, so that neither can any thing be at rest in the now. It is necessary, therefore, that what is moved should be moved in time, and that what is at rest should be at rest in time.
