But since every thing which is moved, is moved in time, and changes from something into something, it is impossible that what is moved, in the time in which it is moved essentially, and not because it is moved in a certain part of that time, should be in a certain first: for this is to be at rest, i.e. for both a thing itself, and each of its parts, to be in the same, for a certain time: for thus we say a thing is at rest, when, in another and another now, it is true to say, that both itself and its parts are in the same. But if this is to be at rest, that which changes cannot wholly be in any thing, according to a firsttime; for all time is divisible. So that, in another and another part of it, it will be true to say, that both itself and its parts are in the same: for if it were not so, but in one now only, it will not be in any time in a certain thing, but in the boundary of time. But a thing may always abide in something in the now, and yet not be at rest in it; for it is not possible either to be moved, or to be at rest in the now. But it is true, that a thing is not moved in the now, and is in something; and it is not possible that it can be in time according to the quiescent: for it would happen that what is borne along would be at rest.
