But since every thing is either moved, or is it at rest, which is naturally adapted to be so, and where, and as it is adapted; it is necessary that whatever tends to rest, when it tends to rest, should be moved: for unless it were moved, it would be at rest. But it is not possible for that to tend to rest which is at rest. This then being demonstrated, it is evident that it must necessarily tend to rest in time: for that which is moved, is moved in time; and it has been shown that what tends to rest, is moved. So that it is necessary that it should tend to rest in time. Again, if we say that the swifter and the slower are in time, and it is possible to tend to rest swifter and slower; therefore, a thing tends to rest in time. But in any part of the time in which that first tends to rest which so tends, it is necessary it should tend to rest: for the time being divided, if it tends to rest in neither of the parts, neither will it tend to rest in the whole. So that that will not tend to rest which does tend to rest. But if it tends to rest in one of the parts, it will not first tend to rest in the whole: for, according to one part, it will tend to rest in this, as was before observed of that which is moved. But as that which is moved, is not in that in which it is first moved; so likewise that which tends to rest, is not in that in which it first tends to rest: for neither of the being moved, nor of the tending to rest, is there a certain first: for let AB be that in which a thing first tends to rest. This, therefore, cannot be without parts; for motion is not in that which is without parts, because something of it is moved through. But it has been shown that what tends to rest is moved. And if A B is divisible, the thing will tend to rest in any one of its parts whatever: for this was shown before, that it tends to rest in any part whatever of that in which it first tends to rest. Since, therefore, it is time in which it first tends to rest, and not an indivisible (but all time is divisible to infinity,) there is not that in which it first tends to rest. Neither, therefore, is there a first in which a thing rests that is at rest: for it will not rest in that which is without parts, because there is not motion in an indivisible. But in that in which a thing may be at rest, in that also it may be moved: for we then say a thing is at rest, when that which is naturally adapted to be moved, is not moved in that in which it possesses a natural aptitude to be moved. Again, we then also say a thing is at rest when it subsists similarly now and formerly, as not judging from one certain thing, but from two at the least. Hence, that in which it rests will not be without parts. But if it is divisible, the time will be divisible, and it will be at rest in any one of its parts whatever: for this may be demonstrated after the same manner as before; so that nothing will be first. But the cause of this is, that every thing is at rest, and is moved in time; and there is not a first time, nor a first magnitude, nor, in short, any first continued quantity:· for every thing continued is divisible to infinity.
