This being shown, it is evident that every thing which is moved must have been previously moved: for if in the time X R it is first moved through the magnitude K L, that which is moved with equal celerity, and begins to be moved at the same time will be moved through half that magnitude in half the time. But if that which has equal celerity is moved through a certain part in this time, it is necessary that the other also should have been moved through the same magnitude. So that what is moved will have moved. Farther still, if we say that it has been moved in the whole time X R, or, in short, in any time whatever, in consequence of receiving the ultimate now of that time (for this it is which terminates); and that which subsists between the nows is time; — if this be the case, in other times also it may be similarly said to have been moved. But the division is the extremity of the half; so that it will have been moved in the half, and, in short, in every part: for always, together with section, time is bounded by nows. lf, therefore, all time is divisible, and that which subsists between nows is time; — hence, whatever changes will have been changed infinitely. Again, if it is necessary that what continually changes, and is neither corrupted, nor ceases from mutation, should either change or have been changed in any time whatever (but a thing cannot change in the now), it is also necessary that it should have been changed in every now. So that, if the nows are infinite, every thing which changes will have been infinitely changed. But it is not only necessary that what changes should have been changed; but it is likewise necessary that what is changed, should previously change: for every thing which is changed from something into something, has been changed in time: for let a thing have been changed in the now from A to B. Hence, in the very now in which it is in A, it has not been changed; for, if it had, it would be at the same time in A and B: for that a thing which is changed, when it is changed, is not in this boundary A, has been shown before. But if it is in another boundary, there is time between; for nows do not adhere to each other. Since, therefore, it is changed in time, and all time is divisible; it will be changed in half the time, and again in the half of that half; and thus perpetually. So that it will previously change. Farther still, what has been said will be more evident in magnitude, because magnitude is continued, in which that which changes, is changed: for let any thing be changed from C to D. Hence, if C D is indivisible, the impartible will adhere to the impartible. But since this is impossible, it is necessary that what is between should be magnitude, and should be divisible into infinite parts; so that it will previously change into these. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing which is changed, should previously change: for there is the same demonstration in things which are not continued; as, for instance, in contraries, and contradiction: for let us assume a time in which it is changed, and again we shall say the same things. So that it is necessary that what is changed, should change, and that what changes should have been changed. Likewise the being changed is prior to changing, and changing to the being changed; and a first can never be assumed. But the non-adherence of the impartible to the impartible is the cause of this: for the division is to infinity in the same manner as in lines which are increased and diminished. It is evident, therefore, that what was generated, was necessarily generated before, and that what is generated, was generated; viz. this is true of such things as are divisible and continued; yet not always that which is generated, but sometimes something else, as, for instance, something belonging to it, as the foundation of a house. The like also takes place in that which is corrupted, and in that which has been corrupted: for since that which is generated, and that which is corrupted, are continuous, a certain infinity is immediately present with these; and it is not possible that any thing can be generated which has not been generated, nor have been generated, which was not generated. The like also takes place in the being corrupted, and in the having been corrupted: for the having been corrupted will always be prior to the being corrupted, and the being corrupted to the having been corrupted. It is evident, therefore, that it is necessary that what was generated should have been generated before, and that what is generated was generated: for all magnitude, and all time, are always divisible; so that they cannot be primarily in that in which they are.
