In the next place, let us show what the subsistence together, or at once, (το αμα), and separately, is, also what to touch is, and to have an intermediate subsistence; and what the successive is, the adhering, and the continuous, and in what things each of these is naturally adapted to subsists. Such things, therefore, are said to subsist together, or at once, according to place, as are in one place primarily. But things subsist separately which are in different places. Those things are said to touch each other, the extremities of which are together. But that has an intermediate subsistence, to which the thing that is changed is naturally adapted to arrive, before it comes to the extreme into which it is changed; when it is continually changed according to nature. The least intermediate subsistence, however, is in three things: for the contrary is the extremity of mutation. But that is continually moved, which intermits nothing, or the smallest portion of the thing, but not of time: for nothing hinders but that an intermission taking place; and immediately after the hypate or the highest chord, the neate or lowest chord may sound. This, however, is an intermission of the thing, in which motion is produced. And this is evident in mutations according to place, and in other mutations. But the contrary according to place, is that which is very much distant in a right line: for the smallest right line is bounded; and that which is bounded is a measure. That is successive, between which and that to which it is successive, there is nothing of the same genus; when it is alone after the beginning, either by position, or nature, or is thus defined in some other way. I say, for instance, as a line or lines between a line; or the monad or monads between the monad; or a house between a house. Nothing, however, hinders but that something else may subsist between: for that which is successive is succcesive to something, and is something posterior: for one is not successive to two, nor the first day of the month to the second; but the latter are successive to the formers. But the adhering is said to be that which; being successive, touches. Since, however, all mutation is in opposites, and opposites are contraries, and things which subsist according to contradiction, and there is no medium of contradiction; it is cvident that in contraries there will be that which has an intermediate subsistence. The continuous is something belonging to the cohering. But I say that the continuous is when the boundaries of things by which each touches the other become one and the same, and as the name signifies, are held together. But this being determined, it is evident that the continuous is in those things from which one thing is naturally adapted to be produced according to contact; and so that what is connected may at length become one.
Thus also, the whole will be one; as for instance, either by a nail, or by glue, or by contact, or by natural conjunction. It is also evident, that what is successive is first, for it is necessary that what touches should be successive; but not that every thing which is successive should touch. Hence also in things which are prior by definition, there is the successive; as for instance, in numbers: but there is not contact. And if a thing indeed is continuous, it is necessary that it should touch; but if it touches, it is not yet continuous : for it is not necessary that their extremes should be one, if they subsist together; but if the extremes are one, it is necessary that they should subsist together. So that natural conjunction is last according to generation. For it is necessary to be in contact, if the extremes are naturally conjoined; but not all things which are in contact are naturally connected. But it is manifest that in those things in which there is not contact, there is not natural conjunction. Hence, if the point, and the monad have, as some say, a separate subsistence, it is not possible that the point and the monad should be the same: for with points contact is present; but with monads the successive; and with the former something may be intermediate; since every line subsists between points; but it is not necessary that there should be something intermediate with the latter; for nothing is intermediate between two and one. And thus we have shown what the subsisting separately and together is; also what it is to touch, and to have an intermediate subsistence, and what the successive is, the adhering and the continuous, and in what kind of things each of these subsists.
