In order however to understand which of the assertions are true it is necessary to consider what the name signifies. A vacuum therefore appears to be a place in which there is nothing. But the cause of this is that they fancied being to be body; but everybody is in place; and in the place in which there is no body there is a vacuum. So that if any where there is no body, there there is a vacuum. Again, they fancied that everybody is tangible; and that whatever has gravity or levity is a thing of this kind. From syllogism therefore it happens that a vacuum is that in which there is nothing heavy or light. These, things, therefore, as we have also before observed, are syllogistically inferred. But it is absurd that a point should be a vacuum: for it is necessary that a vacuum should be a place in which there is an interval of tangible body. A vacuum however appears in one way to be called that which is not full of a sensible tangible body: and that which possesses gravity and levity is sensible according to the touch. Hence, someone may doubt if interval had color or sound whether it would be a vacuum or not. Or is it not manifest that if it could receive a tangible body it would be a vacuum, but if not, that it would not be a vacuum? But, after another manner, a vacuum is said to be that in which there is not this particular thing, nor any corporeal essence. Hence some say that a vacuum is the matter of bodies, who also say, though not rightly, that this very thing is place; for matter is not separate from bodies; but they investigate a vacuum as that which is separate.
