What, however, place is, will become evident as follows: but let us admit concerning it such things as appear to be truly present with it essentially. First, then, we should think that place comprehends that of which it is the place, and that it is not anything of that which it contains. And again, that the first place is neither less nor greater than the thing contained in it; and also, that it does not desert each particular thing, and is not separable from it. Beside this we should think that every place has upward and downward, and that everybody naturally tends to and abides in its proper place; and that it does this either upward or downward. These things being admitted, let us survey what remains. But it is necessary that we should endeavor so to conduct the speculation, that what place is may be unfolded; so that the doubts may be solved, and the things which appear to be present with place may remain; and beside this that the cause of the difficulty and of the doubts about it may be manifest: for thus each particular will be exhibited in the most beautiful manner.
In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to understand that place could not be investigated, unless there were some motion according to place: for on this account we especially conceive that the heavens are in place, because they are always in motion. But of this motion one kind is lation; and another, increase and diminution: for a change takes place in increase and diminution; and that which was formerly here is again transferred into the less or the greater. But with respect to things which are moved, some are essentially in energy, and others according to accident. And of the those which are according to accident, some can be moved essentially; as for instance, the parts of the body, and the helm in a ship; but others cannot be so moved, but are always moved accidentally; as for instance, whiteness and science: for these thus change their place, because that changes in which they subsist. But as we say that a thing is in the heavens as in place, because it is in air, and air is in the heavens; so we say that a thing is in air, that is, not in the whole of air; but, on account of its extremity, and that which comprehends, we say that a thing is in air; for if the whole of air were place, the place of each particular thing, and each particular thing itself, would not be equal. They appear however to be equal: and such is the first place in which a thing subsists. When, therefore, that which contains is not divided, but continued, then a thing is said to be in it, not as in place, but as a part in the whole; but when it is divided, and touches, then it is in a certain first, which is the extremity of that which contains, and which is neither a part of the thing contained, nor greater than the interval, but equal to it: for the extremities of things that touch are in the same. And that which is continued is not indeed moved in, but together with it; but that which is divided is moved in it. And whether that which contains is moved, or whether it is not, it is not the less moved. Further still; when it is not divided, it is said to be as a part in the whole; as for instance, sight in the eye, or the hand in the body: but when it is divided, or touches, it is said to be as in place; as for instance, water in a wine vessel, or wine in an earthen vessel. For the hand is moved together with the body, and the water in the wine vessel. Hence, therefore, it is now evident what a place is: for there are nearly four things, of which it is necessary place should be one. For it is either form or matter; or a certain interval between the extremes of a thing; or the extremes, if there is no interval beside the magnitude of the inherent body. But of these, it is evident that three cannot be placed. Through containing indeed it appears to be form; for the extremes of that which contains, and of that which is contained, are in the same. Both therefore are boundaries, yet not of the same thing; but form is the boundary of the thing contained, but place of the containing body. In consequence, however, of that being frequently changed which is contained and divided, while that which contains remains, as water from a vessel, that which is between appears to be a certain interval; as if that which is changed were something beside body. But this is not the case; but any body whatever departs among those that are transferred, and are naturally adapted to touch. If, however, there were any interval which is naturally adapted to abide in the same place, there would be infinite places: for water and air being transferred all the parts effect the same thing in the whole, as all the water in the vessel. At the same time too, the place will be changed; so that there will be another place of place, and there will be many places together. There is not however another place of the part in which it can be moved, when the whole vessel is transferred, but the same place; for in that place in which they are contained, air and water, and the parts of water, are alternately transferred, and not in that place into which they pass, and which is a part of the place, that is the place of the whole heaven.
Matter, also, may appear to be place if anyone directs his attention to that which is at rest, and is not separated, but continued: for, just as if matter is changed in quality, something which is now white was formerly black, and that which is now hard was formerly soft, on which account we say that matter is something; thus also place appears to be something, through a phantasy of this kind. Except, however, that in the instance of water and air, this is said to be the case, because that which was air is now water; but in place, because where there was air, there is now water. But matter, as was before observed, is neither separable from the thing nor does it contain, both which are the properties of place. If therefore place is no one of the three, namely, if it is neither form, nor matter, nor interval, in consequence of always being something different from the thing which is transferred; place must necessarily be that which remains of the four, namely, it must be the boundary of the containing body. But I call the containing body that which is movable according to local motion. It appears however to be something great and difficult to apprehend what place is, both through its appearing to be at the same time matter and form, and through the transition of that which is borne along being effected in that which contains when at rest: for it appears that there may be a certain interval between, different from the magnitudes which are moved. The air also contributes something, which seems to be incorporeal: for there appears to be not only the extremities of a vessel, but also that which subsists between as a vacuum. As, however, a vessel is a place which may be transferred, so place is an immovable vessel. Hence, when anything is moved in that which is moved, that also which is within changes its place, just as a ship in a river: so that it uses that which contains, rather as a vessel than as place. But place wishes to be something immovable; and hence the whole river is rather place, because the whole is immovable. So that the first immovable boundary of that which contains is place.
