In the next place let us consider in how many ways one thing is in another. In one way, then, as a finger in the hand, and in short, as a part in the whole. In another way, as the whole in the parts: for the whole is not without the parts. In another way, as man in animal, and in short, as a species in genus. In another way, as genus in a species, and, in short, as a part of species in the definition of species. Again, one thing is in another, as health in things hot and cold, and in short, as form in matter. Further still; as the affairs of Greece in the king, and, in short, as that which is in the first mover. Again, as in the good, and, in short, as in the end: but this is that for the sake of which a thing subsists. But one thing is in another in the most proper way of all, when it is as in a vessel, and in short as in a place. It may however, be doubted whether one and the same thing can be in itself or nothing can, but all things are either nowhere, or in another. But this is twofold, namely, either essentially, or with reference to something else: for when both that in which a thing is inherent, and that which is inherent in this thing, are parts of the whole, then the whole is said to be in itself. For it is said to be so with reference to the parts. Thus a thing is white because the superficies is white; and man possesses scientific knowledge because the reasoning power is scientific. Neither the vessel, therefore, nor the wine, will be in itself; but the vessel will be the vessel of the wine: for both that which is inherent, and that in which it is inherent, are parts of the same. Thus, therefore, it may happen that the same thing may be in itself. Primarily, however, this is not possible. Thus, for instance, the white is in body; for superficies is in body: but science is in the soul. According to these however, being parts, the appellations are assumed; so that they are said to be in man. But the amphora and the wine being separate are not parts, but taken together they are parts. Hence, when they are parts the same thing will be in itself; as for instance, the white is in man, because it is in body; and in this, because it is in superficies; but it is in this no longer through another. And these are different in species; and superficies and whiteness possess a different nature and power. Neither, therefore, if we consider the affair by induction shall we see that anything is in itself according to any definition. And reason indeed shows that this is impossible: for it would be requisite that each should be both; as for instance, that the amphora should be the vessel and the wine; and the wine, the wine and the amphora; if it be possible for anything to be in itself. So that if they were especially in each other, yet the amphora would receive the wine, not so far as it is the wine, but so far as it is the amphora. But the wine will be in the amphora, not so far as it is in the amphora, but so far as that in which it is, is the amphora. That these, therefore, are different according to essence is manifest: for there is one definition of that in which a thing is, and another of that which is in this. Beside, neither is this possible according to accident: for two bodies would be at the same time in the same thing; since the amphora will be in itself, if that which is naturally a recipient can be in itself. And further still, that which it is capable of receiving will be in the same; as for instance, wine, if it is capable of receiving wine. That it is impossible, therefore, for anything to be primarily in itself, is manifest. But the doubt of Zeno, that if place is anything, it will be in something, it is not difficult to solve: for nothing hinders the first place from being in something else, yet just in the same manner as health is in hot things, as a habit, but heat is in the body, as a passion; so that it is not necessary to proceed to infinity. This however is evident, that since the vessel is not any part of that which is in it (for that which is primarily inherent, and that in which, are different), place will neither be matter nor form, but something different from either: for these things, namely, matter and form, are something belonging to that which is inherent. Let these therefore be the doubts.
