These things, therefore, being thus enumerated by us, it is evident that every mutation is necessarily made in time, and that every thing which is moved, is moved in time: for the swifter and the slower are in all mutation; since in all things this is apparent. But, I say that a thing is moved swifter, which prior to something else changed into a subject, being moved according to the same interval, and with an equable motion: as for instance, in lation, if both are moved in a circumference, or both in a right line. The like also takes place in other things. The prior also is in time: for we speak of the prior and posterior according to distance, with reference to the present now. But the present now is the boundary of the past and future time. So that since nows are in time, prior and posterior also will be in time: for in that in which the now is, in that also is the distance from the now. But the prior is spoken of in a contrary manner, according to the time past and future; for in the time past we call that prior which is more remote from the present now, but we call that posterior which is nearer to it. But in the future that is prior which is nearer; and that is posterior which is more remote. Hence, since the prior is in time, but the prior is consequent to all motion; it is evident that all mutation and all motion are in times. It deserves also to be considered how time subsists with reference to soul; and why time appears to be in every thing; in the earth, in the sea, and in the heavens. Shall we say it is because time is a certain passive quality or habit of motion, since it is the number of it ? But all these things are moveable; for all these are in place: and time and motion subsist together, both according to capacity, and according to energy. It may, however, be doubted, whether if soul were not, time would be or not: for when it is impossible for that which numerates to be, it is also impossible that there should be anything numerable. So that it is manifest, that neither can there be number: for number is either that which is numbered, or that which is numerable. However, if nothing else than soul, and the intellect of soul are naturally adapted to numerate, it is impossible for time to be, when soul is not, unless time is that which is in reality and in a subject; as for instance, it may be doubted if it be possible for motion to be without soul; but prior and posterior are in motion; and time is these, so far as they are numerable. It may also he doubted, of what kind of motion time is the number, or whetlier it is the number of every kind of motion: for a thing is generated, corrupted, increased, changed in quality, and borne along, in time. So far, therefore, as each of these is motion, time is the number of every motion. Hence it is simply the number of continued motion, and not of a certain motion. But it is possible that something else may be now moved, of the motion of each of which there will be a number. Will there then be a different time, and will there be at once two equal times? Or will there not? For all time is one, similar, and at once. But things are one in species which do not subsist at the same time: for, if these should be dogs, but those horses, and both should be seven, there will be the same number. Thus also there is the same time of motions which are finished together; but the one is perhaps swift, and the other not; and the one lation, but the other change according to quality. Time, however, is the same, since the number is equal and subsists at once, both of the change according to quality and the lation. Hence, the motions are different and separate; but time is every where the same, because the number is one and every where the same of things equal, and which subsist at once. But since there is lation, and motion in a circle belongs to this, and since every thing is numbered by a certain kindred one, as monads by the monad, and horses by a horse, this being the case, time also is numbered by a certain definite time. But time, as we have said, is measured by motion, and motion by time; and this is because the quantity both of motion and time is measured by a definite motion in time. If, therefore, that which is first is the measure of all kindred natures, equable circulation will be especially a measure; because the number of this is most known. Change, according to quality therefore, increase, and generation are not equable; but lation is equable. Hence, time appears to be the motion of the celestial sphere, because other motion, and time itself are measured by this motion. Hence too, that happens which is usually said for they say that human affairs are a circle, and also that the generation and lation of other things which have a natural motion is circular. And this is because all these things are judged of by time, and receive an end and beginning as it were according to a certain period: for time itself appears to be a certain circle, and this again appears to be so, because time is the measure of a lation of this kind, and is itself measured by such a lation. So that to say that things generated are a circle, is nothing more than to say that there is a certain circle of time; and this because time is measured by circulation: for except that which measures, the whole of that which is measured appears to be nothing else than many measures. It is also rightly said, that the number is the same of sheep and dogs, if each number is equal: but there is not the same decad, nor the same tens; as neither are the equilateral and the scalene the same triangles, though the figure is the same, because both are triangles: for that is said to be the same, by the difference of which it does not differ, but not that by the difference of which it differs. Thus, for instance, triangle differs by the difference of triangle; and hence there are different triangles. But figure does not differ by the difference of figure, but is in one and the same division: for a figure of such a nature is a circle; and such a figure is a triangle. And of this, that which is of such a nature is equilateral, but that which is of a different nature is scalene. Hence this, indeed, is the same figure; for it is a triangle; but the triangle is not the same. The number also is the same: for the number of these does not differ by the difference of number. But the decad is not the same; for the things of which it is said to be the decad differ; since some of these are dogs and others horses. And thus much concerning time, as well itself, as the things which pertain to, and are peculiar to the consideration of it.
