Since, however, time is the measure of motion and of being moved; and it measures motion by giving a definite extent to a certain motion which measures the whole; (just as a yard measures length by giving a definite extent to a certain magnitude which measures the whole;) this being the case, for motion to be in time, is nothing else than for time to measure it, and its essence: for at the same time it measures motion, and the essence of motion. And this it is for motion to be in time, viz. for time to measure its essence. But it is evident that this it is also for other things to be in time, viz. for their essence to be measured by time: for, to have a subsistence in time, is one of two things; one of which is, then to be when time is; and the other, just as we say, that certain things are in number. And this signifies, either as a part and property of number, and, in short, that it is something belonging to number; or that it is the number of it. But, since time is number, the now, the prior, and things of this kind, are so in time, as the monad, the even and the odd, are in number; (for these are something belonging to number, and those are something belonging to time, but things are in time as in number.) If this then is the case, things are comprehended by number, in the same manner as things in place, are comprehended by place. It is aJso evident that to be in time is not then to be when time is, as neither to be in motion, nor to be in place, is then to be when motion and place are: for if a subsistence in any thing were of this kind, all things would be in any thing whatever, and heaven would be in a grain of millet: for where a grain of millet is, the heaven also is; but this is an accidental circumstance. That, however, necessarily follows, viz. that to a thing which is in time, there is a certain time when that thing is; and that to a thing in motion there is then motion. But since that which is in time, is also in number, a certain time may be assumed greater than every thing which is in time. Hence it is necessary that all things which are in time, should be comprehended by time, just as other things which arc comprehended in any thing; as for instance, that which is in place, by place. Hence, that which is in time, will suffer something from time, just as we are accustomed to say, that time consumes, that all things grow old from time, and are forgotten through time: but nothing learns, nor becomes young, nor beautiful, through time: for time is of itself rather the cause of corruption, because it is the number of motion, and motion removes that which exists from its state or condition. So that it is evident that eternal beings. so far as they are eternal, are not in time: for they are not comprehended by time, nor is their being measured by time. As a token of the truth of this, they do not suffer any thing by, as not being in time. But since time is the measure of motion, it is also the measure of rest according to accident: for all rest is in time: for it does not follow, that as that which is in motion, must necessarily be moved, so also that which is in time; since time is not motion, but the number of motion. But in the number of motion, there may also be that which is at rest: for not every thing immoveable is at rest; but that is at rest which is deprived of motion, when it is naturally adapted to be moved, as we have before observed. But to be in number, is nothing else than to be some number of a thing, and to have its being measured by the number in which it is. So that if a thing is in time, its essence is measured by time. But time measures both that which is in motion, and that which is at rest, so far as the former is in motion, and the latter at rest; for it measures the quantity of their motion and rest. So that what is in motion, will not simply be measured by time, so far as it is a certain quantity, but so far as its motion is so much. Hence, such things as are neither in motion, nor at rest, are not in time; since to be in time, is to be measured by time; and time is the measure of motion and rest. It is evident, therefore, that neither is every thing which is not, in time; as for instance, such things as cannot subsist otherwise, as that the diameter of a square should be commensurate with its side : for, in short, if time is essentially the measure of motion, but of other things according to accident, it is evident that the essence of all such things as time measures, consists in being at rest, or in motion. Whatever, therefore, is corrupted and generated, and, in short at one time is, and at another time is not, is necessarily in time: for there is a certain greater time which exceeds their essence, and the time that measures their essence. But of things which are not, such as time comprehends, partly have been, as Homer once was; and partly will be, as is the case with any thing future. These time comprehends on both sides; and, if on both sides, they were and will be. But such things as time does not at all comprehend, these neither were, nor are, nor will be; and of this kind are those non-beings, the opposites of which always are. Thus, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with its side always is, and this will not be in time; neither therefore, will it be in time, for it to be commensurable. Hence, it always is not, because it is contrary to that which always is. But those things the contrary to which is not always, these may both be and not be, and of these there is generation and corruption. Again, the now is the conjunction of time, as has been observed; for it connects the time past and future, and, in short, is the boundary of time: for it is the beginning of one time, and the end of another; though. this is evidently not as in an abidimg point. But it divides in capacity; and the now, so far as it is such, is always different; but so far as it connects it is always the same; just as in mathematical lines: for there is not always one and the same point in intellectual conception; because to those who divide, there is always another and another. But so far as it is one line, there is entirely the same point. Thus, also, the now is partly a division of time according to capacity, and partly the boundary and union of both. Division too, and union, are the same, and, according to the same; but their essence is not the same. In this manner, therefore, one of the nows is said to be. But another now is said to be, when the time belonging to this now is near: for some one came now, because he came today; or he came now because he came yesterday. But the Trojan transactions are not performed now, nor does a deluge take place now, though time is continued as far as to those events; because they are not near. The once, however, is time bounded with reference to a former now; as for instance, Troy was once captured, and once there will be a deluge: for it is necessary to be bounded with reference to the now. There will, therefore, be a certain quantity from this time as far as to that, and it was with reference to the past. But if there is no time which has not connection with the once, every time will be finite. Will time, therefore, fail? or will it not? Since motion always is. Will there then be a different time, or the same time frequently? It is manifest that, as is motion, so also is time: for, if one and the same motion is once produced, there will be one and the same time; but if not, there will not be. But since the now is the end and beginning of time, yet not of the same time, but is the end of the past, and the beginning of the future; this being the ease, just as a circle, in a certain respect, contains in the same, the convex and the concave, thus, also, time always is in the beginning and end; and on this account, it always appears to be different: for he now is not the beginning and end of the same time; since, if this were the case, opposites would subsist together, and according to the same. Hence, time will not fail; for it is always in the beginning. But the presently, or just now, is that which is near to the present indivisible now, since it is a part of the future time: for instance, when will you walk? presently; because the time is near in which this will come to pass; and the past time in which it happened is not remote from the present now: for instance, when will you walk? I have already, just now, walked. But we do not say that Troy was just now captured, because the time, when this happened, is very remote from the present now. The lately also is near the present now, and is a part of the past time: for instance, when did you come? lately, is the answer, if the time was near to the present now. The formerly is remote time, and the suddenly is asserted of that which is removed from its condition, in a time which is insensible through its smallness. But all mutation naturally posesses the power of altering the condition of a thing: and all things are generated and corrupted in time. Hence some have called time the wisest of things; but the Pythagorean Paron, speaking more accurately, calls it most unwise, because things are forgotten in it. It is evident, therefore, that time of itself is rather the cause of corruption than generation, as we have observed before: for mutation possesses from itself a power of removing a thing from its condition, but is the cause of generation and being according to accident. As a sufficient token of this, nothing is generated, without itself in a certain respect moving and acting; but a thing may be corrupted which is not at all moved; and this corruption we are accustomed especially to ascribe to time. Time, however does not produce this, but it happens that this mutation is effected in time. We have shown, therefore, that time is, and what it is, and in how many ways we speak of the now, and what the once is, the lately, the just now, the formerly, and the suddenly.
