And, as there is always another and another motion, so likewise with respect to time. But the whole of time, considered as subsisting at once, is the same. For the now is in reality one and the same, but its essece is different. The now, however, measures time, so far as it is prior and posterior. The now also subsists as partly the same, and partly not the same: for so far as it is in another and another, it is different; but this was the now itself. But so far as the now is that which it once was, so far it is the same: for, as we have said, motion is consequent to magnitude, and time to motion. In a similar manner also that which is borne along is consequent to a point, by which we recognize motion, and the prior and posterior in it. But this is in reality the same for it is either a point, or a stone, or something else of this kind; but is different in definition: just as the sophists assume that Coriscus in the Lyceum, is different from Coriscus in the Forum; and this also is different, because it is in a different and a different place. But the now is consequent to that which is borne along, in the same manner as time to motion: for by that which is borne along we know prior and posterior in motion; but the now is, so far as prior and posterior are numerable. So that in these a real instant is the same; for that which is in motion is either prior or posterior; but the essence is different; because the now is, so far as prior and posterior are numerable. And this is especially known: for motion is known through that which is moved, and lation through that which is borne along; for that which is borne along is this particular thing; but this is not the case with motion. That which is called the now, therefore, is partly the same and partly not the same: for the like also may be said of that which is borne along. But it is also evident, that whether time is not, there will not be the now; or whether the now is not, time will not be: for as that which is borne along and lation subsist together, so likewise the number of that which is borne along, and the number of the lation: for time is the number of lation; but the now, with respect to that which is borne along, is as the monad to numbers. Time also is continued through the now, and is divided according to the now: for according to this, time and the now are consequent to lation, and the thing which is borne along: for motion and lation are one with that which is borne along, because it is one; and not according to that which is; for it may fail; but also in definition. And this bounds prior and posterior motion. According to this, also, it is in a certain respect consequent to a point: for a point also, in a certain respect, connects and bounds length; since it is the beginning of one length, and the end of another. When, however, any one thus considers it, using one point as if it were two, it is necessary to stop, if the same point will be the beginning and end. But the now, because that which is borne along is moved, is always different. Hence, time is a number, not as of the same point, because it is both beginning and end, but rather as the extremities of a line, and not as parts; for the reason already assigned: for it uses the middle point as two points; whence it happens that it rests. And, further still, it is evident, that neither is the now a part of time, nor division a part of motion; as neither are points parts of a line; but two lines are parts of one line. So far, therefore, as the now is a boundary, it is not time, but an accident of time: but so far as it numbers, it is number: for boundaries belong to that only of which they are the boundaries. But the number which is of these horses, as for instance the decad, has also a subsistence elsewhere.
