Both fortune and chance, therefore, are, as has been said, causes according to accident; since they belong to things which can neither subsist simply, nor frequently, and also to such as may be produced for the sake of something. They differ, however, because chance has a more extended subsistence: for that which is from fortune, is also from chance; but not everything which is from chance is also from fortune. For fortune, and that which proceeds from fortune, are in those things in which prosperity of fortune, and, in short, action, may subsist. Hence it is necessary that fortune should be conversant with things of a practical nature; of which this is a token, that prosperous fortune (eutuchia) apears to be either the same with or near to felicity (eudaimonia). But felicity is a certain action; for it is good action (eupraxia): so that such things as are incapable of acting cannot do anything from fortune. And on this account, neither anything inanimate, nor brute, nor infant, can do anything from fortune, because they have not any deliberate choice: nor does either prosperous or adverse fortune pertain to these, except according to similitude. For thus Protagoras said, that the stones are fortunate from which altars are constructed, because they are honored, though others are trampled on of a kindred nature. To suffer also from fortune belongs, in a certain respect, to these things, when he who does anything pertaining to these does it from fortune: otherwise it does not belong to them.
But chance belongs to other animals, and to many inanimate things. Thus we say the horse came by chance, because when he came he was saved, though he did not come for the sake of being saved. We also say that the tripod fell by chance; for it stood for the sake of being sat on. It did not, however, fall for the sake of being sat upon. So that it is evident, that in things which are simply produced for the sake of something, when they are not produced for the sake of that which happens, and the cause of which is external, then we say they are produced from chance. But of these, those things are from fortune which are produced from the chance pertaining to objects of deliberate choice, by those endued with deliberate choice. This may be inferred from the word matēn (in vain); because a thing is then said to be done in vain, when that is not affected for the sake of which it was done, but something else; as, for instance, walking, if it is for the sake of evacuation; but if this does not happen to him who walks, we say that he has walked in vain, and that his walking is vain; as if this word signified that which is naturally undertaken for the sake of something else, when it does not effect that for the sake of which it was undertaken, and for which it is naturally adapted: for if anyone should say that he has washed in vain, because the sun is not set, he would be ridiculous; Since the former was not undertaken for the sake of the latter. Thus, therefore, chance (to automaton) has a subsistence, according to its name, when a thing is done in vain: for a stone fell not for the sake of striking anyone: it fell therefore by chance, because it might have fallen, being thrown by someone for the sake of striking. But that which subsists from fortune is especially separated from chance, in things which are produced by nature: for when anything is made contrary to nature, we then do not say that it is made by fortune, but rather that it is produced from chance. this also is different for the cause of that is external, but of this internal. And thus we have shown what chance, and also what fortune is, and in what they differ from each other.
With respect, however, to what pertains to the mode of cause, each of these ranks among those causes whence the principle of motion is derived: for the cause of these always belongs to those things which are produced by nature, or by the dianetic power; and the multitude of these is indefinite. But since chance and fortune are the causes of those things of which intellect, or nature, might be the cause, namely, when anything becomes from accident the cause of these very things; and nothing which subsists from accident is prior to things essential; it is evident that neither can cause, which is from accident, be prior to that which is essential. Chance and fortune, therefore, our posterior both to intellect and nature. Hence if chance were in an eminent degree the cause of the heavens, it would nevertheless be necessary that intellect and nature should be a prior cause, as well of many other things, as of this universe itself.
