In the first place, therefore, since we see that some things are always generated after the same manner, but others for the most part, it is evident that neither fortune, nor that which proceeds from fortune, can be said to be the cause of either of these, either of that which is from necessity, and always, or of that which is for the most part. But since there are certain things which are generated, and have a subsistence beside these, and all men acknowledge that these originate from fortune, it is evident that fortune and chance are each of them a certain thing: for we know that things of this kind are from fortune, and that what originates from Fortune is a thing of this kind. But of things which are generated, some are generated for the sake of something, but others not. And of these, some are produced from deliberate choice, and others not. But both these rank among things which are produced for the sake of something. Hence it is evident that both in things which neither subsist from necessity, nor for the most part, there are some in which a subsistence for the sake of something may take place. But such things subsist for the sake of something as are accomplished by the dianoetic power, and also such as are produced by nature. Things of this kind, however, when they are produced from accident, are said by us to subsist from fortune: for as, with respect to being, one kind has an essential, but another an accidental subsistence, The like also may take place with respect to cause. Thus, that which is capable of building is the essential cause of the house, but that which is white or musical from accident. The essential cause, Therefore, is definite; but cause, according to accident, indefinite: for an infinite number of things may happen to one thing. As we have said, therefore, when this takes place in things which are produced for the sake of something, then they are said to be from chance and from fortune. We shall, however, afterward, explain in what these differ from each other; but at present this will be evident, that both these rank among things which subsist for the sake of something. Thus, for instance, a man would have come for the sake of receiving silver, in order that he might take back with him money, if he had known that he could; he did not, however, come for the sake of this; but it happened that he came, and did this, for the sake of taking back the money: and this, not in consequence of coming for the most part, or necessarily, to that place. The end, however, that is, the taking back the money, is not in the number of causes which are in the thing itself, but ranks among things which proceed from deliberate choice, and the dianetic power, and then it is said to have proceeded from fortune. But if from previous choice, and for the sake of this, he had either always come, or for the most part, taking back with him the money, in this case, his coming would not have been from fortune. It is evident, therefore, that fortune is a cause from accident in things which rarely happen, according to the deliberate choice of those things which subsist for the sake of something. Hence the dianoetic power and fortune are conversant with the same thing: for deliberate choice is not without the dianoetic power. It is necessary, therefore, that those causes should be indefinite, from which that may be produced, which is from fortune. Whence fortune appears to belong to the indefinite, and to be in manifest to man. In a certain respect also it may seem that nothing is produced from fortune: for all these things are rightly because they are reasonably asserted. For in a certain respect a thing is produced from fortune, namely, from accident; and fortune is a cause, as accident: but, simply considered, it is not the cause of anything. Thus, a builder is the cause of a house, but a piper from accident; and of a man coming into the forum, and taking back with him money, when he did not come for this purpose, the causes are infinite in multitude; for the causes might be, the wish to see, pursue, inspect, or avoid someone. It is rightly said, therefore, that fortune is something contrary to reason: for reason is either of things which always are, or of those which frequently subsist; but fortune belongs to things which are contrary to these. Hence, since things which are thus causes are indefinite, fortune also is indefinite. At the same time, however, someone may doubt whether anything casual can become the cause of fortune; as, for instance, whether wind or heat is the cause of health; and not the head having been shaved: For of causes according to accident, some are more proximate than others. But good fortune is then said to take place when something good, and bad fortune when something bad, happens. Prosperous and adverse fortune, too, are then said to subsist when these are attended with magnitude. On this account, when we want but little of receiving a great evil or good, our fortune is then adverse or prosperous, because the dianetic power asserts this as if it subsisted: for that which wants but little seems as if it wanted nothing. Besides, prosperous fortune is deservedly unstable: for fortune itself is unstable; since none of the things which proceed from it can either have a perpetual or a frequent subsistence.
