Fortune, also, and chance are said to be in the number of causes; and many things are said both to be, and to be produced through Fortune and chance. Let us consider, therefore, after what manner fortune and chance subsist in these causes, and whether the former of these is the same with or different from the latter, and, in short, what each of them is: for with some it is dubious whether these things have a subsistence or not. For, say they, nothing is produced from fortune, but there is a certain definite cause of all such things as we say are produced from chance or fortune. Thus, for instance, the cause of a man fortuitously coming into the forum, and there finding what he wished indeed to find, but did not think he should, is the wish of buying something when he came into the forum. In like manner, and other things which are said to originate from fortune, some cause may always be assigned, and not fortune. For if fortune were any thing, it would truly appear to be absurd; and someone might doubt why no one of the ancient wise men, when assigning the causes of generation and corruption, has ever defined anything concerning fortune. As it seems, however, they did not think that any thing is produced from fortune. But this is wonderful. For many things are produced, and have a subsistence, from fortune and chance; and though they were not ignorant that each of these may be referred to a certain cause of things which are generated, according to the ancient assertion which subverts fortune, yet at the same time they all say that some of these are from fortune, and others not. Hence, some mention should have been made by them a fortune. They did not, however, think that fortune was anything belonging either to friendship or strife, or fire, or intellect, or anything else of things of this kind. They are chargeable, therefore, with absurdity, whether they did not conceive that it had a subsistence, or whether fancying that is had, they omitted it; especially since it was sometimes employed by them. Thus Empedocles says that the air is not always separated in the highest place, but just as it may happen: for in his Cosmopoeia, he says:
Thus it then chance’d to run, tho’ varying oft.
He also says that the greater part of the members of animals were generated from fortune. But there are some who aside chance as the cause of this heaven, end of all mundane natures: for they say that the revolution and motion which distinguishes and establishes the universe in this order are from chance. And this indeed is well worthy of admiration, that they should say, that animals and plants neither subsist nor are produced from fortune, but either nature, or intellect, or something else of this kind, is the cause of them (for not anything casual is produced from each scene, but from that an olive, and from this a man), but that the heavens, and the more divine of things apparent, should be produced from chance, and that of these there should be no such cause, as they acknowledge there is of plants and animals. Indeed, if it were so, this very thing will be worthy of consideration, and it will be well to say something concerning it. For, beside the absurdity of what is said, the assertion is still more absurd, when we see that nothing in the heavens is produced from chance, and that, in things which do not originate from fortune, many things happen fortuitously, though it is reasonable to suppose that the very contrary should take place. There are some, however, to whom fortune appears to be a cause, but immanifest to human conception, as being something divine, and more demoniacal. So that we must consider what each of these is, and whether chance and fortune are the same with or different from each other, and how they fall into definite causes.
