These things being defined, let us consider with respect to causes, what they are and how many there are in number: for since this treatise is for the sake of knowing natural things, and we do not think that we know anything till we aren in possession of the cause on account of which that thing subsists, (and this is to be in possession of the first cause) this also must be done by us in discoursing concerning generation and corruption, and all physical mutation, that knowing the principles of these, we may endeavor to refer to them each of the objects of investigation.
Cause, therefore, is after one manner said to be that, from which, being inherent, something is produced: as, for instance, brass is the cause of the statue, silver of the bowl, and the genera of these. But after another manner, cause is form and paradigm (and this is the definition of the essence of a thing) and the genera of this. Thus, for instance, the form of the diapason is two to one, and in short number, and the parts which are contained in the definition. Further still, cause is that whence the first principle of mutation or rest is derived. Thus he who consults is a cause of this kind, and a father of his child, and in short, the maker of that which is made, and that which changes of that which is changed. Again, cause is as the end; and this is that for the sake of which; as health of walking: for why does he walk? We say that he may be in health; and having thus said, we think that we have assigned to the cause. This cause also is seen in such things as are for the sake of the end, when something else moves, which has an intermediate subsistence. Thus, leanness, or purgation, or medicines, or instruments are for the sake of health: for all these are for the sake of the end. They differ, however, from each other because some of them are works and others instruments. Causes, therefore, are nearly predicated in so many ways.
But it happens, since causes are multifariously predicated, that there are also many causes of the same thing, and this not from accident. Thus the statuary’s art and the brass are causes of the statue, not according to anything else, but so far as it is a statue; yet not after the same manner; but the one is a cause as matter, and the other as that whence motion is derived. Some things also are the causes of each other. Thus labor is the cause of a good habit of body, and a good habit of body, of labor; though not after the same manner; but the one as the end; and the other as the principle of motion. Again, the same thing is the cause of contraries: for that which when present is the cause of this effect, is sometimes, when absent, said by us to be the cause of a contrary effect. Thus we see that the absence of the pilot is the cause of the loss of the ship, the presence of whom is the cause of its safety. But all the causes which we have now enumerated fall into four most manifest modes: for letters are the causes of syllables; matter is the cause of things which consist from workmanship; fire, and things of this kind are the causes of body; parts of the whole, and hypotheses, of the conclusion; all which are causes as that from which a thing proceeds. Of these causes, however, some are as a subject, as, for instance, parts; but others as essences, viz. whole, composition, and form. But seed, a physician, he who consults, and, in short, he who makes, are all of them causes as that whence, the principle of mutation or permanency, or motion is derived. Others again, are causes as the end, and the good of other things: for that for the sake of which a thing subsists, ranks as that which is best, and the end of other things. It makes however, no difference whether we say the end is good itself, or apparent good. Such, therefore, and so many other species of causes.
The modes of causes, however, are many in number, but they will be fewer when collected into a sum: for causes are multifariously predicated; and of those which are of a similar species, one is prior and posterior to another. Thus the position end the artist are the causes of health; the double and number, of the diapason; and always things which contain are thus related with respect to particulars. Causes also are predicated as accidents, and the genera of these. Thus, Polycletus is in one way the cause of the statue, and in another way the statuary, because it happens to the statuary to be Polycletus. Those things, likewise, which contain accident are called causes; as if man, or, in short, animal should be the cause of a statue. Of accidents, also, some are more remote and proximate than others; as if, for instance, something white and a musician should be said to be the cause of a statue. But, besides all these causes, and those which are denominated according to accident, some things are called causes from the power which they possess, and others from the energy which they exert. Thus the builder is the cause of the house being built, or the builder when building. The like also may be said in those things of which the causes are such as we have above enumerated. Thus, for instance, there is a cause of this particular statue, or of statue, or, in short, of image. There is also a cause of this brass, or of brass, or, in short, of matter; and in a similar manner with respect to accidents. These two and those are denominated connectedly; for instance, not Polycletus nor a statuary, but Polycletus the statuary. At the same time, however, all these are in multitude six; but they are predicated in a twofold respect: for they are predicated either as particulars, or as genus, or as subsisting according to accident, or as the genus of accident; and either as these connectedly, or simply considered. All these, too, subsist, either energizing, or according to capacity. They so far, however, differ, that the energizers of particulars at the same time exist and cease to be with the things of which they are the causes. Thus this man who heals is contemporary with him who is healed, and this builder with the building. But causes which are denominated according to capacity, do not always subsist together: for the house and the builder do not perish at one and the same time. It is, however, necessary always to investigate the supreme cause of everything, as in our investigations of other things. Thus, for instance, a man builds because he is a builder; but he is a builder according to the building art. This, therefore is the prior cause; and so in everything. Further, still, it is necessary to investigate the genera of genera; and particulars of particulars: as a statuary is the cause of a statue; but this statuary is the cause of this statue. We should also explore the capacities of capabilities, and the energizers of things affected by energy. How many causes, therefore, there are, and after what manner they are causes, let it be considered as sufficiently defined by us.
