The assertions of the natural philosophers may be referred to two modes; for, some of them making being to be one, viz. body, which is a subject, and this either one of the three elements or something else which is more dense than fire but more attenuated than air, generated the rest of things, making many things by density and rarity. But these are contraries, and universally they are excess and defect. Just as Plato says, they are the great and the small, except that he makes these to be matter, but the one to be form. But they make the one which is the subject to be matter and the contraries to be differences and forms. Others separate from the one, the contrariety which are inherent in it as Anaximander, and those who assert that beings are one and many, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras; for they separate from that which is mixed the rest of things. They differ, however, from each other because the one makes a circulation of these, but the other asserts that they subsisted once only. And the one says that they are infinite of similar parts and contraries, but the other that they are those things only which are called elements. But it seems that Anaxagoras thought they were thus infinite because he conceived that the common opinion of natural philosophers was true, that from nothing, nothing is produced. Hence, they say, “All things together were”, and “Generation is, in quality, a change.”. But others said the generation is concretion in separation. Further still, Anaxagoras was induced to this opinion from contraries being generated from each other, and hence he concluded that they were inherent in each other. For, if it is necessary that whatever is generated should either be generated from beings or from non-beings, and it is impossible that things should be generated from non-beings, for in this opinion all physiologists accord, they thought that what remains must necessarily happen, viz., that they must be generated from beings, and these such as are inherent, but that they were not perceived by us through the smallness of their bull. Hence, they say that everything is mingled in everything, because they saw that everything is generated from everything. But they assert that things appear different and are denominated different from each other from that which especially transcends through the multitude of infinites in the mixture, for they say that the whole is not genuinely white or black or sweet or flesh or bone. But that what each particular possesses in greater abundance than other things is the nature of that thing. If therefore the infinite, so far as infinite is unknown, that which is infinite according to multitude or magnitude is a certain unknown quantity, but that which is infinite according to form is a certain unknown quality. But if principles are infinite, both according to number and according to form, it is impossible that the things consisting from these should be known. For thus we apprehend that we know a composite when we know from what and from how many things it consists. Again, if it is necessary that when the part of a thing may be of an indefinite magnitude, that thing also should itself be indefinitely great or small. But I mean someone of such parts into which, being inherent in the whole, the whole itself is divided. And it is impossible for an animal or a plant to be of indefinite dimensions according to magnitude and parvitude. If this be the case, it is manifest that no one of the parts can be indefinitely great or small, for if it could, this must also be the case with the whole. But flesh and bone and things of this kind are parts of an animal, and fruits are parts of plants. It is evident, therefore, that it is impossible for flesh or bone or anything else to be indefinitely great or small. Besides, if all such things are inherent in each other and are not generated, but being inherent, are separated and are denominated from that which is more abundant. If also anything is generated from anything, as for instance, water from flesh by secretion and flesh from water. And if every finite body is consumed by a finite body, it is evident that everything cannot be inherent in everything, for flesh being taken from water, and again other flesh being generated from the remaining water by secretion, though that which is separated will be always less, yet at the same time, it will not surpass a certain magnitude in smallness. Hence, if the secretion should stop, everything would not be inherent in everything, for in the remaining water flash will not be inherent. But if it should not stop and there should be a perpetual ablation in a finite magnitude, there would be equal finites, infinite in multitude, which is impossible. To which we may add that if any body necessarily becomes less when something is taken from it, but the quantity of flesh is definite both in magnitude and parvitude, it is evident that from the smallest flash no body will be separated, for otherwise there would be a less than the least. Besides, in infinite bodies, infinite flesh would now be inherent, together with blood and brain, and these would be separated from each other, would no less have a subsistence, and each of them would be infinite. This, however, is absurd. But it is not sagaciously, though it is rightly asserted by Anaxagoras that one thing will never be entirely separated from another, for passions, i.e., accidents, are inseparable from substance. If, therefore, colors and habits are mingled, if they are separated, there will be something white or salubrious which will not be anything else, and which will not be predicated of a subject, so that intellect, by investigating things impossible, will act absurdly, if it wishes indeed to separate. It is impossible, however, for this to be done as well according to quantity as according to quality. It is not possible according to quantity because there is not a least magnitude, nor according to quality because accidents are inseparable. Nor does he rightly assume that generation consists from things which possess a similar form. For clay is partly distributed into clay, and partly not, nor are water and air produced from each other and generated in the same manner as tiles from a house and a house from tiles. But it is better to assume principals less in number and finite, as Empedocles makes them to be.
