It is likewise not difficult to solve the arguments from which they demonstrate. For both Melissus and Parmenides syllogize litigiously, since they assume that which is false and their arguments are not conclusive. The argument of Melissuss, however, is more troublesome and does not contain a doubt. But one absurdity being admitted, the rest happens as the consequence of this, a circumstance which it is not at all difficult to suppose. That Melissus therefore paralogizes is evident, for he fancies it should be assumed that if everything which is generated has a beginning, that which is not generated has not a beginning. In the next place, this also is absurd to fancy that there is a beginning of everything and not of time only, and that there is a beginning of generation not only of that which is simple, but also of change according to quality, as if there were no mutation produced collectively and at once. Besides, why is being immovable if it be one? For as a part being one, as for instance, this water is moved in the same place, why is not this also the case with the universe? And in the next place, why will there not be change according to quality? To which we may add, that neither is it possible to be one in species, except according to the material cause, for according to this mode some of the natural philosophers say that being is one, but not according to the other mode. For man is different in species from horse and contraries from each other.
Against Parmenides also there is the same mode of reasoning though there are certain arguments which are peculiar to him, partly because he assumes that which is false, and partly because his arguments are not conclusive. He assumes that which is false so far as he considers being to be simply predicated when at the same time it is predicated multifariously. And his arguments are inconclusive because if things which are white were alone assumed since that which is white signifies one thing, there would nevertheless be many white things, and not one alone. For that which is white will not be one alone, either by continuity or definition, since the essence of whiteness will be different from that of its recipient, and it will not follow that nothing will have a separate subsistence besides whiteness. For there is no difference so far as it is separate. But the essence of whiteness, and of that in which it subsists, are different. This, however Parmenidies had not yet seen. It is necessary, therefore, that those who assert that being is one should not only assume that being signifies one of which it is predicated, but also that it truly is and truly is one. For accident is predicated of a certain subject, so that if being is one accident, that to which being is an accident will not have any subsistence, since it is different from being. Hence there will be something which is not being. It is requisite, therefore, that Parmenides should assume that which is properly and essentially being, for accident will not have the essence of being unless being signifies many things, so that each may be some particular thing. But it is supposed that being signifies one thing. If therefore, that which is properly being is not an accident to anything, but something else is an accident to it, why should that which is properly and essentially being signify being rather than non-being? For, if that which is properly being is the same as that which is white, but the essence of white is not properly and essentially being. For it is not possible that anything can be an accident to it. If this be the case, since there is no being except that which is truly and properly being, that which is white will not be being. It will not, however be non-being as if it were some particular non-entity, but it will be entirely non-being. Hence that which is properly and essentially being is non-being. For the assertion is true that it is white, but this signifies non-being, so that if that which is white signifies being properly and essentially so-called being will signify many things. Hence, neither will being have any magnitude, since it is truly and essentially being for the being of each of the parts of magnitude is different. But that being properly so-called, may be divided into something else which is properly and essentially being is evident to reason. Thus, for instance, if man is something which is properly being, it is necessary that animal also and biped should each of them be essentially being. For if they are not truly beings, they will be accidents. They will either therefore be accidents to man or to some other subject. This, however, is impossible, for that is and is said to be an accident which may or may not be inherent or in the definition of which that is inherent to which it is an accident. Thus, for instance, to sit is an accident as that which may be separated. But in a flat nose, the definition of nose is inherent to which we say flatness is an accident. Further still, with respect to such things as are inherent in a definitive sentence, or from which a thing consists in the definition of these, the definition of the whole is not inherent. For instance, in biped, the definition of man is not inherent, nor in that which is white is the definition of a white man contained. If therefore these things subsist after this manner and biped also is an accident to man it is necessary that it should be separate so that it may happen that man may not be a biped, or in the definition of biped the definition of man will be inherent. This, however, is impossible, for the former is inherent in the definition of the latter. But if biped and animal are accidents to any other subject than man, and neither of them is a certain being, properly and essentially so-called man alo will be in the number of things accidental to something different from themselves. Let, however, that which is properly and essentially being be that which is not an accident to anything, and of which both and each of the essential parts and that which consists from these are predicated. The universe therefore consists from indivisibles. Some however have assented to both the assertions; to the one, because all things are one if being signifies one, since there is also non-being but to the other by making from bisection indivisible magnitudes. But it is evident that it is not true if being signifies one, and it is not possible for contradiction to be simultaneous, that there will be no such thing as non-being, for nothing hinderers, but that non-being, though it has not simply a subsistence yet, it may be a certain non-being. The assertion, therefore, that all things will be one if there is not anything else besides being itself is absurd. For who can understand being itself to be anything else than that which is properly and essentially some particular being? But if this be the case nothing prevents the subsistence of a multitude of beings in the manner we have mentioned, then it is impossible therefore for being to be thus one is manifest.
